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Series editor’s foreword
In 1984 the philosopher and bioethicist John Harris met the theologian 
Anthony Dyson, by chance on a train journey to a conference they were 
both attending in Aberdeen. Despite both working at the University of 
Manchester and both sharing an interest in exploring the moral issues that 
arise from healthcare and bioscience, they had never heard of each other, 
so the story goes, until that train journey to Scotland. This chance meeting 
was the beginning of not only an enduring friendship and academic col-
laboration between these two men, but also the first step towards the creation 
of the now famous Centre for Social Ethics and Policy (CSEP) which has 
been so influential in the area of bioethics, medical law and medical humani-
ties more generally. Together with the lawyer Margaret Brazier and clinician 
Mary Lobjoit, Harris and Dyson set up this Centre later that year to enable 
both this new academic alliance and a wider network of academics and 
students to pursue research and teaching in this area in an innovative 
interdisciplinary way.
My connection with this ground-breaking interdisciplinary Centre began 
in 1993 as a junior research fellow on a multidisciplinary, international 
research collaboration that involved participants from fourteen countries 
and eleven academic disciplines and so began my apprenticeship in this 
particular brand of bioethics, law and medical humanities with this amazing 
group of people and the networks they created. Simona Giordano, the 
editor of this edition and my co-editor in this book series, joined the Centre 
shortly afterwards as a research student. It is therefore a particular pleasure 
of mine to write the foreword for this edited edition that is so very much 
in the spirit of our Centre and the work that is done there.
This impressive edited volume is the third book in the series I co-edit 
with Simona Giordano entitled Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, Law 
and Medical Humanities. The first book in this series was an edited volume 
that celebrated the work of John Harris’s, From Reason to Practice in 
Bioethics. The second book was the new edition of the brilliant and ever 
popular Medicine, Patients and the Law by Margaret Brazier and Emma 
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Cave. As such we are proud that this series reflects the people, the academic 
rigor and interdisciplinary flavour that has been the essence of our Centre 
from those very early beginnings. Typical of the CSEP approach, this series 
not only highlights the work of those directly involved in the Centre but 
also the research networks that have grown from the work initiated by the 
Centre and its team including the many students and researchers and other 
collaborators who have been and remain a part of the CSEP family.
This edited volume The Freedom of Scientific Research: Bridging the 
Gap between Science and Society fits perfectly into this interdisciplinary 
approach to research into the important area of scientific research and 
innovation with contributions from an impressive range of disciplines 
including bioethics, philosophy, life sciences, history, law, social science 
and medicine. It is this kind of interdisciplinary and international collabora-
tion that has been so central to the success of bioethics and medical law 
across the decades and is one that we are proud to continue both as a 
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University of Manchester
Preface: the moral foundations of freedom 
of science1
John Harris
This volume of essays under the banner of ‘freedom of science’ constitutes 
a new direction for science ethics. One fundamental issue has been and 
remains defending the idea of the freedom of scientific inquiry and research 
from political, legal and social restraints. The reasons for maintaining this 
defence are many. Principal among these are the good that science does, 
the way it relates to fundamental elements of human nature and the hope 
it offers to humankind and the planet; more concerning all of these in a 
moment.
Separating the freedom of scientific inquiry and research from questions 
concerning the application of science – the progress of discovery, research 
and innovation through proof of principle to products in the clinic and the 
marketplace, is fraught with difficulty. For one thing these are often a 
continuous process and often unstoppable from the perspective of individual 
jurisdictions. For another, science has increasingly become ‘democratised’. 
In part this has been a deliberate choice with a movement from within 
science now becoming increasingly conspicuous. This movement calls itself 
‘citizen science’ (Vayena et al. 2016) and involves the encouragement of 
citizen participation in scientific activity essentially conceived and organised, 
not ground up by the citizens, but essentially top-down by professional 
scientists of one sort or another.
A more worrying version of citizen science however has also sprung up 
and involves the increasing ability of scientifically (often self-) educated 
citizens creating labs in their garage or kitchen to make a wide range of 
products free from regulation, or codes of ethics or even conceptions of 
good or even safe practice (Royal Society 2012; Scientific American 2017; 
Prepperzine 2017; Wikipedia 2017). This sort of citizen science, because it 
is often secret and always unregulated, gives opportunities for terrorists of 
all sorts, but particularly for bioterrorists to manufacture weapons formerly 
required professional expertise and often expensive and conspicuous facilities.
A rather different case, which also crucially engages freedom of science, 
involves research on human stem cells derived from embryos which is illegal 
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in some jurisdictions and permissible in others (Robertson 2001; EuroStemCell 
2008–17; National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). The result is 
work continues in the UK, for example, which is illegal elsewhere. Scientists 
move, relatively freely between jurisdictions. What we find is not power 
without responsibility but responsibility without power. Nations assume 
responsibility for activities within their borders but turn a blind eye to 
what their nationals do abroad. The extent to which this is to be celebrated 
of course varies with attitudes to the substantive ethical issues.
The idea that justice delayed is justice denied continues, rightly, to have 
currency. But just as justice delayed is justice denied, so therapy delayed 
is therapy denied, and because illness is confining and health liberating, 
freedom reappears as inextricably allied to science and medicine. Likewise, 
‘scientific freedom’, freedom to do and publish scientific research, is also 
often advocated as a basic right (Edsall 1975; Giordano et al. 2012). One 
reason, to have, not faith in science (heaven forbid!), but to put cautious 
trust in science, is that science has indeed proved to be ‘magic that works’. 
It is the fact that science works, and snake oil does not, that, above all, 
makes science trustworthy.2
Equally fruitless of course is the concentration on protection against real 
and present dangers, while neglecting preparedness for future threats. 
Preparedness for the future calls for science and technology and for the 
habits of mind, free inquiry, reliance on evidence and argument, and above 
all intellectual honesty, which characterise science broadly conceived.
It is important to remind ourselves of the moral nature of science, 
threatened, today more than ever, by a culture of reckless deceit, shameless 
denial of history, and of evidence, and the profligate (Garver 2015; Berrien 
2016;3 Abramson 2017) invention and repetition of more convenient ‘alterna-
tive facts’. The dishonesty and untruths perpetrated by the culture of 
alternative facts are polluting every aspect of those freedoms that are worth 
fighting for.4 I have been preoccupied with the moral character of science 
for a very long time (here’s why: Harris 1985: especially chs 3, 5 and 6; 
Harris and Sulston 2004; Harris 2005; Chan and Harris 2009; Chan et 
al. 2010; Harris 2013).
We all benefit from living in a society, and, indeed, in a world in which 
science is respected and in which science flourishes. Science and the discovery 
and innovation it generates, resulting in products in the clinic and the 
marketplace, no less than the objectivity, rigorous analysis, evidence and 
respect for truth it promotes, is in the interests of us all (see for example 
Harris 1997; 2005; Zee et al. 2010).
The other imperative for science (and for philosophy)
While there are powerful moral reasons for doing science and philosophy, 
these activities are not necessarily pursued solely (or even principally) for 
moral, or even for prudential reasons, powerful as these are. There is a 
simpler, but perhaps even more powerful, imperative at work (Harris 2018).
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We humans are curious birds; we like to understand stuff.5 We like to 
know why, to know what and to know how and to know whether. We like 
to know how things work, and what they are for, or what they are good 
for. We also like to know why things happen and the probability of their 
occurrence. This includes the question of why we exist at all. We spend a 
lot of time on such things, and we do so, not because it is good for us, or 
because either the questioning process, or the answers, conduce to our 
welfare or well-being or make us happy, or protect our vital rights or 
interests or confer evolutionary advantage (although they may). We do so 
because that’s the sorts of creatures we are: curious birds who like to ask 
and answer questions.
True, there are myriad ‘rewards’ for education, science and curiosity, the 
reason we pursue these, however, if one were needed, is in our will,6 our 
free will – it’s what we choose to do and how we choose to live. But if the 
exercise of our curiosity is not honest and evidence based, then the exercise 
of our will is thwarted, we simply won’t find out the why, what, how or 
whether . . . to questions we ask. We may get ‘answers’ but they won’t be 
informative, they will simply deliver lies, fantasies or ‘alternative facts’.
As Thomasine Kushner and James Giordano (2017) have argued recently:
It is important to recognize that sound ethical analysis begins with and proceeds 
from facts. Facts of the context, circumstance, agents, implements, and actions 
involved. These facts should not be ‘alternative’, they need to be real. But this 
is an age of increasing misinformation.
We have been talking about the sorts of creatures we are. But ‘we’ may be 
on the verge of creating new unprecedented creatures, not only with powers 
and capacities comparable to ours, but maybe enhanced beyond those that 
humans have yet attained, or even beyond those which creatures constituted 
as we are, with our evolutionary history and maybe also constructed as 
we are – flesh and blood creatures – can attain. ‘We’ may soon include 
both machines and hybrids. But the success of such creations will depend 
vitally on the nature of the creatures we create and how that nature can 
develop and relate to or coexist with our own.
If we create beings as smart, or smarter, than us, how can we limit their 
power to act detrimentally towards us, perhaps deliberately to destroy us, 
or simply to act in ways that will have this result? Martin Rees (2003) has 
observed that there may be scientific facts that will never be discovered by 
beings with brains that have evolved in the way that human brains have 
so far developed, and scientific theories creatures with our evolutionary 
history are incapable of postulating. One reason for creating AI persons 
might then be to solve problems we humans cannot address or even imagine.
How can we ensure that such creatures, if we bring them into being, 
will act for the best? Some have thought that this problem can be solved 
by programming them (or us) to obey some version of Isaac Asimov’s so-
called ‘laws’ of robotics, particularly the first law: ‘a robot may not injure 
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a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to  come to 
harm’. The problem of course is how the robot would be able to obey such 
a law when ethical dilemmas often involve choosing between greater or 
lesser harms or evils rather than avoiding harm altogether; or by allowing 
or causing some to come to grief for the sake of saving others. How would 
they be able to keep their eyes on the protective prize?
The question of how to combine the capacity for good, with the freedom 
to choose is probably one of the things Stephen Hawking had in mind when 
he told the BBC in 2014 that ‘the primitive forms of artificial intelligence 
we already have, have proved very useful. But I think the development of 
full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race’ (Cellan-Jones 
2016). How might AI persons, who could determine their own destiny, as 
we humans do, be persuaded to choose modes of flourishing compatible 
with those of humans? Of course we currently have these problems with 
respect to one another; but at least we have not as yet shackled our capacity 
to cope with these by creating AI persons which may be ‘programmed’ in 
ways that selectively preclude acting on the basis of genuine choices informed 
by evidence and argument (Harris 2011; Harris 2014; Palacios-González 
and Harris 2014).
As we emerge into a post-truth fantasy world, a Trumped-up world of 
lies and ‘alternative facts’ this problem becomes acute. In such a world how 
can there be genuine choices informed by evidence and argument? This 
post-truth world raises very real questions about the possibility of our 
long-term survival, either as the sorts of rational moral beings evolution 
has painstakingly made us, or indeed as beings of any description at all.
Initial scientific predictions on the survival of our planet suggested we 
might have 7.6 billion years to go before the earth gives up on us. These 
were Steven Hawking’s calculations, but recently Hawking revised his 
prognosis: ‘I don’t think we will survive another thousand years without 
escaping beyond our fragile planet’ (Cellan-Jones 2016). And Martin Rees 
(2003) has speculated that this might be our ‘final century’.
In view of threats like these, we need to make ourselves, humankind, 
smarter, more resilient and more aware that honesty, truth and objectivity 
are not optional and dispensable extras. And we may need to call AI persons 
in aid to achieve this if we are to be able to find another planet on which 
to live when this one is tired of us, or even perhaps develop the technology 
eventually to construct another planet. To do so we will have to change, 
but not, we may hope, in ways that risk our freedom, our capacities to 
choose both how to live and the sorts of lives we wish to lead; and also by 
making sure we avoid the creation of machines who might choose to be 
our masters.7
These are some of the ethical challenges that are created by science and 
our freedom (indeed our fate) to pursue truth, facts and evidence by, inter 
alia, various sorts of scientific method. This pursuit has become more urgent 
in view of increasing awareness of the dangers that threaten humanity and 
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indeed our fragile planet and because of the increasingly parochial decisions 
made recently in many democracies across the world.
A book like this is thus particularly important at this point in history. 
Its multidisciplinary contents represents its greatest strength; contributors 
from several disciplines discuss various areas of scientific research, make 
it accessible to the non-specialised audience but also engage with the broader 
question of how regulation can promote and hinder a progress of science 
that can yield significant benefits for ourselves, the future generations and 
possibly other animals too, indeed providing the human species with a 
concrete hope for survival. But the other important aspect of this book is 
how it came to exist. Many of the contributors to this volume have been 
engaged in an ongoing forum for over a decade now, participating over the 
years in a regular arena of debate, update and discussion, and this book 
brings some of these discussions, with different spirit, tone and aims, to a 
broader audience, in this way concretely bridging the gap between science 
and society.
Notes
1 I outlined this imperative, inter alia, in Harris (2007: ch. 11) on which I draw 
here. Also, I freely acknowledge and deploy arguments developed in Harris 
(2018).
2 Other reasons are its openness, its publication of results for further scrutiny, its 
rigorous peer-review process, and the fact that good science can only be pursued 
in free societies. I do not of course have room here to justify these claims.
3 There are many more apparent examples of Trump’s alternative facts listed at 
the sites (listed in the references), but I should warn fellow scientists that I have 
not myself personally checked any of these, either for accuracy or coherence.
4 I am grateful to Tomi Kushner for a stimulating correspondence on the subject 
of alternative facts.
5 For a recent ‘take’ on curiosity, see Kahan et al. (2017). See Harford (2017) for 
a fascinating account both of the mechanisms and history of alternative facts, 
but also of the importance of human curiosity as an antidote.
6 Julius Caesar, in Shakespeare’s play of that name, justifies his decision (which 
he later reverses) not to attend the Senate on the Ides of March thus: ‘The cause 
is in my will: I will not come’ (Act II, Scene ii). 
7 In the following paragraphs I draw on work published with my colleagues in 
Lawrence et al. (2016).
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Part I
Freedom of science: promises 
and hazards

Introduction to Part I
Simona Giordano
The weight, value and transformative effect of scientific research are greater 
now than they have ever been. The nature of the moral scepticism that 
underpinned much late twentieth-century liberalism now bows to a scientific 
culture, where scientific method and the reliability of peer-reviewed results 
bear directly on our ethical norms, our national and supranational laws, 
and on social activities as diverse as farming, medicine, insurance and city 
planning. Science has thus changed the world, and has changed, as some 
of the authors discuss in this collection, even our cognitive and moral 
abilities.
The idea of writing this book was formed a long time ago, in April 2014, 
after the Third World Congress on Freedom of Scientific Research, held in 
Rome and organised and sponsored by the Luca Coscioni Association. The 
editor of this collection, John Harris and Lucio Piccirillo have collaborated 
with the Luca Coscioni Association and participated in the conference, 
either as speakers or organisers. But the origins of this book are even older.
The World Congress on Freedom of Scientific Research is an international 
ongoing forum, which was formed in 2006 in response to concerns in the 
international scientific community that scientific freedom might be hindered 
by ideologies that do not stand up to moral or rational scrutiny. In the 
early 2000s, part of the international scientific and bioethics community 
was responding with profound concern to innovations in embryological 
science; the European Union decided to take time to think about the matter, 
and first imposed a moratorium, and then a series of limits to the funding 
of scientific research involving human embryos. A heated debate followed 
regarding the likely repercussion upon the development of regenerative 
medicine.
Marco Cappato, in Part II of this volume (Chapter 12), discusses the 
international reaction to ‘human cloning’ (more properly, cell nuclear transfer) 
following the announcement of the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997. In 
response to the virtually unanimous ban on ‘human cloning’, and on the 
restrictions imposed all over the world upon stem cell research and, 
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consequently, upon regenerative medicine, the United States Coalition for 
the Advancement of Medical Research, the Genetics Policy Institute, together 
with several Nobel Laureates and a number of representatives of patients’ 
associations, scientists and politicians, including Members of the European 
Parliament, united in The World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research.
This book makes the results of this intellectual enterprise available to 
the international academic community and to the general reader, bridging 
the gap between communities that often work in isolation from one another: 
the scientific community, the political community and the academic com-
munity. But we aim at making the discourse on the politics of science 
available and accessible to the general public, attempting to explain how 
decisions that affect us all are taken, and thus how science and politics 
function in contemporary society, and perhaps how they could and should 
function.
This book includes contributions by some of those who participated in 
the last Congress, as well as contributions by others who joined later. 
Obviously, the original papers have substantially changed, because a lot 
has happened since 2014. The focus of this collection is on the relationship 
between science and society, and its mediation through law, ethics and 
social, political and economic norms. The authors have the most diverse 
backgrounds, and therefore their style is diverse, and this comes across 
clearly; some of the contributors are scientists, others are philosophers, 
others are politicians or humanitarian activists; their nationalities are also 
different – some are European, some are not. So the way they convey their 
message and their writing style differ significantly, and it is hoped that this 
diversity will contribute to make this collection valuable and original. This 
book takes a multidisciplinary approach to the problems of scientific freedom. 
The methodologies used will therefore be those of discursive research in 
sciences, politics, law, philosophy and economics.
The notion of freedom is central to this book. This notion has evolved 
historically and has been debated widely over the history of Western thought 
(Arendt 1993). Depending on the context we may talk of ‘freedom of the 
will’, ‘legal freedom’, ‘economic freedom’, ‘religious freedom’ and so on. It 
may be possible, however, to distinguish or identify four broad meanings 
of the term ‘freedom’: metaphysical freedom, negative freedom, positive 
freedom and civil and political freedom (or freedoms). This distinction is 
approximate, but it may be useful to identify the uses and meanings that 
tend to recur most often in the volume.
In the first sense (which I called metaphysical freedom), freedom refers 
to the ability of humans to act according to their own will (Mele 1995). 
This sense of freedom appears relatively recently in the history of Western 
thought. In Greek mythology and in a large part of ancient Greek philosophy 
humans are not ‘free’ in the way we would consider ourselves free today. 
In ordinary language, to say that I am free may mean, for example, that I 
am not enslaved, or very simply that I have the ability to choose, say, to 
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eat pasta or chilli con carne, or to go for a walk or watch a film. For many 
Greek philosophers, this freedom is an illusion. It is ‘fate’ that determines 
our choices and actions. Even the gods are subject to fate. Gods and humans 
may have the sensation of being free to choose, but their life, death and 
destiny are predetermined. Thomas Hobbes observed that the notion of 
freedom for most Greek philosophers was a feature of the state (the polis), 
and was not a feature of individuals (Hobbes 1651: X, 8). For the Stoics, 
for Heraclitus and Parmenides, men were free insofar as they were able to 
accept their own destiny (Palmer 2013). A person is like a dog tied to his 
chain: he can freely run around, and enjoy his freedom, but only insofar 
as he stays within the length of his chain.
The first known discussions of freedom as we may intend it today, as 
free will and self-government, are found in the Sophists, and a precursor 
of this understanding of freedom can also be found in Plotinus, one of the 
most prominent scholars of Plato, who became a famous philosopher in 
Rome in his later years. The ideas of free will and moral responsibilities 
that he contributed to shape were later elaborated and became central to 
Christian theology. Most of the Western philosophers we know of – Leibniz, 
Voltaire, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, Condillac, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, 
Marx, Jaspers, Sartre, to mention just a few – have developed theories of 
human freedom, intended as our ability to act according to our will, or 
our intellect, or our reason.
Although the other three meanings of ‘freedom’ will be more relevant 
to the contributions in this book, it should be noted that science is relevant 
to the understanding of freedom in the metaphysical sense. Neuroethics, 
for example, attempts to evaluate whether individuals form genuinely 
autonomous decisions, and thus also whether they should be held responsible 
for their choices and actions. The relevance of this to a number of contexts 
is remarkable: think of criminal liability. If people are not free in the relevant 
sense, how can they be held accountable and punished for their actions? 
Think of informed consent. Are there factors that render our choices non-
autonomous? Some religious and cultural influences are regarded as rendering 
people non-autonomous, and thus as invalidating consent; this is why in 
the UK for example the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 prohibits 
excisions of labia majora, minora and clitoris for non-medical reasons, even 
if requested by adult consenting women. Yet in other cases religious beliefs 
are not regarded as invalidating people’s autonomy and their ability to give 
or withdraw consent to medical procedures – and this is why Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are allowed, in England and in many other countries, to refuse 
whole blood products, even if they will die as a result of their refusal.
There is another way in which this metaphysical sense of freedom features 
in this collection. As Corbellini and Sirgiovanni discuss (Chapter 13), science 
has an impact on our freedom, intended in this first metaphysical sense. 
The authors argue that the wider accessibility of scientific education has 
enhanced people’s ability to evaluate facts, to reason around them, to make 
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hypotheses, to think abstractly, to think critically and rigorously. These 
abilities can ‘free’ individuals from the grip of superstition or from the 
malice of deceit, as they allow us to reflect critically on what is in front of 
us, and to question what is said or offered to us. These abilities thus enhance 
our freedom and moral responsibility, even if we accept that our choices, 
actions and even preferences are largely determined by factors beyond our 
control (environment, genes, culture and so on).
Science enables us to know many things about ourselves. This raises 
other questions around freedom in this metaphysical sense, which are both 
theoretical and practical, and which are relevant to a number of domains, 
such as medical ethics, science ethics and even law. Once the information 
about us, that is precisely about you and about me, is available to you and 
to me, can we still be free if we refuse to receive it? For example, the 
sequencing of our whole genome is now possible, and through genetic tests 
it is possible to evaluate our susceptibility to develop certain diseases, or 
in rarer cases to establish the presence of genetic mutations that will lead 
to the development of certain diseases. Can we still be free, in this first 
sense, if, having this information made available for us, we decided to 
remain in ignorance? More broadly, what does it take to be free, in this 
first metaphysical sense? How much knowledge to we need to have about 
ourselves, how much does ‘science’ need to disclose about us, for us to be 
free?
These questions have engaged and divided bioethicists for over a decade 
now. Harris and Keywood argued that we cannot be free and we cannot 
make autonomous decisions unless we accept available knowledge about 
ourselves. Not only can we not be free unless we possess the available 
information: because without this knowledge we cannot be free, we cannot 
even freely refuse to obtain that information (Harris and Keywood 2001). 
Takala and Bortolotti objected that Harris and Keywood misinterpreted 
here the notion of freedom and autonomy. We can decide not to be told 
whether we carry a genetic mutation that may or will cause us to develop 
an illness later in life, and we can still live our life freely (Takala 2001; 
Bortolotti 2013).
When we apply these considerations to our relationships with children, 
dilemmas become perhaps even more acute. There has been a debate in the 
UK as to whether parents who have genetic disorders such as Huntington’s 
chorea (a non-treatable and non-preventable disorder that appears in adult-
hood, and that is caused by a genetic mutation) could test their children 
for the disease. The UK Genetic Alliance’s recommendation is that children 
should not be tested for these disorders, because this knowledge violates 
children’s right to an open future. This notion of an ‘open future’ appears 
conceptually akin to the notion of freedom in the first metaphysical sense. 
The UK Genetic Alliance’s position is that, as the conditions in questions 
are not treatable or preventable, knowing about them only limits children’s 
right to an open future (and thus their freedom) (Genetic Alliance 2016). 
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But, conversely, it could be argued that without that knowledge, freedom 
is actually taken away from the child. If I have this information about my 
life as a child, this might allow me to shape my plans and my priorities; I 
may decide to give precedence to what I can realistically achieve in the time 
I have at my disposal and avoid long-term plans, for example. Likewise, 
parents may find that without knowledge there is no open future for their 
children, only a bet at best, and an inauthentic life based on false hopes 
at worst. Ignorance may shadow, rather than promote, an ‘open future’, 
or our freedom.
The second distinction mentioned earlier, between positive and negative 
freedom, is usually associated with Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1982), although John 
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau had already discussed these concepts. Berlin 
identified two ways in which the notion of freedom can be understood. One 
is ‘negative’: here freedom is freedom from (from interference or limitations). 
If I say, for example, that I am free to marry a person of my choosing, 
and that nobody should interfere with my choice, I refer to freedom in its 
negative sense. I am free, and should be free from unnecessary or unjusti-
fied external limitations. This sense of freedom echoes John Stuart Mill’s 
notion of liberty: individuals are sovereign over their bodies and their life, 
and the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over a 
member of a civilised society against his will is to prevent harm to others 
(Mill 1859). Modern liberalism is largely based on this view of freedom; 
individuals can enjoy large spheres of self-government in their private life, 
insofar as they do not limit the equal freedom of others or do not hurt 
others.
Positive freedom, instead, is freedom to: this freedom usually requires 
that others provide to me with something so that I can exercise my freedom. 
If I have a freedom to, say, education, this entails that someone else has a 
duty to provide me with something so that I can exercise my right (e.g. 
that the state provides schools). This second sense of freedom echoes discourse 
of rights: right to education, for example, to work, to life and health.
Positive and negative freedoms are interrelated in many ways. For me to 
enjoy freedom in the negative sense, it is usually not sufficient that others 
do not interfere with my choices and actions. Usually it is also necessary 
that others provide certain things to me. To give an example, suppose that 
I choose to terminate a pregnancy, and that I live in a country in which 
this is legally permitted. Negative freedom means that others cannot ethically 
seize me and force me to keep the baby; they can try to persuade me, to 
convince me, but they cannot physically interfere with me to prevent me 
from acting in the way I choose. But in order for me to exercise my freedom, 
it is not sufficient that others do not interfere with me directly: it is also 
necessary that the healthcare system provides accessible services. If, say, in 
rural areas abortion clinics are not available, and women do not have the 
resources to access available centres, then women are not free, even if their 
negative freedom is respected.
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This is important to the purposes of this collection. If individuals have 
a right to life and to health, as protected and defended in virtually all 
declarations and conventions of human rights, this means of course that 
they ought not to be deprived of their life (unless perhaps they so wish – as 
in cases of assisted suicide or euthanasia); and of course it means that they 
should not be exposed to preventable harm, diseases and illnesses (they 
should not be deliberately infected with transmissible diseases, for example, 
and they should not be physically assaulted or harmed). This is why many 
liberal states recognise forms of liability for murder and physical assault, 
but also for accidents recklessly caused to others. This is also why many 
liberal states adopt routine or compulsory vaccination programmes, and 
why in many liberal states healthcare services are made available to all 
citizens. The provision of these services may cause some restrictions of other 
freedoms we may also enjoy: for example, the provision of publicly funded 
health services causes people to pay taxes, and thus limits their freedom 
to dispose of all their earnings. Some restrictions are usually regarded 
as proportionate and justified, because of the good that they protect and 
promote. Your right to life is more important than my claim to be able to 
drink and drive. It could be argued that if this is true, then limiting the 
ability of scientists to pursue research into certain areas of medical science 
is limiting the right to life and to physical integrity of those who would 
benefit from this research. This is an argument that the reader will find in 
this volume (see, for example, Chapters 11–12). It makes no sense to speak 
of negative freedom unless certain barriers that can limit the enjoyment 
of that freedom are removed. Thus, one could argue that if, for example, 
stem cell research offers the prospect of treatment for spinal cord injuries, 
there is little point in saying to a person who is paraplegic that she has a 
right to non-interference, if the parliament of her country prohibits stem 
cell research, or if funding for that research is not made available. To say 
this, it could be argued, is similar to saying to her that we respect her 
negative freedom to non-interference, but then we do not provide her with 
a wheelchair. It could be argued that if it is cruel to say to this person that 
she can rightfully exercise her freedom from interferences while at the same 
time denying her the available wheelchair, it is similarly cruel to prevent 
scientific research that is likely to lead to the discovery of treatment for 
her condition.
Thus, it becomes clear that what it takes to respect people’s negative 
freedom relates very closely to what should be provided for them so that 
they can actually exercise their freedom. And it is here that complexities 
arise in the context of freedom of scientific research; in this context the 
values, priorities and demands are multiple and diverse; how these should 
be balanced and ranked, and how our most fundamental freedoms should 
be protected, in order for them not to be mere unfulfilled words, is central 
to this collection.
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In the fourth sense, freedom can be intended as civil and political (in 
this sense it is more appropriate to talk about freedoms). In this sense we 
refer to freedom from oppression, freedom from coercion, freedom of 
association, of speech, of movement, of the press; civil and political freedoms 
are those that many of us relate to as what citizens of liberal democracies 
enjoy, as opposed to the limitations that characterise totalitarian regimes.
Civil and political freedoms are those that a state cannot legitimately 
restrict without good reason. Most contemporary states have documents 
(in the form of a constitution or bill of rights) which state what the basic 
civil and political freedoms of citizens are. There are also supranational 
documents, which have similar content, and which can be ratified by 
individual states, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; these will be 
discussed in various chapters in this collection.
Although this book is not primarily a book of political philosophy, it is 
still a book about freedom; in particular, the notions of negative and positive 
freedom and civil and political freedoms will recur in the works presented 
here. The notion of metaphysical freedom will probably be less prominent. 
Freedom of scientific research can be understood as negative freedom 
(questions here concern the degree of freedom from interference that scientists 
should enjoy) and as positive freedom (questions here concern the infra-
structures and legislative frameworks that should be provided in order for 
science to operate). Scientific freedom can also be understood as a particular 
type of civil and political freedom, or as an enterprise that has direct impact 
upon people’s civil and political freedoms.
The support and limits that should be given to science require constant 
evaluation: priorities need to be set, scarce resources need to be allocated, 
competing principles and faiths need to be accommodated, obligations and 
responsibilities need to be distributed among societies’ members. Questions 
about freedom of scientific research are also questions about how free 
science truly is or can be (Vattimo and Cavalli Sforza 2006). Science is an 
enterprise, and as such it is directed (at least to an extent) by the political 
agenda, which, in turn, also determines how funding is allocated. Even in 
liberal democracies, where parliaments and governments are democratically 
elected, political agendas do not always reflect the priorities of the people; 
but of course it may be debatable whether or not it is the priorities of the 
people, even of the majority of the population, that should steer political 
agendas and scientific research.
The ethical properties of science are inherently subject to controversy 
and debate. As we will see in this volume, some areas of biomedical science 
are by some considered outright wrong. But on the other hand, other areas 
of research that may appear morally neutral can still be used for morally 
dubious purposes (see Chapter 6 on bioterrorism in this volume). Other 
areas of science and technology may be seen as morally neutral, but may 
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be expensive and may not promise immediate ‘returns’. Questions may thus 
be asked about whether it is ethical to invest in these areas of science, in 
a context of limited resources.
This book will not offer a coherent or conclusive notion of freedom. It 
rather wants to promote a space for cultural exchange – on paper of course, 
just with a book – and critical reflection on issues that concern scientific 
research, its boundaries and who should be setting those boundaries. This 
collection tries not to be skewed in one direction, but we recognise that a 
liberal, progressive spirit has moved the World Congress and thus also 
inspires this book. However, we don’t wish to indoctrinate the reader – we 
believe that within the spirit or culture that has inspired this collection it 
is possible to reason about the advantages and disadvantages of certain 
scientific developments and about certain regulatory mechanisms. We 
recognise that we are probably all somehow ‘indoctrinated’, whether or 
not we are willing to admit it. But our aim is to promote a debate, which 
of course moves from a certain perspective, and which sometimes proposes 
a certain point of view, but which wants to remain informed and responsible. 
With this in mind, we have decided not to attempt to level either the style 
or the voice of different contributors, because we wanted this collection to 
reflect the pluralism that inspires the enterprise of the World Congress of 
Scientific Freedom. Our aim is to provide and show the value of different 
intellectual and practical endeavours, and not to yield a unified message 
to the reader.
Part I of this collection discusses some of the ways in which science is 
changing the world. The first two chapters discuss the impact of science 
(particularly immunology) on human life. Sir Peter Lachmann (in Chapter 
1) provides a fascinating overview of the milestones in the immunological 
sciences and the effect these have had on the duration and the quality of 
human life. Overall, humankind has lived longer and better since at least 
the 1900s. But ‘all that glitters is not gold’, wrote Shakespeare in The 
Merchant of Venice. And Lachmann concludes by unveiling the other side 
of the coin: the growth of world population is simply unsustainable. CO2 
emissions and indiscriminate use of scarce resources are likely to put 
humankind at new risks of global deaths and even extinction. Life extension 
and overall population growth call humans to new levels of responsibility 
towards the environment and towards each other. These new and more 
demanding levels of responsibility are the price we need to pay for our 
longer and healthier lives, and they are the only way to ensure that what 
is a blessing to many does not become a curse for the generations to come.
My contribution (Chapter 2) continues the discussion on the curses and 
blessings of scientific progress. I take a different angle, though, and consider 
the challenges that life extension presents for humankind, particularly in 
middle- and high-income countries. I consider philosophical and metaphysical 
concerns around life extension: some thinkers see death, the inevitable 
death of humans by ageing (not just their inevitable vulnerability to accidents 
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and illnesses), as an inherent feature of humans. The ever-growing ability 
to delay death, to slow or even reverse the process of ageing, and the 
possibility of replacing ‘old’ body parts with younger ones, and even animal 
or artificial ones, for some changes the very essence of what it is to be 
human. Some find this trajectory repugnant, unnatural. I propose that life 
extension is not changing the nature of humans – and this is so for the 
simple reason that it is unclear what this inherent universal and eternal 
essence of humans is supposed to be; on the contrary, the ability to extend 
life, or postpone death, are to be celebrated as one of the greatest triumphs 
of humankind. In practical terms, this means that the growing presence of 
older people in our societies is also to be honoured.
Similarly to Lachmann, I highlight that social changes are, however, 
necessary to make population ageing sustainable. These changes include 
the modification of working patterns, retirement age, city planning and 
much more. There are also changes in individual lifestyles that need to be 
responsibly implemented in order to make the most of a long life, and to 
prevent what is a triumph from becoming the worst of all nightmares for 
ourselves and those who will come after us. The danger, here, is becoming 
prey to the old argument that wanted to make people ‘responsible’ for 
their own ill health, and thus placed people higher or lower on the scale of 
healthcare rationing depending on ‘how well’ they had led their life. The 
focus, and the responsibility for sustainable population growth, should not 
exclusively fall upon individuals. There are shared responsibilities, which 
are social and political, which need to tie in with personal responsibilities.
Science thus changes population structures, demographics, the planet 
and human life as a whole. But it also changes intimate and private aspects 
of our lives. Daniela Cutas and Anna Smajdor (Chapter 3) explore some 
of these transformations in what for centuries have been regarded as natural 
and thus immutable relationships, namely the relationships between parents 
and children. In particular, developments in reproductive technologies have 
created new types of connections between parents and children. Social or 
legal parenting and genetic parenting have never necessarily coincided, as 
exemplified by cases of adoption or, traditionally, by cases in which children 
are raised by, say, grandparents or other members of the extended family. 
But reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilisation, allow a woman 
to give birth to a child who is not genetically her own, or to a child who 
bears genetic material from both herself and another woman (via, for 
example, mitochondrial DNA transfer). A man can become at the same 
time a mother and a father (as in the case of the transman who has oocytes 
harvested prior to transition, or as in the case of the transman who does 
not seek genital confirmation surgery and thus retains the uterus and ovaries 
– biologically these people are mothers to their children, but socially and 
legally they are fathers; or as in the case of people who transition to the 
other gender after having had children – in these cases they will be biological 
fathers and social mothers, or vice versa). Women are now able to bear 
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children way past the age of fertility. Perhaps, in the future, a woman will 
be able to give birth to a child who is genetically only her own (via solo 
reproduction with in vitro-created gametes or human cloning). Gamete 
donation and surrogacy bring about legislative challenges that many legis-
latures are still trying to sort out. Some people will find these new possibilities 
marvellous and amazing; some will find them disturbing. Cutas and Smajdor 
point out that the changes of the last decades are harder and harder to 
reconcile with the still pervasive nuclear family expectations in ethics and 
regulation. They show how many legislatures across the world still regulate 
medical care, by limiting access to it, on the basis of an ideology according 
to which a nuclear family, constituted by a man and a woman, possibly 
married, conceive children who are genetically related to them. The diver-
sification of genetic parentage itself (alongside a host of other sociocultural 
changes) pushes the model further into what some may see as the crisis of 
the family.
There is a question to be asked here, namely whether this ‘genetic jealousy’ 
has anything to do with the atavistic tendency to tenaciously preserve 
economic assets within family lineages. It is a question that Cutas and 
Smajdor do not openly address, and one for which it would be difficult to 
provide a substantiated answer, but it is a doubt that arises from reading 
their informative chapter. There is another interesting aspect of the regulation 
that Cutas and Smajdor highlight: norms and assumptions concerning the 
structure of the family constrain the direction of scientific progress in the 
area of human reproduction. It is one’s family status that determines whether 
one’s reproductive aspirations are classified as medical needs and thus eligible 
for treatment, or, put differently, as just personal preferences or desires. 
In turn, needs (deemed eligible for medical treatment) form the basis of 
future research priorities. Desires do not give impetus to research priorities 
in the same way. The chapter challenges our assumptions relating to the 
boundaries of human reproduction, and calls for adjustments in ethics and 
law to make space for more realistic perimeters of human parenting, and 
thus for greater freedom of scientific research in the area.
In Chapter 4, Selvaggi and Aas consider another development of scientific 
research and technology, which raises again a number of issues relating to 
reproductive ethics, as well as to the ethics of scientific freedom. They focus 
particularly on recent developments in uterus and penis transplantations. 
They point out that these types of transplantations, unlike other types, are 
not primarily meant to save or lengthen the patient’s life, but to improve 
their quality of life by increasing reproductive and sexual function. Also 
for this reason, they raise questions relating to the ethics of surgical research, 
when innovative treatment may enhance patients’ quality of life if successful, 
but also expose patients to high risks, including risks of immunological 
rejection and even death. They go further though; so far, both penis and 
uterus transplantations have only been performed on cisgender people, that 
is, people whose gender is congruent with their birth sex. For example, 
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penis transplantations have been attempted on men who have lost their 
penises due to illness or accidents; uterus transplantations have been per-
formed on women with health problems, who could not bear children. 
These techniques, however, are in principle viable options for transgender 
men, that is, women who transition to a male gender, and could represent 
an alternative to penis reconstruction, which is often unsatisfactory to 
patients. Uterus transplantations could be utilised to allow transgender 
women, that is, men who transition to female, to bear children. If these 
forms of surgery had to be utilised in this population of patients, further 
challenges, in addition to those highlighted by Cutas and Smajdor, would 
arise for the law and social policy around who has ethically legitimate 
claims to reproduce. But Selvaggi and Aas also point out other issues: how 
are benefits and risks to be judged? And who should make the judgement? 
Also, importantly, whose organs should be used? In the case of penis 
transplantations, cadaver organs are normally used – would it be possible 
to have live donations from transgender women? They discuss the surgical 
and ethical issues that would need to be addressed in order to answer this 
question. Finally, they pose a broader question. These are expensive and 
non-life-saving procedures. Is this a good use of scientific effort?
Another relatively novel development in reproduction is mitochondrial 
DNA replacement. The issue was in the spotlight in 2015 and 2016 around 
the world. Iain Brassington explores the ethical issues around this technique 
in Chapter 5. He explains the technique and its therapeutic goals. Although 
these are now widely known, there is an interesting aspect of mitochondrial 
DNA replacement that Brassington examines: namely the relationship between 
this technique and the broader issue about the ethics of freedom of scientific 
research. Mitochondrial DNA replacement is in effect a germline modification: 
an alteration that will be passed down the generations. Hence its promise 
is potentially double-edged: it may improve future lives significantly over 
the run of several generations; but if it turns out to have undesirable sequelae, 
it might cause several generations of harm. This raises questions about the 
freedom to pursue potentially harmful techniques – not just in relation to 
this particular case, but across the board. Moreover, some worry that the 
human genome, or nature, has a value that will be undermined by interfer-
ences such as this. But scientific freedom is also valuable. Can we measure 
one against the other? Finally, what about the freedom not to investigate? 
In a world where the scientific community chose not to pursue such innova-
tions, would that be a proper use of scientific freedom? Brassington argues 
that scientific freedom includes the freedom not to pursue research; in this, 
he represents a somewhat dissenting voice in the volume. Most of the 
contributors stress the importance and value of scientific research, in various 
areas and aspects (Piccirillo considers physics, Mertes and Woolley make 
quite a strong appeal to ethics in justification of freedom of science, par-
ticularly in the field of regenerative medicine; see Chapters 8, 11 and 15, 
respectively).
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Although Brassington notes that there are no particular reasons to be 
concerned about certain types of germline modifications, such as those 
brought about by mitochondrial replacements, there is no moral obligation to 
pursue research, even if it is aimed at preventing potentially serious diseases, 
such as mitochondrial diseases. Brassington here seems to discount what 
is known in applied philosophy as the ‘equivalence thesis’; according to 
this thesis, acts and omission may have the same moral weight. There are 
caveats to the ‘equivalence thesis’ but at its minimum it states, somewhat 
convincingly, that harming someone with a positive action is not necessarily 
worse or morally more repugnant than procuring the same harm through 
an omission. So Brassington leaves unanswered the question of whether 
deliberately failing to prevent a child from being born in a harmed condition 
is equivalent to causing that harm. The discourse is complicated further by 
what philosophers call, after Derek Parfit, the problem of ‘non-identity’; 
in the choice between bringing into the world two different children, each 
child has only got that specific chance of existence. Therefore, if a child 
is brought into the world with a mitochondrial disease, who would have 
not been born otherwise, that child is neither harmed nor wronged by 
being brought into the world. The ‘non-identity’ problem suggests that 
a child is not harmed by being brought into existence, even if he or she 
has a disability or a medical condition, if he or she could only be born 
in that state (unless his or her life is so overwhelmed by suffering that 
it would be preferable for him or her to have never existed in the first 
instance).
But there are two problems here. One is this: even admitting that the 
‘non-identity’ problem applies here, one could still say that philosophers 
seem to be the only category of people who are not concerned about whether 
a child is born with a serious medical condition or not (provided he or she 
is not overwhelmed by suffering). The second is perhaps a more compelling 
problem. As Brassington notes, the mitochondrial DNA represents such a 
tiny portion of the whole DNA, and indeed of the oocyte, that the problem 
of ‘non-identity’ is not likely to apply. If the ‘non-identity’ problem does 
not apply, then the ‘equivalence thesis’ applies. If Brassington is right to 
say that the mitochondrial DNA is such a tiny portion that it does not 
affect the identity of the child, then a child, the same child, is likely to be 
born, whether the portion of faulty mitochondria in the egg has been 
substituted or not. Therefore, it would be true to say that a child (the same 
child) will be brought into the world, either suffering from mitochondrial 
disease or clear of mitochondrial disease. It would not be true to say in 
this case that one child would be brought into the world who suffers from 
mitochondrial disease, or another child would be brought into the world 
clear of mitochondrial disease (as it would be if one embryo rather than 
another had been implanted). Thus the ‘equivalence thesis’ is still relevant 
here, but Brassington leaves the reader to make up their mind about this 
thorny issue.
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The interest of applied ethics and bioethics in science has traditionally 
been raised mainly, though not exclusively, by scientific research that impacts 
upon human health – genetic and genomic research, for example, regenerative 
medicine research, embryonic stem cell research, and research that uses 
humans or other animals as research subjects. In this collection we wanted 
to cover science more widely, at the risk of sacrificing perhaps some depth 
to that purpose, and the rest of Part I of this collection is devoted to areas 
of scientific research which seem less directly involved in the protection or 
promotion of human health, but which, instead, as the authors show, are 
likely to have a profound impact on human health and welfare.
Catherine Rhodes discusses scientific research in relation to biosecurity 
(Chapter 6). Her chapter is (sadly) very timely, given the increasing global 
threats of attacks involving pathogens. She stresses that scientific freedoms 
are to be exercised within the context of certain responsibilities, which in 
some cases justify constraints on those freedoms. Responsibility to prevent 
certain threats from materialising falls on a large pool of actors, she argues: 
scientists, but also journal editors, scientific academies and national and 
international policy groups. Scientific research on pathogens is afflicted 
inherently by a profound tension: scientific work on pathogens yields huge 
public health benefits, but the same public health protection calls for a 
restriction on such work, or at the very least tight control of the release of 
information. International and national policy, Rhodes points out, increasingly 
hold scientists responsible for public health protection; but, as she notes, 
there must be recognition of reciprocal responsibilities of scientists and 
policymakers, to develop effective international policies that can mitigate 
the tension inherent in this area of scientific research.
David Lawrence in Chapter 7 focuses on robotics and artificial intelligence. 
After the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s, we are now used to the idea 
that machines carry out tasks traditionally performed by humans. Experi-
mental robots are extremely impressive devices. We know already that they 
are widely applied to surgery, but, as Lawrence explains, it is possible now 
to emulate proprioception, tactility, visual processing, object recognition, 
walking and running. As with other areas of scientific research, the results 
are received either with enthusiasm or with worry. Automation is perceived 
by some as a threat; many human professions, it is feared, will disappear, 
being replaced by ‘better robotic versions of ourselves’. The work market 
will be steered to make space for electronic engineers and similar profes-
sionals, to the detriment of the variety of what individuals, with their own 
unique talents and skills, can offer to society. The prospect of the development 
of conscious, thinking machines is even more disquieting. Artificial intel-
ligence challenges regulation and policy around liability, ownership, 
employment and more. But Lawrence points out another preoccupation, 
which links his chapter to my earlier chapter. Scientific development challenges 
what it is to be human. I posed the question of how much of ‘us’ can be 
substituted by, say, robotic parts, before ‘us humans’ become something 
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else. Lawrence poses the corresponding question: how much should an 
artificial life, a robot, understand, feel or think before it is regarded as ‘one 
of us’? This metaphysical question raises a number of moral questions 
relating to how beings ought to be treated, moral questions about where 
on the ladder of moral status a being should be before it is entitled to equal 
concern and respect.
Part I of the volume concludes with Chapter 8 by Lucio Piccirillo. Piccirillo 
offers some reflections on the importance of science and freedom of scientific 
research, considering some of the important discoveries in the field of physics. 
In this chapter he takes on a role which, he argues, many scientists should 
take on in society, that is, to explain in plain and accessible language what 
their job is. He focuses on the Large Hadron Collider as an example of big 
science and on the Markov chain as an example of small science; first he 
explains what these are and what their purposes are, and then he offers 
some reflections on freedom to pursue both big and small scientific projects. 
He makes two seemingly straightforward points: the first is that insofar as 
science can yield advantages for humankind, science is a prima facie good, 
and thus scientists should enjoy a significant degree of freedom. The second 
is that in order to obtain this degree of freedom, society at large must 
receive clear and accessible information about the purpose and methods 
utilised in various scientific disciplines. So far so good, but as Piccirillo 
himself recognises, both arguments raise a number of complex issues. On 
the first point, Piccirillo distinguishes two types of impediments: financial 
constraints on the one hand, and ideologies and fears on the other. He 
discounts the latter as inherently detrimental to science, but accepts con-
straints based on resource rationing. But on the vexed problem of how 
scarce resources should be allocated, Piccirillo does not offer a solution or 
a method to begin to frame possible solutions.
On the second point, there are also questions to be asked. One is again 
about resources, and perhaps responsibilities. Is it really the job of scientists 
to communicate with the general public? Or is it the job of science corre-
spondents, who often work as a liaison between scientists, on the one hand, 
and the public, through the means of the media? Corbellini, as we will see 
in Part II of this collection, raises doubts about whether it is scientists who 
ought to or are even best equipped to bridge the gap between science and 
society. Rather, the problem of the gap between science and society should 
be dealt with upstream, so to speak, at the level of public education in 
scientific disciplines and scientific methods. The public needs to be prepared 
to welcome and evaluate critically scientific discourses, and this cannot 
result from individual conversations of scientists, as clear as they might be, 
on specific issues. It is the state that has a responsibility to educate citizens, 
particularly during the phase of compulsory education, in scientific methods 
especially, in order to foster the analytic thinking that equips citizens to 
evaluate rationally facts, claims and scientific developments. Only this can 
protect us from various serious dangers, particularly from the exploitation 
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and false claims divulged in the guise of scientific truths for fame or financial 
rewards – think of homeopathy or untested stem cell therapies, with no 
proven benefit or scientific credibility, which have been and are administered, 
generating lucrative payments, to patients affected by various serious diseases 
(Nature 2015); or think of claims around the ineffectiveness or harmfulness 
of vaccinations. There is little that can be done to convince someone to 
change their belief, say, that genetically modified foods destroy natural 
equilibrium, or to persuade someone who believes that vaccinations are 
harmful to vaccinate their children. Normally people do not abandon their 
strong beliefs, even in the face of evidence that they are likely to be mistaken. 
They often instead manipulate the facts to reconcile the cognitive dissonance, 
that is, to reconcile the contradiction in their minds. Therefore, a one-to-one 
or one-to-many conversation on a specific issue (say, a scientist explaining 
the science of genetically modified organisms) will be able, typically at 
least, to convey the message only to those already open to ideas that may 
contradict their beliefs or predispositions to certain beliefs. But being open 
to ideas that may contradict our predispositions is a complex and sophisticated 
skill to be acquired and developed. Thus, the conversation between scientists 
and the public at large must be preceded by a certain degree of formal 
education in science and in its methods, so that people can develop the 
critical skills that may enable them to approach scientific developments 
rationally and critically and to form more reasoned or rational beliefs.
Many of the contributors here, as mentioned earlier, participate in an 
ongoing international forum on freedom of scientific research begun in 
2006, and have participated in academic and political debate both before 
and since. So, with this volume we want to contribute to an ongoing 
international bioethical and political debate on the ethics and politics of 
scientific freedom. We do not offer a collection from academics who have 
ideological affinity with us: we want to provide a truly multidisciplinary 
and open perspective on scientific developments in society and a critical 
reflection on the regulation of science. We hope to provide a balanced but 
progressive collection, which will promote further reasoned debate on the 
gap between science and society and on how to correct it.
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1
The influence of infection on society
Peter Lachmann
The main theme of this chapter is the enduring and extensive influence that 
combating infection has had on human life and society. This is a topic 
much neglected in accounts of human history. Moreover, the influence of 
infection is not restricted to humans but can be seen throughout the living 
world from bacteria and fungi to plants and animals.
The bacteriophages that infect bacteria have been invaluable tools to 
study molecular biology though their promise as antibacterial agents in 
medicine has not so far been fulfilled. The devastating effect of infection 
on the tree population in this country has been demonstrated by Dutch 
elm disease, and more recently by ash dieback, which have had a large 
effect on the overall tree population.
In animals, there is a very interesting review by Hamilton et al. (1990) 
who analysed why it was that primitive animals always adopt sexual 
reproduction as opposed to vegetative reproduction as used in many plants. 
They came to the conclusion that the advantage of sexual reproduction is 
that it provides a mechanism to reassort the genes that are concerned with 
resistance to infection at each generation. In other words, the reason we 
have sex is to combat infection. Here, however, I will restrict myself to 
discussing infectious disease and its effects on human societies.
It is likely that humans became significantly more susceptible to infectious 
disease as a result of the agricultural revolution about 10,000 years ago. 
This is less than 10 per cent of the period in which modern humans, Homo 
sapiens, have existed. For the first 90 per cent of human existence the 
communities were small, they tended to move about and not occupy the 
same site for long, and they had no domestic animals. Although evidence 
on the incidence of infection before the agricultural revolution is sparse, 
it is highly plausible that it was less. The coming of larger communities 
living at fixed sites led to their contaminating their water supplies with 
their own faeces and promoted orofaecal spread of infection. The fact that 
they lived in larger communities will itself have helped to spread infections 
by the respiratory route but perhaps the most important feature was the 
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domestication of animals. It is quite remarkable how many of the common 
infectious diseases appear to have a zoonotic origin (Weiss 2001). Table 
1.1 shows some examples.
The close association of humans with the animals that they kept for 
hunting or as pets or as sources of meat and milk or hides or wool is likely 
to have caused a huge increase in the burden of infectious disease. This led 
to a human mortality pattern shown in Figure 1.1 where more than half 
of those born were dead before the age of 5 and thereafter mortality was 
more or less continuous, so that 50 per cent of the remaining population 
were dead before the age of 40. It is nevertheless interesting that the modal 
age of adult death, i.e. the age at which the largest number of people died 
in old age has probably been around 70 since biblical times at least – so 
that it is not that humans were at that time less capable of surviving for 
their three score years and ten, but that infectious disease often prevented 
them from doing so.
Infection, mortality and religion
Humans are probably unique in being aware of their mortality from early 
life. This awareness of mortality combined with the mortality pattern shown 
in Figure 1.1 will certainly have contributed to views on life and its signifi-
cance and to have promoted the idea of life after death, or of repeated 
reincarnation, as a way of coping with the loss of so many young children 
and the constant threat of death throughout life. This can be seen as 
Table 1.1 Examples of human infectious diseases of animal origin
Disease Microbe Animal source
Date of 
crossover Location
malaria parasite chimpanzee c.8000 bce
smallpox virus ruminant? >2000 bce
tuberculosis mycobacterium ruminant? >1000 bce 
typhus rickettsia rodent 430 bce Athens
1492 ce Spain
plague bacterium rodent 541 ce Justinian Plague
1347 ce Black Death
1665 ce Great Plague of 
London
dengue virus monkey c.1000 ce
yellow fever virus monkey 1641 ce
Spanish flu virus bird, pig 1918 ce worldwide
AIDS/HIV-1 virus chimpanzee c.1931 ce
AIDS/HIV-2 virus monkey 20th century  
Modified from Weiss (2001: 960)
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contributing greatly to the growth of religions which place an emphasis on 
some continued existence after death, or on repeated incarnation.
It is, however, remarkable that there is one religion, the original teachings 
of Buddha, which regards repeated reincarnation not as an achievement to 
be desired but one from which one eventually wishes to escape. This escape 
is to nirvana, the state of absolute oblivion. This is achieved through 
enlightenment which requires freeing oneself of all desires. Buddha considered 
belief in god(s) as a desire, so that early Buddhism was anti-theistic. Buddha 
insisted that he was not a god. That humans achieve total oblivion after 
death is integral to modern secular beliefs except that it is no longer thought 
to be a necessity either to achieve enlightenment or to go through many 
cycles of reincarnation before oblivion can be achieved.
Making things better
However, the secularisation of society that accompanied the European 
Enlightenment really became widely established only after mortality patterns 
began to improve. This was brought about largely by three great contributions 
to fighting infectious disease.
The first improvement was better hygiene and public health, particularly 
the provision of clean water supplies and effective sewage disposal; but also 
Figure 1.1 A history of mortality. Pattern of survival in seventeenth-
century Breslau (which may have been typical for the times), nineteenth-
century Liverpool (which had the lowest survival for any city in 
nineteenth-century England) and England in the 1990s (Cairns 1997)
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more hygienic ways of preparing and storing food. An important early 
example showing the importance of clean water was the work of John 
Snow who in 1854 traced a large epidemic of cholera to the use of water 
from a pump in Broad Street in London. He persuaded the local authority 
to remove the pump handle and the epidemic promptly came to an end. It 
still took a long time thereafter before systematic provision of clean water 
(and chlorination where necessary) became enforced even in England. The 
‘great stink’ in central London in 1858, by afflicting the Houses of Parliament, 
led to the provision of an effective sewage disposal system being devised 
by Joseph Bazalgette and built between 1859 and 1875. This again had a 
major beneficial effect on the incidence of cholera in London. More recently, 
the introduction of domestic refrigerators in the early twentieth century 
and of domestic freezers in the 1940s made a large contribution to reducing 
food-borne infection – as well as greatly reducing stomach cancer by reducing 
the use of wood smoke (with its carcinogens) to preserve food.
The second improvement was the introduction of vaccination. This first 
reached the West in the form of variolation against smallpox in the eighteenth 
century. Vaccination against smallpox using cowpox was introduced at the 
very end of that century. Both of these were quite empirical procedures, 
and are described in more detail in the account of smallpox below. The 
first involved administering a tiny amount of pus from a smallpox lesion 
which gave rise to a (usually) mild and localised attack of the disease. The 
second used lymph from a cow suffering with cowpox, a related virus, it 
having been observed that milkmaids who had caught cowpox while milking 
cows did not thereafter catch smallpox.
Vaccination based on an appreciation that infectious disease was due to 
microorganisms does not really start until the nineteenth century and the 
seminal work of Pasteur and of Koch and their associates and the rise of 
immunology. Their effects are not really seen to any great extent until the 
beginning of the twentieth century and particularly since mass vaccination 
against many diseases has been introduced on an increasingly worldwide 
basis (Table 1.2).
The discovery of antibiotics was originally made by René Dubos in 1938 
who recognised that bacteria survive in soil by secreting substances that 
inhibit the growth of other bacteria. His original antibiotics, gramicidin 
and tyrocidin are still used topically but are too toxic for systemic use. 
Probably for this reason, he was, unjustly in my view, not given a Nobel 
prize. It was after the isolation by Florey and Chain in 1941 of penicillin, 
an antibiotic made by a fungus which is not toxic in mammals, that antibiotic 
discovery developed into a mega-industry. This was the third major factor 
in reducing the mortality from infectious disease in the period after the 
Second World War. No new antibiotics using the Dubos model have been 
discovered for some years now and the growth of antibiotic resistance 
among bacteria is giving rise to major concerns that bacterial infection may 
once more become a serious problem for the human population. The 
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development of chemotherapy for viral infections is a field that is still 
expanding. While effective drugs now exist against some important viruses, 
HIV being a good example, there are many viruses, measles for example, 
for which no effective chemotherapy yet exists; and others like flu where 
the treatments are not particularly effective.
Older practices that fight infections
However, even in a much more distant past, one can see in the prescriptions 
of various religions, practices that will have led to increased resistance to 
infectious disease. This was certainly not the reason why such practices 
were introduced – at a time when the causes of communicable diseases 
were unknown. Examples here include the prohibition of cannibalism. There 
are probably multiple reasons why particular religions forbade cannibalism 
while others did not, but it became the case that communities which rejected 
cannibalism survived better. This was, at least in part, due to the spread 
of spongiform encephalopathies, diseases that in humans include kuru and 
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, which can be spread by eating human brain. It 
is therefore fairly clear that cannibalistic societies were at increased danger 
of succumbing to the spread of these lethal diseases. The Fore Tribe in 
New Guinea very nearly died out from kuru in the early twentieth century 
before the Australian government who then ruled New Guinea forbade the 
practice of ritual cannibalism.
It is likely that male circumcision persisted in some communities for an 
analogous reason. There is little doubt that the spread of various sexually 
spread diseases, not just HIV, is reduced by circumcision and it is likely 
that this practice helped to reduce the incidence of potentially lethal diseases 
like syphilis and hepatitis B infection, and prevented women becoming 
infertile as a result of non-lethal diseases such as gonorrhoea. These con-
sequences again were clearly not the reason for the introduction of 







pertussis 265,269 1934 4315 −98.37
measles 894,134 1941 309 −99.97
mumps 152,209 1968 840 −99.45
congenital rubella 
syndr.
20,000+ 1964/65 7 −99.96
polio 21,269 1952 0 −99.99
adverse events 0 10,594*
* For all these vaccines plus H.Influenzae, diphtheria and tetanus (data for USA from CDC)
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circumcision but the improved survival of communities practising it will 
have favoured its survival.
Historical pandemics and their effects on society
It is quite difficult to imagine now the scale of mortality that was produced 
by major pandemics of infectious disease. There must be many great pandem-
ics of which we have no record but there are several which certainly had 
a major influence on the course of human history.
The Athenian plague between 430 and 426 bc during the Peloponnesian 
War, probably contributed greatly to the demise of the Athenian empire. 
The organism causing this plague is not certainly known. Typhus, smallpox, 
measles and flu have all been suggested. So has typhoid but that is implausible. 
It is estimated that 25 per cent of the city’s population died (75,000–100,000 
people) (Littman 2009).
The Antonine plague, between ad 165 and 168, is likely to have accelerated 
the fall of the Western Roman Empire. This is believed to have been a 
smallpox epidemic and to have killed 3.5–5 million people (Wikipedia 
2017a).
Plague is due to a bacterium, Yersinia pestis commonly known as the 
plague bacillus, and typically gives rise to ‘bubonic plague’ which is spread 
by fleas from rats to humans. During pandemics it can also spread directly 
from human to human – giving rise to the even more deadly ‘pneumonic 
plague’. Plague has been one of the greatest scourges to afflict humans.
The Justinian plague (Wikipedia 2017b), which decimated the population 
of both the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire in the sixth to seventh 
centuries from 542 to about 750, may have killed 100 million people 
worldwide. It is argued by Holland in his book In the Shadow of the Sword 
(2013) to have made the Arab conquests possible. The Arabs, in his view, 
lived in dispersed settlements much further south, somewhere near Yemen, 
where rats were much less frequent and so had not been exposed to decades 
of the Justinian plague. This allowed them with relative ease to conquer 
both large parts of the Byzantine Empire and of the Persian Empire. Holland 
suggests that Islam originated as a need to control these great new acquisitions 
and followed the Arab conquest rather than preceding it. He also believes 
that the original Mecca was far further south than Mecca is now and in 
consequence out of the range of the plague.
The Black Death was also due to Yersinia pestis. The Black Death in 
the early fifteenth century was a catastrophe on a scale that is now quite 
difficult to imagine. It is estimated that more than one-third of the popula-
tion of much of Europe died over a relatively short period and in some 
communities in East Anglia it has recently been shown that the produc-
tion of ceramics fell by 70 to 80 per cent reflecting the enormous loss of 
population. It is certainly regarded as having caused the end of serfdom 
since there was such a shortage of labour that labourers were no longer 
bound to stay at their original sites of serfdom but could sell their labour 
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throughout the country. This so-called ‘second wave’ of plague continued 
for centuries in Europe with intermittent outbreaks culminating in Britain 
in the great London Plague in 1665. This also caused a very substantial 
death rate.
It has been speculated that the decline of plague after this time was the 
result of the gradual replacement of the indigenous black rat by the larger 
brown Norway rat which appears to be a less congenial host for the rat 
flea. Rather later, the population became less tolerant of carrying fleas too!
Plague, however, still persists. In parts of the United States it is endemic 
and there was a small outbreak in North Africa during the Second World 
War which, greatly exaggerated, forms the subject of Camus’s novel La 
Peste (Camus 1947). However, Yersinia pestis is sensitive to antibiotics and 
this has caused plague largely to die out, although the emergence of antibiotic-
resistant plague bacteria is now giving rise to concern.
Most other major plagues that we know of have been caused by viruses 
rather than bacteria. The most devastating of these in human history has 
been smallpox. However, it is so far the only human pandemic disease to 
have been eradicated from the planet (Glynn and Glynn 2004; Rhodes 
2013). Smallpox has been a scourge among humans since ancient times. It 
is probably of zoonotic origin and related pox viruses occur in many mam-
malian species. It is known to have been in the Far East centuries ago and 
it is there that the first attempts at prevention were established by variolation. 
This was introduced from the East to Turkey where it was used particularly 
to immunise the Circassian women who were used as slaves by the Turks 
and whose freedom from smallpox scars was held to be of greater importance 
than the occasional death. From Turkey, variolation was introduced into 
England through the good offices, in part, of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu 
(as shown in her letter below) and became reasonably widespread.
Extract of a letter from Lady Mary Wortley Montagu in Constantinople to  
Mrs Sarah Chiswell, written in 1717 (Lynch n.d.: Letter XXXI)
The small-pox, so fatal, and so general amongst us, is here entirely harmless 
by the invention of ingrafting, which is the term they give it . . .
Every year thousands undergo this operation; and the French ambassador 
says pleasantly, that they take the small-pox here by way of a diversion, as 
they take the waters in other countries. There is no example of any one that 
has died in it; and you may believe I am very well satisfied on the safety of 
this experiment, since I intend to try it on my dear little son . . .
I am patriot enough to take pains to bring this useful invention into fashion 
in England; and I should not fail to write to some of our doctors very particularly 
about it, if I know any one of them that I thought had virtue enough to destroy 
such a considerable branch of their revenue for the good of mankind.
Variolation was never entirely safe and people who were variolated had to 
be isolated for some period to avoid infecting others. However, it was this 
practice that enabled Edward Jenner to do a trial of vaccination with 
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cowpox in one patient. This was given to a boy, James Phipps, who was 
subsequently variolated and the variolation was shown not to take. This 
led to the widespread introduction of vaccination with cowpox and subse-
quently with vaccinia (whose exact animal origins are unknown) to prevent 
smallpox – the first great triumph of vaccination at the end of the eighteenth 
century.
Although smallpox epidemics occurred throughout the Old World, it 
was unknown in the New World and it was smallpox (together with measles) 
that enabled small numbers of Spanish conquistadores to conquer Mexico 
and Peru. Although other explanations, like more ruthless warfare, better 
guns, or horses have been quoted, it is almost certainly the case that they 
brought smallpox with them that caused their rapid success (Oldstone 2010). 
It is recorded that Cortez had a slave in his entourage who was incubating 
smallpox when they arrived in America. In populations with no herd 
immunity to smallpox, the mortality was extremely great. Similar findings 
were recorded in California where the establishment of mission stations 
was always followed by the death of much of the local population, the only 
survivors being the offspring of the native women and the soldiers guarding 
the missions (and probably the priests too). It is strange that the cause of 
this mortality was never really considered at the time.
Disgracefully, smallpox was also used in biological warfare, even by the 
British. Pox viruses are extremely stable in the environment and blankets 
that had been exposed to a smallpox patient were given to native Americans 
during the siege of Fort Pitt in 1763 to infect the natives – an entirely 
shameful episode and quite probably not unique.
The eradication of smallpox by a massive vaccination programme in the 
1960s is one of the great triumphs of preventive medicine. It would be very 
difficult to achieve now because of the increased emphasis on individual 
consent. The smallpox eradication campaign was done with what is called 
‘community consent’ so that the local authority would agree and then all 
the available children would be lined up and vaccinated. Attempts to eradicate 
measles and polio, two other great scourges of humankind, are still not 
fully complete although they are very slowly reaching completion.
Eradication by vaccination is, of course, possible only where humans are 
the only host for the organism and cannot be achieved if there are alternative 
hosts such as in the case of yellow fever and many other diseases.
Another major epidemic, of which there are a few human survivors who 
still remember it, was the flu epidemic that followed the First World War 
in 1918. It is reckoned that this killed some forty million people – more 
than were killed in the war. Flu is a constant companion of humans and 
has given rise to frequent epidemics as well as the regular presence of flu 
in the population, but it is only occasionally that disastrous pandemics 
such as those of 1918–19 arise. Flu virus has an unusual genome where 
there are eight separate stretches of genome in the virus, which can therefore 
reassort rather than recombining and this gives the virus a great capacity 
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of rapidly induced changes in its antigenic structure. There has more recently 
been a major outbreak of bird flu, which is contagious and can be lethal 
to humans, but which fortunately so far has not shown the ability to spread 
readily from one human to another. This again, however, cannot be guar-
anteed to continue indefinitely although the major haemagglutinin antigen 
of the bird flu virus (H5) is not known ever to have caused pandemics 
in man.
Another current global viral pandemic is HIV. There are two HIV viruses 
– HIV1 and HIV2. Both are lentiviruses but they are distinct. HIV1 is 
endemic in chimpanzees in Central Africa and HIV2 in sooty mangabeys 
in West Africa. The spread of these viruses to humans probably occurred 
some decades ago but they became a major problem much more recently, 
from the 1970s. It is highly likely (but difficult to fully establish) that the 
cause of this accelerated spread was the introduction into Africa of hypo-
dermic syringes and needles for vaccination and other medical purposes. 
At that time the danger posed by their misuse after their original use was 
not recognised and no efficient disposal procedure was put in place. The 
syringes and needles allowed materials from animals, monkeys in particular, 
to be injected as part of native African medicine rather than just smeared 
as was previously the custom. This is likely to have caused the catastrophic 
explosion in the amount of HIV present and facilitated sexual spread – both 
homosexual and heterosexual and allowed spread to the USA, Europe and 
the rest of the world. Although relatively effective antiviral drugs against 
HIV have been developed, there is still no effective vaccine against the 
virus, which is highly immunosuppressive and whose cellular host is the 
T-lymphocyte, the major mediator of antiviral immunity. If this account 
of the pandemic spread of HIV is correct, it is a particularly tragic example 
of how interventions made with the best possible intentions can have cata-
strophic side effects.
Other infectious diseases have exercised a major effect on human society 
not in the form of pandemics but because they are continuously present in 
various human populations and have been major causes of mortality: among 
the most important of these is tuberculosis caused by Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis. Mycobacteria are intracellular bacterial infections which are 
difficult to neutralise and are contained by cellular immunity which is 
however also responsible for much of the pathology produced by the infection. 
Tuberculosis has been a major cause of death for centuries and, as is known 
from nineteenth-century literature, was regarded at that time with the same 
apprehension as cancer is at the present time. There is an excellent account 
of tuberculosis given by René Dubos (1987), which concerns attempts to 
control it. Some degree of immunity can be produced by infection with 
attenuated organisms, the so-called Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG), but 
this is more effective in northern than in southern climates, though it does 
largely prevent everywhere the more lethal forms of childhood tuberculosis 
– miliary tuberculosis and tuberculous meningitis – and for this reason it 
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is well worth persevering with. However, effective control of tuberculosis 
was only achieved when antituberculous chemotherapy was produced – 
notably streptomycin – followed by isoniacid and polyaminosalicylic acid. 
The growth of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis at the present time presents 
a very serious hazard to public health globally in the next decades.
In and around the tropics, malaria is a major endemic scourge. It is 
caused by a protozoan parasite – Plasmodium – of which there are several 
species, Plasmodium falciparum being the most important in man. It is 
spread by the bite of the anopheles mosquito. Malaria is an important cause 
of chronic disease in adults and of death in children. Although there are 
effective treatments, it is still a major cause of death and morbidity in 
lower-income countries around the tropics.
Effects of infection on human genetic variation
Malaria is the canonical example of a rather different way in which infection 
has impacted human society – by its selective effect on human genetic 
polymorphisms. Plasmodia infect red blood cells and their ability to do so 
efficiently is influenced by the haemoglobin the cells carry. There is a 
haemoglobin variant – sickle cell haemoglobin – which when there is a 
single copy of this gene gives some slight protection in young children 
against malaria. This gene has been selected for in areas were malaria was 
common. Where subjects are homozygous for the sickle gene they suffer 
from sickle cell anaemia – an unpleasant disease which requires repeated 
blood transfusion throughout life. This, and a variety of analogous hae-
moglobin variants, have become a real problem for countries like Sardinia 
and Cyprus where malaria has been eradicated and where treating these 
haemoglobinopathies takes up a considerable fraction of their health budget.
Attempts have been made to eliminate these haemoglobin alleles. The 
Roman Catholic Church has given its approval to the testing of people 
before marriage and forbidding the marriage of two carriers of the disease, 
i.e. two heterozygotes. This is not a great idea. It is difficult to enforce and 
therefore doesn’t work well and in addition it is a solution that is ‘dysgenic’, 
i.e. it leads to the increase in the number of the harmful genes rather than 
a decrease. If heterozygotes are not allowed to marry each other, there will 
be no breed-out of the homozygotes who carry two copies of the gene and 
an increasing percentage of the population will become heterozygous. The 
‘eugenic’ solution would be to let people breed at will but where two heterozy-
gotes breed together, the foetus should be checked for the presence of the 
gene and aborted if homozygous. With modern medical technology, this 
no longer requires invasive biopsy of the early foetus because genetic analysis 
can be done on foetal cells that pass into the maternal circulation. By this 
non-invasive technique the homozygotes can be identified early in pregnancy 
and aborted at an early stage. This still gives problems to those religions, 
largely Roman Catholics, who believe that the embryo acquires full human 
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status at the moment of conception. This, however, is a modern idea, 
propounded first by Pope Pius IX in 1869, and has no origins in more 
ancient teachings. It was probably an attempt to bring the teachings of the 
Church in line with what was then known of human embryology. In this 
respect it was entirely misplaced. Pius IX and his contemporaries did not 
realise that the majority of fertilised eggs to which they ascribe full moral 
status do not even implant in the uterus; and, since they have had no 
opportunity to sin, they would form the majority population of heaven (or 
limbo) – a concept that I think would be foreign to the thinking of even 
the most right-wing Catholics.
There has been much written on the moral status of the embryo, that by 
the late Gordon Dunstan (1984) being a good example. I think it is widely 
accepted, among philosophers at least, that full human status cannot be 
granted unless there is some form of sentience and intentionality. There is 
no possibility of sentience when an embryo has no central nervous system 
and no sense receptors. If it can neither hear, nor feel, nor smell, or see, 
then it is not capable of being sentient and is not appropriately regarded 
as having achieved full or even appreciable moral status.
It is clear that the removal of these haemoglobin variants that once were 
important in resisting malaria need to be eliminated if the health services 
in many of these countries are to survive, and this is an area where it really 
is important that some rationality is applied.
The human genetic locus that shows the most variability is known as 
the major histocompatibility complex (MHC). These antigens are responsible 
for binding peptides derived from pathogens and allowing T-lymphocytes 
to react with them, and because there are so many antigenic variants it is 
important that there is a great assortment of these antigens. This is the 
group of antigens in mammals that correspond to the ones that Hamilton 
was referring to when he said that we had sex because of infection and 
they remain a vital component of our resistance. They are one of many 
reasons why excessive inbreeding in human communities can cause their 
demise because there are insufficient variants, and one particular infection 
can wipe out a whole population. This is another example of where a 
religious prohibition has survival value that is unlikely to bear any relation 
to the reasons for which it was introduced.
Conclusion
The consequence of improved hygiene and vaccination, antimicrobial and 
antiviral therapy has led to great changes in the mortality curves (see Figure 
1.1) so that now it is relatively unusual for humans, in the developed world, 
to die of natural causes before the age of 60 and mortality has become 
concentrated in old age. As already said, this has led to a very great change 
in attitude to mortality and is perhaps more important in the secularisation 
of the world than is commonly realised. This has also led to a huge population 
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explosion, particularly because of the reduction in childhood mortality, 
which is relatively easy to achieve and where the adoption of effective 
contraception has failed to balance the reduced mortality. Most religious 
prescription, particularly in regard to reproductive practices, is still that of 
an endangered species with enormous emphasis being placed on the duty, 
as well as the right, to reproduce. With the changes in society that place 
more emphasis on personal autonomy, even those restrictions which previously 
applied to procreation outside marriage have been abandoned and this 
effect may have even been exaggerated.
It is entirely self-evident that unless effective steps are taken to stop the 
growth of the human population, then there is a serious threat to the 
survival of mankind even in the medium term. No amount of reduction in 
CO2 output, although highly desirable to protect against global warming, 
or in the consumption of other products needed for human life, will prevent 
catastrophe without the control of human population. There is sadly, in 
many parts of the world, still no serious attempt to see this done.
On the other hand, reduction in human population may be brought about 
by other means. The rejection of vaccination on irrational grounds, the 
abuse of antibiotics, the increase in global travel and threat of biological 
warfare, are all dangers to the future of the human race from infectious 
disease, as is the possibility, looking more serious now than at any time 
since the 1960s, of nuclear war. It may be that the second half of the 
twentieth century will come to be seen as a golden period, certainly with 
regard to infectious disease. The possibility that we will be unable to control 
drug-resistant infections such as tuberculosis, or of other bacteria, is not 
at all unreal, though it is possible that science and human ingenuity may 
still win through.
What is totally clear is that the changes in human behaviour necessary 
to prevent disaster will need the participation of those who understand the 
roots and ethics of human behaviour as well as the underlying science.
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Scientific progress and longevity:  
curse or blessing?
Simona Giordano
Background: life, death and the elixir of long life
Many myths and epics, from various eras and geographic locations, mirror 
the human yearning for longevity. The Asian Epic of Gilgamesh is one of 
the oldest (2600–2500 bc), but there are many others: the Garden of Eden 
(in the Bible), the Holy Grail, the Fountain of Youth, the Philosopher’s 
stone, to mention just a few. Many ‘precursors’ of modern scientists actively 
sought to find medical means to defeat death (a notable example is the 
alchemists, particularly the Chinese alchemists in the fourth and third 
century bc). In some sense, it may be argued that much, if not all, scientific 
effort is ultimately meant to prolong human life, the life of the planet, to 
give humans and perhaps other living beings the best chance to live as well 
as possible for the longest time, hopefully forever. Many of those who 
defend scientific freedom do so in the name of human welfare, longevity 
and freedom from illness and disability (see Chapter 15 in this volume).
The longing for immortality is obviously the other face of the anxiety 
about death. The finitude of human existence is at the heart of Western 
philosophy across the centuries. As Lachmann (see Chapter 1 this volume) 
points out, the awareness of death is probably exclusive to humans among 
all the animals, and this has probably prompted the birth of theist religions 
that promise some kind of afterlife or reincarnation. Many philosophers 
and schools of philosophy since antiquity have also attempted to ease worries 
about death. The Eleats believed in an eternal reality, from which we come 
and towards which we are directed. Life is a passage in an uninterrupted 
journey. Later, in Plato and much of the Platonic tradition, death acquires 
a positive value; through death the soul will be finally freed from the ‘cage’ 
of the body. Plato, in his Apology, writes:
Either to be dead is not to exist, to have no awareness at all, or it is, as the 
stories tell, a kind of alteration, a change of abode for the soul from this place 
to another. And if it is to have no awareness, like a sleep when the sleeper 
sees no dream, death would be a wonderful gain. (1984: 103)
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Epicurus expanded on the idea that death represents the end of sensations, 
including good and bad:
Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil 
imply awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness; therefore a right 
understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, 
not by adding to life an unlimited time, but by taking away the yearning after 
immortality. For life has no terror; for those who thoroughly apprehend that 
there are no terrors for them in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the person 
who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but 
because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is 
present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, 
the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is 
not come, and, when death is come, we are not . . . The wise person does not 
deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. (2017)
In spite of these (and other) efforts to calm uneasiness at the thought of 
dying, aversion to death is quite pronounced in humans and drives much 
of our individual and collective efforts. Contrary to what Epicurus may 
have hoped, humans have continued across the centuries to fight death and 
deadly diseases, and to extend and ameliorate their quality of life.
Science, including medical science, developed and changed drastically 
during the Renaissance: Kepler, Copernicus, Newton, Da Vinci, Vasalio, 
Descartes and many others revolutionised the understanding of the universe, 
of humankind and of other animal kingdoms. The changed landscape paved 
the way for the great discoveries and innovations of the second part of the 
1800s and of the 1900s.
Science has had a significant impact upon longevity: Lachmann highlights 
that the main determinant in the reduction of mortality since the 1900s 
has probably been the development of epidemiological science, which has 
allowed control of infectious diseases (see Chapter 1 in this volume). There 
is wide agreement among demographers as to the factors that have extended 
human life: tackling infant mortality, particularly through the mastery of 
infectious diseases, was one of the most important in the second part of 
the 1800s. During the following century, biomedical sciences also tackled 
much better the diseases of older people, particularly cardiovascular diseases. 
Improvement in living conditions, provision of clean water and sewage 
disposal, better nutrition, better education, better income and better medical 
care have all contributed to doubling life expectancy in just over a century, 
initially more prominently in middle- and high-income countries (Bonicelli 
and Sciarretta 2005), and now across the globe (WHO 2015a). Among all 
these factors, it seems that the contribution of science and medicine, through 
immunisation, vector control and provision of drugs, is probably the most 
substantial (Gratton and Scott 2016: 19).
Moreover, cellular and genetic therapies offer the possibility of treating 
or preventing many serious diseases and extending human life further. 
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Transplantations, now seen as established treatment, were only developed 
in the 1960s, and give us the opportunity to substitute old or damaged 
body parts with younger and healthier versions; genome editing revives the 
prospect of xenotransplantations. Cellular therapies can regenerate tissues, 
and if genetic and cellular research realised its potential, many degenerative 
diseases could be cured or even eradicated from humankind, with the result 
that we all could potentially live longer and disease-free lives.
There is further ground for optimism for the non-Epicurean. At the end 
of the 1990s it was discovered that lifespan depends on the bottom part 
of the chromosome (called the telomere), which protects the genetic material 
(Bodnar et al. 1998). Every time the genetic material is replicated during 
cellular replication, the telomeres become shorter, and thus they lose part 
of the genetic information they carry. Ageing is determined by this process, 
and this process ends when the cell has lost all the genetic material, cannot 
replicate itself and dies. A gene is responsible for the initial length of the 
telomeres and for the rhythm of shortening. Therefore, in principle, interven-
ing on the length of the telomeres either with drugs or by genomic therapy 
could extend human life, in principle forever (accidents and illnesses aside). 
The hypothesis that human life could be extended indefinitely is contentious: 
a 2016 article published in Nature denies that this could ever be possible 
(Dong et al. 2016), but experiments on non-human animals show that this 
type of intervention may reverse the process of ageing (Broccoli et al. 1997).
Immortality may not yet be on the menu for us, at least not on this earth, 
but we live longer than the previous generation, and the next generations 
will live longer than us. This offers us hope for a long life, and is perhaps 
the fulfilment of one of our most ancient and rooted dreams. But, as we 
all know, the sweetest of all dreams can easily turn into the worst 
nightmare.
Introduction
Today men live on average 76 years and women 83, and average lifespan 
extends itself by about three months every year. According to some studies 
people will soon live on average 120 years, and adolescents today have a 
life expectancy of 100 years (Bonicelli and Sciarretta 2005). In the UK, by 
2040 one in seven people will be aged over 75 (GOS 2016). A real demo-
graphic revolution is thus well under way. This raises a number of questions 
and concerns. Some are metaphysical in nature: longevity raises questions 
about what it is to be human. If finitude is an inherent feature of humanity, 
how long can our life be before we become something else?
Biomedical sciences also raise metaphysical issues. Think of transplantation: 
naturally we know that nearly all our cells are replaced regularly, so in one 
sense it shouldn’t worry us that bigger body parts are replaced. But how 
many parts of ‘me’ need to be substituted before ‘I’ become ‘someone else’? 
Are there some specific organs that are constitutive of personal identity? 
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The heart, or the brain, or something else, or nothing? Would I still be me 
in some significant sense, if, for example, my body parts (some or all) were 
replaced regularly, every 50 or 60 years, say? And how about replacement 
with other animals’ body parts, or with artificial parts? What is ‘I’ a 
function of? Of the way I look? The face I have? The skills I have? The 
materials I am made of? The memories I hold? Would I still be me if I had, 
say, a brain replacement, or if my vital organs were not made of organic 
material? Or would I be someone else? (Bonicelli and Sciarretta 2005).
I will not discuss in this chapter the metaphysical issues relating to what 
it is that makes ‘you’ and ‘I’ respectively you and I, and what it is that 
constitutes the essence of personal identity. One of the reasons for leaving 
the metaphysical questions aside is that in the debate about ageing and 
longevity, these metaphysical issues are sometimes used simply to contradict 
the value of science. For example, it is sometimes argued that to strive for 
longevity and immortality is to deny the dignity of humankind as it is 
(Ramsey 2009). The appeal to the metaphysical issue of what a ‘human’ 
is thus is used ad hoc in a non-elaborated attempt to discredit certain 
practices.
Another similar objection to science, which I will not consider here in 
any depth, is the one that argues that the attempt of biomedical sciences 
to eradicate diseases is an attack on the dignity and value of people who 
have those diseases. This is a particularly common argument with regard 
to genetic testing, particularly prenatal genetic testing, genome editing and 
mitochondrial DNA replacement. For example, some see prenatal genetic 
testing for chromosomal disorders as an attack on the dignity of people 
born with Down’s syndrome – and similar arguments apply to other condi-
tions as well (BBC 2016). An in-depth response to these concerns would 
require a separate analysis, but it is sufficient to note here that there is no 
reason why achieving a longer lifespan should imply the ascribing of less 
dignity to those, or those generations, who have not been lucky in the same 
way; similarly, attempting to eliminate certain diseases, or supporting science 
to do so, in no way involves undermining the dignity of people who are 
born with or have developed those diseases. One can consistently believe 
that it is not immoral (or that it is indeed good) to attempt to cure or even 
eliminate cancer, dementia, spinal cord diseases and many others, while 
recognising the equal dignity and value of people who suffer from those 
conditions.
I will thus leave aside the metaphysical issues relating to personal identity, 
or arguments suggesting that science, particularly biomedical sciences, 
represent an attack on human dignity. I will instead focus on the practical 
and ethical concerns surrounding longevity: how is society going to cope 
with an increasing number of long-lived people? Greater numbers of older 
people in society may mean an increase in dependency, infirmity, dementia 
epidemics, medical spending. Will the workforce cope with the increasing 
demands of the older sections of the population?
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The implications of population ageing are vast: they spread to housing, 
pensions, family life, family responsibilities, transport, education, working 
patterns and healthcare systems (GOS 2016). The ‘sweetest of all dreams’ 
can easily mutate into a looming crisis. The worries are wide-ranging: levels 
of ill health and disability will increase, the workforce will become increas-
ingly reduced, and chronic conditions, multiple morbidities and cognitive 
impairments will become more common, raising long-term expenditure to 
unknown levels. At the same time families will face increasing pressure to 
balance care with other responsibilities, particularly work. As the population 
ages, so will the workforce: how can the nation’s economic well-being be 
preserved? (GOS 2016).
I suggest that the demographic changes are inevitable and irreversible; 
but they are not a curse: they are to be welcomed as one of the greatest 
triumphs of humankind (WHO 2002a: 6). Many worries surrounding 
longevity (of individuals and of our species) result from a misconception 
of old age as a season of dependency and burden, on persisting stereotypes 
of the old as frail and useless, and on misunderstandings relating to disease 
and old age. Moreover, many important steps can be taken to prevent 
certain negative outcomes from materialising.
The demographic revolution: facts and myths
In the last century the world has faced a real demographic revolution. ‘In 
2010, an estimated 524 million people were aged 65 or older – 8 per cent 
of the world’s population. By 2050, this number is expected to nearly triple 
to about 1.5 billion, representing 16 per cent of the world’s population’ 
(WHO 2011). The main drivers of this ageing population are an increase 
in life expectancy and a decline in fertility and birth rates. Estimates for 
2014 predicted that over the entire world, the number of over-sixties will 
double from approximately 11 per cent to 22 per cent between 2000 and 
2050 (WHO 2014). Already in 2015, it appeared that people over 60 
represented over 30 per cent of the population in Japan, and this proportion 
is predicted to grow over 30 per cent in many more areas of the world 
(WHO 2015a).
The absolute number of people aged 60 years and over is expected to increase 
from 605 million to 2 billion over the same period . . . The number of people 
aged 80 years or older will have almost quadrupled between 2000 and 2050 
to 395 million. There is no historical precedent. (WHO 2014)
The fastest increases are predicted to occur in low- and middle-income 
countries. For example, in China the number of those over the age of 65 
is likely to increase to 330 million by 2050 from 110 million in 2011, and 
by then there could be 100 million people in China over the age of 80 
(WHO 2011). For countries in which the demographic changes occur quickly, 
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giving less time for adjustment, the strain on national infrastructures, 
especially the national healthcare systems, is likely to be significant.
Ageing populations are at the centre of debates on social and economic 
life. As Weisstub puts it: ‘Longevity coupled with economic reality is a 
frightening cocktail for societies to bear’ (2015: 150). Phillipson adds:
Concerns about the most appropriate way of resourcing such populations, 
their impact on standards of living, and relations between age groups and 
generations feature prominently in public debate and discussion. The 21st 
century will without question be a time when all societies take stock of the 
long-term impact of demographic change and the implications for managing 
and organizing a major area of social and economic activity. (2015: 80)
Western governments have considered population ageing as ‘a mixed blessing’ 
(Phillipson 2015).
Longevity raises a number of ethical, social and political issues as well 
as issues of global justice. Will the labour force be able to assist the ever-
growing proportion of older people? Will healthcare systems be able to 
cope with the demands of a long-lived generation? It also raises ethical and 
political issues of intergenerational and global justice: what do we owe to 
future generations? And what do we owe to each other globally? Until 
2000, the European Union did not express particular concern over the 
ageing population. For example, in the OECD document The Welfare State 
in Crisis (cited in WHO 2000), the issue of long-term care was given only 
marginal coverage. Later, however, especially in the last decade, the WHO 
has been increasingly worried about demographic changes and the ability 
of states to cope.
However, a few points need to be clarified. Many older people continue 
to work in either the formal or informal labour sectors (WHO 2002a; 
2012). Moreover, the productivity of the older person, overall, does not 
seem to be lower than that of younger workers; in fact, according to some 
studies, older workers are more efficient than younger workers (Russo et 
al. 2006; Heidemeier and Moser 2009; Staudinger and Bowen 2011; Backes-
Gellner and Veen 2013). Experience, knowledge and insight may compensate 
for some of the losses that may accompany ageing (these and others will 
be discussed later).
It should also be noted that people after retirement age often take respon-
sibility for household management and childcare, which allows younger 
adults to work outside the home. In this way, they contribute actively 
to the labour market. Older people often offer the skills and experience 
accumulated during their working life in the voluntary sector, acting as 
volunteers in schools, communities, religious institutions, business and 
health and political organisations (WHO 2002a; 2012). Many long-lived 
people, then, far from being a ‘burden’ on society, provide an important 
contribution to the fabric of society, and ultimately benefit the overall 
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economy. However, it is a contribution that, not being always directly 
remunerated and thus not being directly a part of the complex financial system 
of paid labour, tends to be overlooked, and its value therefore tends to be 
underestimated.
There is another aspect that is noteworthy: Gratton and Scott (2016) 
propose a number of solutions to the issue of sustainability. They note that 
the three-stage life (education/working life/retirement) was relevant when 
average life expectancy was around 70 years, and is no longer relevant 
when people can expect to live well beyond 100 years. Therefore, the 
structure of life, and working life, needs changing. We will all need to 
work much longer, and this seems inescapable; but working patterns will 
also need to change – for example we will have to retrain later in life, as 
the skills acquired during our earlier years may be obsolete during our 
seventies and eighties, and it is likely that the working environment will 
also become more flexible. Interestingly in this context, Gratton and Scott 
note that science will be one of the sectors that are likely to obtain an 
increment as the population ages:
Greater numbers of older people will create a demand effect to which sectors 
and market prices will respond. So, for example, it is likely that medical 
research focused on longevity and bioengineering will be significant growth 
sectors and the service sector will shift towards healthcare and service 
provision.
Environmental concerns and sustainability will also exert a substantial 
impact on prices and resources and the relative size of different sectors. We 
are on the cusp of substantial shifts in energy provision and, if energy scarcity 
continues and energy prices rise, then there will be significant innovations in 
energy creation and resource conservation. The same is true of food supply, 
where there is an expectation of radical innovation especially in combination 
with genetic engineering and health concerns. (2016: 50–1)
The next section will look at the issue of healthcare needs, because one 
specific concern relates to the ability of the healthcare system to cope with 
the demands of an ageing population (OECD 2006). I will evaluate the 
changes in disease patterns that appear with increased longevity, and I will 
argue that these changes need to be understood. We will see that several 
diseases typically associated with old age are not an inevitable consequence 
of age, and there is a lot that can be done by individuals and collectively 
in order to reduce their incidence.
Longevity and healthcare
Becoming older, as is well known, exposes us to some ailments. The greater 
the number of older people, one may believe, the greater the demands on 
healthcare systems. However, whereas it is undeniable that older people 
may have greater healthcare needs than younger people, the relationship 
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between longevity and healthcare requests or healthcare access is not 
linear.
First, not all older people are unhealthy, and not all young people are 
healthy; health needs are highly variable within individuals, and not just 
within age groups. But even if it were true that older people (say the group 
over 60) have greater healthcare needs than younger people, it does not 
follow that they actually demand or access the healthcare system; their 
needs thus do not automatically translate into spending. For example, in 
low- and middle-income countries the increase in healthcare needs does 
not result in higher demand on the healthcare system, due to a number of 
factors, including barriers to access (WHO 2015a). Also, in high-income 
countries, research shows that those with chronic conditions tend to use more 
healthcare than those who do not have these conditions. But among those 
with chronic conditions, people with additional functional limitations use 
healthcare services more than any other group. So, there are variations among 
individuals and within groups. Moreover, even in high-income countries, 
where there may not be particular barriers to access to healthcare services, 
people with lower socio-economic status tend to access healthcare less than 
other groups, regardless of their needs (Alecxih et al. 2010; Terraneo 2015).
It is thus extremely difficult to predict the impact that population ageing 
has or will have on healthcare expenditure. Even if barriers to access and 
social inequalities were to be eliminated, so that healthcare access and 
demands matched healthcare needs, the link between longevity and healthcare 
expenditure is not linear (WHO 2015a).
Recent research indicates that in high-income countries the peak of 
healthcare demands is around the age of 65–70; after that time demands 
decrease (Oliver et al. 2014; Kingsley 2015). Historical analyses also suggest 
that ageing may have less influence on healthcare expenditure than other 
factors. Research conducted in the US between 1940 and 1990 found that 
ageing
contributed to only around 2% of the increase in health expenditures observed 
during the period. In comparison, technology-related changes in practice were 
responsible for between 38% and 65% of growth, increasing prices were 
responsible for between 11% and 22%, and growth in personal income was 
responsible for between 5% and 23%. Similarly, research on expenditures in 
France between 1992 and 2000 found the contribution of ageing to be relatively 
small, with the impact of changes in clinical practice being almost four times 
as large. (WHO 2015a: 96)
Therefore, the claim that population ageing will result in increased healthcare 
expenditure is simplistic.
A related worry is that population ageing is correlated with changes in 
disease patterns, and this in itself poses novel challenges for healthcare 
systems. While this is true to an extent, the relationship between these 
changes and longevity needs to be understood.
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Disease patterns and longevity
In a 1998 document, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 
changes in the population structure affect disease patterns (WHO 1998a). 
The WHO lamented that what it called non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 
have become the leading causes of death both in ‘industrialized countries’ 
(WHO 1998a: 14) and ‘developing countries’ (WHO 2017). The main 






• chronic obstructive pulmonary disease;
• musculoskeletal conditions (such as arthritis and osteoporosis);
• mental health conditions (mostly dementia and depression);
• blindness and visual impairment.
In 2002 the WHO again reported that NCDs may be significant and costly 
causes of disability and reduced quality of life (WHO 2002a: 34), and can 
be expensive to treat and long-lasting (WHO 2002b).
More recent research, however, amends the picture significantly:
• NCDs kill more than 36 million people each year.
• Nearly 80 per cent of NCD deaths – 29 million – occur in low- and 
middle-income countries.
• More than nine million of all deaths attributed to NCDs occur before 
the age of 60; 90 per cent of these ‘premature’ deaths occur in low- and 
middle-income countries.
• Cardiovascular diseases account for most NCD deaths, or 17.3 million 
people annually, followed by cancers (7.6 million), respiratory diseases 
(4.2 million) and diabetes (1.3 million).
• These four groups of diseases account for around 80 per cent of all NCD 
deaths.
• They share four risk factors: tobacco use, physical inactivity, the harmful 
use of alcohol and unhealthy diets (WHO 2017).
This research shows that NCDs are not diseases of the elderly and are not 
a result of longevity. They may afflict all sections of the population, regardless 
of age. In higher-income countries they are more often associated with old 
age, either because people tend to become affected later, or because people 
live for longer periods with their disease, due perhaps to better healthcare 
and better living conditions (Kalisch et al. 1998: §7.1). Moreover, NCDs 
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are to a large extent preventable, and many prevention measures are highly 
cost-effective. Thus, again longevity and population ageing will not necessarily 
result in an increase in healthcare demands and expenditure (WHO 2002a; 
2010).
As mentioned earlier, health and illness are highly subjective states, and 
it is simplistic to associate longevity with disease. However, it could be 
objected that as we age, we are subjected inevitably to a certain degree of 
molecular and cellular damage. This damage may result in functional 
impairments, which, in turn, may cause psychosocial afflictions (WHO 
2015a). While this is true, it is also to be recognised that how susceptible 
individuals are to those losses, and how they respond to them, is subjective, 
and much can be done to prevent these losses, or to prevent a deterioration 
in people’s quality of life once they have taken place.
We have seen that there are various factors that are responsible for the 
onset of NCDs; these diseases are not age related, and are much more 
directly correlated to behavioural, psychological, social and environmental 
factors than to chronological age. Tobacco smoking, for example, increases 
the risk of stroke and lung cancer, accelerates the decline of bone mineral 
density, muscular strength and respiratory capacity, and so may lead to 
important losses of functional capacity. Excessive alcohol consumption and 
a diet high in saturated fats and salt and low in vitamins and fibre are also 
associated with higher risk of cardiovascular diseases. From a psychosocial 
point of view, both decline in cognitive capacity and the sense of loneliness 
are often related, in the older person, to the loss of relatives and close 
friends. In their turn, lack of participation in activities and social isolation 
are related to a higher risk of disability, both physical and mental. These 
factors can be modified, and they do not automatically ‘come with living 
longer’.
In what follows I will look specifically at the ailments that are often 
thought to be related to old age, and argue that the connection between 
these and longevity is not necessary: in fact living longer does not necessarily 
expose us to certain diseases. It is often other factors that do so, not primarily 
age. I will focus in particular on the relation between physical activity and 
NCDs. However, this should not be misinterpreted. What I point out does 
not gesture towards assigning individuals the sole or main responsibility 
for their own ill health. I simply point out that age is not primarily responsible 
for many NCDs, and that these are largely controllable and preventable. 
But whether or not individuals are in a position to make lifestyle changes 
or to exercise sufficiently for their health is not only a function of their 
conscious choices and will. Whether or not people are able to exercise 
depends on many factors (working patterns, family responsibility, costs, 
accessibility, information and infrastructures). Later in this chapter I will 
discuss some key actions across sectors that may reduce barriers to healthier 
longevity.
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Musculoskeletal damage
A condition that afflicts older people more than other groups is musculoskeletal 
problems. There are various types of musculoskeletal problems and various 
degrees of impairment. However, it is well known that older people are, 
for example, subject to falls more than other age groups. Falls are a major 
cause of disability and even mortality due to injury (Dhital et al. 2010; 
Gillespie et al. 2012; Hoops et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2012; Karlsson et al. 
2013). The fear of falling may also affect quality of life, providing a significant 
limitation on daily activities (Department of Health 2001).
The effects of falls depend to an important extent on bone mineral density 
(WHO 1998b). Bone mineral density decreases to some extent physiologi-
cally with age. Proportionally, the risk of bone fractures increases (Cheng 
et al. 1997). Loss of bone mineral density, also known as osteoporosis, 
begins at around the age of 40, and mainly afflicts women, especially 
after the onset of menopause. Hormonal changes (particularly decline in 
oestrogens) are partly responsible for such bone thinning, but decrease 
of muscle mass is also a major cause of bone mineral loss. Research has 
shown that after a peak in early adulthood, muscle mass declines with 
age (Rantanen et al. 2003; Cruz-Jentoft et al. 2010). Both the number 
and size of muscle cells decrease. Because muscle mass has a direct impact 
upon bone mineral density, weight-bearing exercise is a standard treatment 
for osteoporosis and osteopenia. Bone mineral loss thus can be slowed 
down significantly with exercise. Neuromuscular coordination, proprio-
ception and postural stability also contribute to the prevention of falls 
(Dargent-Molina et al. 1996), and these can all be manipulated with regular 
physical activity (Bacher et al. 2002; WHO 2002a: 28; Chubak et al.  
2006).
But even when someone already suffers from disabling loss of bone mineral 
density, with consequent reduced mobility and independence, exercise can 
be an effective treatment (Suominen 2006). Research provides slightly 
different data on the amounts and regimes of exercise required for older 
people already affected by different musculoskeletal conditions (Moreira 
et al. 2014). However, a positive correlation is observed between resistance 
training, bone mineral density and muscular strength. Some research shows 
that after only six months’ strength training, muscular strength increases 
by 9 per cent (lower body) and 18 per cent (upper body) in people aged 
70–79 (WHO 2002a: 5; Gianoudis et al. 2012; Ribeiro and Neri 2012).
Developing muscular strength is not just an effective prevention and 
treatment for osteoporosis: walking, climbing stairs and overall mobility 
rely on muscular strength (Studenski et al. 2011), particularly leg strength, 
and when this is poor, a person clearly becomes more dependent and 
increasingly frail. It could be argued that the quality of life of the long-lived 
person is thus to an important extent dependent on one single factor: 
muscular strength, particularly leg muscular strength, and this is highly 
controllable (HM Government 2014).
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Cardiovascular diseases
It might be believed that living longer exposes us to cardiovascular diseases 
because the heart, like any other muscle, loses strength as we age. In reality, 
other factors relating to lifestyle represent a more significant risk than 
chronological age. It is common knowledge that smoking, a diet rich in 
saturated fats and salts, and a sedentary lifestyle are major risk factors for 
cardiovascular diseases. Recent research also notes a correlation between 
loneliness, social isolation and poor cardiovascular health (Courtin and 
Knapp 2015).
Epidemiological studies show that perhaps one of the most important 
factors for the prevention of premature death from cardiovascular diseases 
is physical activity, even in people with established heart diseases. Physical 
activity reduces the risk of death from cardiac disease by 20–25 per cent 
among people with established heart diseases (Shiroma and Lee 2010; 
Longobardi et al. 2012: S99). Positive changes are manifested in cardiovascular 
efficiency, blood lipids, blood pressure and thrombotic tendency (WHO 
1998a: 6). Physical activity has a direct effect on the heart, as it may increase 
oxygen supply and improve myocardial contraction and electrical stability. 
Moreover, physical activity increases the diameter of the coronary arteries 
and this also contributes to reduction of blood pressure at rest (both systolic 
and diastolic). Blood lipid profile is also positively affected.
What is more, regular exercise prevents the occurrence of cardiovascular 
diseases in those predisposed to them. This is one of the clear cases in 
which genetics and biology can be, to an important extent, controlled 
through lifestyle. A person initially ‘at risk’ because of her family history 
can turn out to be a ‘fitter than average’ person. In short, diseases of the 
cardiovascular system, which, it is worth remembering, are the leading 
cause of death in many countries, are a result of many factors, and are not 
the inevitable consequence of longevity.
Reduced mobility
Mobility clearly has a direct influence on a person’s functional capacity 
and quality of life. Loss of mobility means dependency, and dependency 
means costs. The first age-related changes that affect mobility are anthro-
pometric changes. They are related to both stature and the joints’ range of 
motion. People between 65 and 74 years old are approximately 3 per cent 
shorter than people between 18 and 24 years old. This is likely to result 
from the shortening of intervertebral disc spaces and resulting kyphosis. 
This shortening begins at the age of 30 for most people and increases after 
the age of 40.
The range of motion of the joints also declines physiologically. In addition, 
decrements in the sensory-motor system produce a decline in postural balance. 
Poor balance, posture and physical coordination may also increase the risk 
of injuries or falls due to false movements (Salzman 2010; Farley et al. 
2011: 163).
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Deterioration of the musculoskeletal system is not simply or mainly a 
function of age, but primarily of a sedentary lifestyle. Simply moving and 
working out in different areas (balance, agility, coordination and skeletal 
flexibility) reduces the spontaneous loss in these areas.
Metabolic diseases
Older people generally tend to ‘put on weight’. It is thought that this is in 
part due to the decline in metabolic rate, that is, the ability of our body 
to burn calories at rest. Changes in metabolic rate depend on various factors, 
and age is not their primary cause. Metabolic rates depend to a very important 
degree on muscle mass. The more muscle mass we have, the faster our 
metabolism. This is why weight-loss training now no longer incorporates 
just aerobic and cardiovascular exercise, but also strength training. As we 
age, we experience a physiological loss of muscle mass. However, this 
physiological loss is exacerbated usually by the person becoming less active 
and can be counteracted by exercise.
Maintaining good metabolic fitness is important in order to prevent 
obesity, which is often associated with greater risk of coronary heart diseases 
and diabetes (Type 2). Energy metabolism can be improved significantly 
with exercise, and so again the reduction of metabolic rates can be delayed, 
prevented or contained.
Among the metabolic changes that may affect us, those relating to glucose 
metabolism are particularly worrisome. Poor glucose tolerance may lead 
to diabetes (Type 2, which generally occurs after the age of 40), which is 
characterised by variable degrees of insulin resistance and relative insulin 
deficiency. In its later stages, diabetes is associated with a number of serious 
disorders that have a great impact upon a person’s quality of life (e.g. 
blindness, kidney diseases, heart diseases, stroke and peripheral vascular 
diseases severe enough to result in the amputation of a leg or foot). Again 
age is not the sole or even the main determinant of these metabolic changes. 
Genetic predisposition, but also obesity and physical inactivity, increase 
these risks. Whereas not much can be done to change our genetic predisposi-
tion, being genetically predisposed does not necessarily mean developing 
the disease: lifestyle can significantly alter the probability that people 
genetically predisposed to metabolic diseases will actually become affected 
by them. In particular, exercise improves the glucose metabolism, and so 
not only can prevent metabolic diseases, but can also assist in the treatment 
of those who have developed them (International Diabetes Federation 2013).
Cognitive functioning
Old age is often associated with decline in cognitive function, but this 
association must be understood properly. Research suggests that ‘capacity 
to tackle complex tasks that require dividing or switching attention’ (WHO 
2015a: 55) may decrease as we age; also our ability to ‘learn and master 
tasks that involve active manipulation, reorganization, integration or 
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anticipation of various memory items’ (WHO 2015a: 55) may decrease 
with age. However, the capacity to maintain concentration, avoid distraction, 
‘memory for factual information, knowledge of words and concepts, memory 
related to the personal past, and procedural memory . . . language features, 
such as comprehension, reading and vocabulary’ (WHO 2015a: 55) do not 
deteriorate with age and remain stable throughout life.
Mental health: affective disorders and dementia
Affective disorders, particularly depression, are major afflictions for older 
people, but often, like dementia, go unnoticed at least during the early 
stages, as they are taken as an inevitable feature of ageing (Department of 
Health, UK 2001: 19). Again, however, the association between living 
longer and suffering from affective disorders needs to be properly understood. 
First, what is sometimes perceived as a feature of old age is in fact a disease 
that has multiple causes: these have often little to do with how long someone 
has lived (though they may be related to exposure to adverse life events, 
such as multiple losses of significant others) (Seitz et al. 2010). Second, the 
prevalence of depressive and anxiety disorders is in fact slightly lower 
among older adults than among younger adults (with the exception of older 
adults living in care homes) (WHO 2015a: 58). Third, whereas it is notori-
ously difficult to treat multifactorial diseases, it is possible to prevent them 
and ameliorate the conditions of those who suffer from them, regardless 
of their age.
With regard to dementia, the WHO predicts that the current number of 
sufferers (47 million people) is going to triple by 2050 (WHO 2015a: 59). 
In the UK, projections are for an increase in the overall number of cases 
from 822,000 in 2016 to 1.7 million by 2051 (GOS 2016: 77). But dementia 
is not simply a result of longevity. In fact, research shows that certain types 
of dementia may be prevented by reducing the risk factors for cardiovascular 
diseases.1
Once again, it appears that exercise has a major role in preventing and 
reducing the impact of mental illness among the long-lived. Earlier studies 
in gerontology suggest that regular physical activity helps to maintain and 
improve functional ability, health and mental well-being in the older person 
(Ruuskanen and Ruopilla 1995). More recent studies seem to confirm these 
findings (Weuve et al. 2004; Ikeda et al. 2012; Steinmo et al. 2014). It has 
been found that walking can help to prevent vascular-related dementia 
(HM Government 2014: 4, Annex A). It has also been noticed that people 
who perform regular aerobic exercise tend to suffer from depression less 
than inactive people, although it has been impossible to establish what the 
causal connection between the two is. Some studies suggest that exercise 
may make older people able to cope independently, and may thereby enhance 
self-esteem and confidence, which, in turn, may help to prevent or reduce 
depression (O’Connor et al. 1993). Physical exercise is also considered as 
a treatment for anxiety. It is associated with improved general satisfaction 
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and well-being (WHO 1998b: 9.) Moreover, physical activity is associated 
with better social adjustment and cognitive functioning. It may enrich the 
social life of the elderly, as it may be a way of meeting other people. Social 
participation greatly affects the quality of our life, and isolation is associated 
with higher mortality among older people (Sugisawa et al. 1994).
Intergenerational relationships
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are various steps that can be taken 
to avoid certain negative outcomes. One element conducive to healthy ageing 
Box 2.1 Physical (in)activity and spending
Physical inactivity costs the national health services nearly as much 
as smoking. Inactivity in the UK costs around £20bn per year (HM 
Government, 2014: 5).
Physically active people incur fewer direct medical costs than inactive 
people (Pratt et al. 2000; Wang et al. 2004; Hagberg and Lindholm 
2006; Franklin 2008).
Physically active people have fewer periods in hospital, go to the doctor 
less frequently, and use less medication than inactive people.
People in work who are physically active have lower rates of sickness 
absence, fewer retirements on health grounds and are more productive 
(HM Government 2014: 12).
Absenteeism related to physical activity costs the economy 5.6bn per 
year (Cabinet Office for Urban Transport 2009, cited in HM Govern-
ment 2014: 14).
Physical activity has indirect financial benefits: in London town centres 
in 2011 walkers spent £147 more per month than those travelling 
by car, thus contributing to the economy (Department for Transport 
2012).
An increase in 1 per cent in physical activity could save 1.2bn over 
five years (HM Government 2014: 5).
Across a town of 150,000 people, if everyone walked an extra 10 
minutes a day, 31 lives and 30 million£ per year would be saved 
(HM Government 2014: 4, Annex A).
People who are physically active also have 30 per cent–50 per cent 
reduced risk of getting colon cancer (Department of Health 2004), 
and approximately 20 per cent reduced risk of breast cancer (US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2008).
Public policy in England and in other countries now reflects and 
incorporates these findings.2
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that has been identified in the literature is intergenerational dialogue and 
solidarity. Phillipson argues that part of the worry relating to longevity is 
the liberal assumption, embedded in many Western democracies, that the 
state has (through its welfare system) the main responsibility for vulnerable 
members of society. Increases in longevity and the related modification in 
population structure challenge this assumption. Phillipson argues that forms 
of solidarity need to accompany state responsibilities. He writes:
[W]e need to think about new forms of solidarity both to replace existing 
institutions and to indicate the basis for alternative forms of social action. 
Four illustrations [can] be made to develop this point: first, identifying forms 
of cooperation that bring together different generational interests; second, 
reconnecting to the original vision of the welfare state; third, adopting a 
human rights perspective in old age; and fourth, restoring meaning and dignity 
to the end of life. (2015: 90–1)
Phillipson’s suggestion echoes an older recommendation made by the WHO. 
In Active Ageing (2002a) the WHO recognised that negative attitudes 
towards older people result partly from a lack of interaction among age 
groups. In some societies, intergenerational dialogue is simply a part of 
life. In many Asian countries, for example, extended families live in mul-
tigenerational households. In many European countries, however, where 
the nuclear (and the blended) family has replaced the extended family, 
intergenerational dialogue has to be a conscious choice (WHO 2002a: 20).
Intergenerational cooperation would allow the older person to have some 
interests in common with younger generations, to exercise his or her skills 
(memory, learning and cognitive abilities) and to continue to contribute to 
the changing labour market. Moreover, intergenerational dialogue promotes 
the transmission of values between different age groups and a more positive 
and realistic attitude of the younger towards the older.
The WHO advised a number of key action points: schools and communities 
should provide intergenerational activities such as training in new technologies 
for older people and opportunities for lifelong learning (2002a: 52); inter-
generational solidarity could be enhanced by ‘supporting traditional societies 
and community groups run by older people, voluntarism, neighbourhood 
helping, peer monitoring and visiting’ (WHO 2002a: 28).
Phillipson, similarly, offers some examples of existing intergenerational 
cooperation and provides ideas for further development of intergenerational 
solidarity:
[An] important area for informal education has been the development of 
‘intergenerational learning’ – that is, educational programs that link older 
with younger learners. Newman and Hatton-Yeo (2008) cite the example of 
the NUGRAN program at the University of Valencia, which creates learning 
experiences that cross the generations, involving older and younger adults 
together, with the aim of promoting greater contact, trust, and more positive 
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attitudes between them. The program began with 71 students in 1999 and 
had expanded to 1,000 by 2007. Achenbaum (2005: 61) provides similar 
examples from the United States, citing in particular the partnership between 
the University of North Carolina at Asheville and the North Carolina Center 
for Creative Retirement: ‘Participants take classes that they design, conduct 
inter-generational programs to develop leadership skills, and analyze problems 
in the community and at the state level.’ (2015: 90–1)
There are also, Phillipson points out, common interests:
Pillemer et al. (2010) argue that older people represent an important source 
for creating solutions to environmental problems through volunteering and 
civic engagement, drawing upon their own knowledge and experience . . .  
Steinig and Butts (2010), discussing the U.S. experience, highlight the fact 
that intergenerational strategies can have a positive impact on the environment 
through shared sites and housing developments that bring generations together. 
(2015: 92)
There are many other key actions that can and perhaps ought to be 
implemented, in order to ensure the sustainability of a long-lived world. In 
this short chapter it is not possible to cover them in detail. Gratton and 
Scott have provided an accurate analysis of the various comprehensive 
changes that need to be taken in order to ensure that longevity is not a 
curse, but an exciting opportunity. I will list some of the key action points 
here and refer to their book for an in-depth analysis (Gratton and Scott 
2016).
• Pension system/long-term investment: people will have to work for longer 
and retirement age will need to increase. Work flexibility and a different 
balance of work/leisure time will need to be implemented to prevent 
burnout and exhaustion.
• A longer life cannot be structured in the traditional three stages (education/
work/retirement); a longer life will be multi-stage; education and employ-
ment will need to become more flexible; long-lived people will need to 
requalify over time.
• There will be a greater number of career transitions. Psychology and 
sociology have the task of understanding how people can make smoother 
career transitions.
• Architecture/infrastructure need to accommodate the growing proportion 
of older people: housing and city planning will need to accommodate 
the needs of older people.
Happily ever after?
Longevity is one of the greatest triumphs of humankind. The fact that we 
will all live longer raises many worries, however. Old age worries not only 
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individuals, but also our collective psychology: people worry about what 
is going to happen to our planet, how our societies are going to function, 
given that the over-sixties are becoming the largest section of society.
However, not only is the pressure that the long-lived are perceived to 
present exaggerated, it can also be further reduced. There are of course 
other strategies by which being old could be made more desirable, but I 
have proposed that we should start with simple and realistic steps: dismantling 
some myths relating to longevity, understanding how diseases often associated 
with longevity may be effectively prevented (Bostrom 2005) and promoting 
intergenerational dialogue and solidarity.
This is not to say, of course, that individuals should bear the responsibility 
for their own health as they age. It is instead to say that policies that involve 
relatively minor costs could bring high benefits for all (older and younger). 
Healthy longevity is the result of a concerted effort that must happen at 
various levels, and stressing individual ability to control health is only one 
of them. Whether or not we, say, keep walking as we grow older depends 
not just on whether we have sufficient mobility, or whether we are willing 
to do so, but also on whether there is a set of infrastructures that allow 
us to feel safe in walking. The Brasilia Declaration on Ageing recommends 
that ‘[a]ll actions must . . . take into account the bio-physical, social, 
psychological, economic, and environmental determinants of health. Policies 
across sectors [of local government and its employees] must be coordinated 
and harmonized’ (WHO 1996).
How we age, partly depends on luck of course; but it also depends on 
behavioural and environmental factors: luck aside, these can be controlled, 
but only through a coordinated effort (HM Government 2014: 5). Infra-
structures and architectonic designs must reflect the findings relating to 
longevity. Safe areas for walking, well-lit streets, adequate pavements (together 
with pedestrian traffic lights that have sufficient duration for those with 
reduced mobility); support for community activities that encourage physical 
activity; provision of recreational services that offer elderly people exercise 
programmes that help them to maintain their mobility; the inclusion of 
information and education about longevity in the training programmes of 
health carers, social carers, recreational workers, city planners and architects; 
provision of pavements and cycle tracks close to residential areas to encourage 
walking or cycling as a part of daily activity; easy access to information 
about healthy longevity – these are just a few examples of cost-effective 
policies aimed at promoting good longevity (WHO 2015b).
Population ageing has not only raised mixed reaction and worries; it has 
also raised awareness of the need to protect older members of society from 
abuse and discrimination. One of the first documents on the rights of the 
older person was the Brasilia Declaration on Ageing (WHO 1996). One of 
the most recent was the Declaration of Rights for Older People in Wales 
(2014), and the United Nations is calling for a legally binding convention 
on the rights of older people (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
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Rights 2014). Virtually all declarations and conventions on human rights 
contain statements about the fundamental human right of the elderly not 
to be discriminated against; for example, the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol n. 
11, 4 November 1950, art. 14, Prohibition of discrimination; or the European 
Social Charter (Revised) (3 May 1996), Part V, art. E.3 The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) prohibits:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, 
age or sexual orientation. (art. 21, non-discrimination – my emphasis)
Universal ethical principles, however, remain abstract and empty concepts, 
mere unfulfilled ideals, unless policy directed at improving people’s lives 
is implemented. When a policy involves relatively minor costs and high 
benefits for all (older and younger), it is clearly morally irresponsible not 
to endorse it.
The growing proportion of elderly people is a sign of the achievements 
of humankind in extending life and improving life conditions. This growth 
means that all of us get a better chance of living longer. This is to be 
celebrated as one of our greatest accomplishments, and the contribution 
that older people offer to society is to be appreciated, promoted and defended.
Notes
1 Further information on dementia can be found in other WHO documents that 
focus specifically on this topic at www.who.int/topics/dementia/en.
2 For example, in England the Department of Health has published a report (2011). 
See also HM Government (2014: 10). The American College of Sports Medicine 
(2010) also has various guidelines on healthy ageing, and recommends public 
policy to ensure promotion of physical activity as a public health measure. Wales 
has introduced, in 2014, the Active Travel Act, an Act of Parliament that requires 
local authorities to continuously improve facilities and routes for pedestrians 
and cyclists. This act requires local authorities to publish maps of safe walking 
and cycling routes and enhance these over time and new road schemes to consider 
the needs of pedestrians and cyclists (HM Government, 2014: 13).
3 Including also Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Preamble; Council 
of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997; United Nations Convention on Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1981.
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Reproductive technologies and the family in 
the twenty-first century
Daniela Cutas and Anna Smajdor
The first IVF baby was born in 1978 in the UK, following an intervention 
that had not been preceded by any clinical trials. After Louise Brown’s birth, 
legislators and policymakers rushed to create an ethico-legal framework 
within which this new development could be practised without outraging 
public sensibilities. Since then, the speed and direction of scientific research 
as well as the practice and regulation of reproductive technology have 
been inexorably shaped by assumptions concerning family, fertility and 
reproduction. Research towards ever more sophisticated medical technolo-
gies for the purpose of the relief of infertility has raised relatively few 
concerns, provided the procedures were proven to be satisfactorily safe, and 
insofar as they were used to facilitate and reinforce existing norms about 
family structure and relationships. Ideas of what a family is (or should be) 
have a powerful influence on determining which potential technological 
innovations in human reproduction are developed and funded, and who can 
access them.
Social, legal and biological parenthood did not invariably coincide in 
the past. Different jurisdictions have various approaches to the ascription 
of parental rights and responsibilities. However, the default legal position 
is that a woman who gives birth to a child is that child’s mother and her 
husband is the father – regardless of whether she is the genetic mother 
or he the genetic father. Embedded in this view is the expectation that 
the two members of the married couple are the legal and social parents 
and also the biological parents of the child. These legal measures have 
not been extended in the same way to the case of same-sex married 
couples. Furthermore, the child’s ‘right to know’ her genetic origins, 
which features as a core argument for transitioning from anonymous to 
non-anonymous gamete donation in many countries, has not persuaded 
legislators that children who are born to married couples via sexual repro-
duction should also be aware of who their genetic father is (Ravelingien 
and Pennings 2013). These assumptions indicate that biological relation-
ships are subservient to the nuclear family in the eyes of the law – and 
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furthermore, specifically to the heterosexual nuclear family (Cutas and Chan  
2012).
Developments in reproductive technologies have created new types of 
connections. A woman can now give birth to a child who is not genetically her 
own, or to a child who bears genetic material from both herself and another 
woman (via, for example, mitochondrial DNA transfer). Perhaps, in the 
future, a woman will be able to give birth to a child who is only her own 
genetically (via solo reproduction with in vitro-created gametes or human 
cloning). Gamete donation and surrogacy bring about challenges that many 
legislatures are still trying to sort out. Changes brought about by such 
innovations are increasingly hard to reconcile with still pervasive nuclear 
family  expectations in ethics and regulation. If not so long ago, legal 
parenting at least approximately mirrored genetic parentage (one female 
mother and one male father, preferably married to each other), the diversi-
fication of genetic parentage itself, alongside a host of other sociocultural 
changes, pushes the model further into what some have called the crisis of 
the family (Collier 1999: 38–58; Cutas and Chan 2012; Szczurek 2013: 
355–90).
In this chapter, we explore the nature and significance of these interactions 
in the context of research towards prospective reproductive technologies. 
We will start by giving a brief overview of the aftermath of the advent of 
IVF in the UK. We will then discuss how desires come to be classified as 
medical needs, and the relation between reproductive aspirations, the cir-
cumstances of those who hold them, and the weight that they are given. 
This will lead us to a discussion of current definitions of infertility, which 
have constituted the core criteria of access to reproductive technologies. 
These definitions determine not only who has access to reproductive technolo-
gies, but also whose desires are deemed worthy to motivate research efforts 
to make these treatments possible.
The regulatory background in the UK
After Louise Brown’s birth was reported in the British press, amid much 
speculation and anxiety about the likely effects of IVF, the government of 
the time concluded that some regulatory intervention would be required. 
The public needed to know that scientists’ and doctors’ activities were 
subject to ethical and legal oversight (Deech and Smajdor 2007). A report 
into the ethics of IVF and embryo research was commissioned: its task 
was to answer the question of whether the use of IVF was acceptable 
and if so, in which circumstances – and to advise on the acceptability 
of using human embryos in research. Mary Warnock, the chair of the 
committee, held the position that legal and regulatory barriers need 
not be based solely on the avoidance of adverse consequences. Rather, 
she claimed that these barriers reflected a public desire for boundaries, 
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and served to express and enforce moral beliefs that define our social 
identity:
[i]n recognising that there should be limits, people are bearing witness to the 
existence of a moral ideal of society. (Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984: 2)
A society which had no inhibiting limits, especially in the areas with which 
we have been concerned . . . would be a society without moral scruples. 
And this nobody wants. (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology 1984: 2) [our emphasis]
Barriers, it is generally agreed, must be set up. (Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984: 3)
While later reports were critical of Warnock’s approach, and less enthu-
siastic about the importance of barriers (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2004–05: 4–5), it remains the case that the direction 
of scientific progress, and the form of the post-reprotec family, have been 
profoundly shaped by these regulatory constraints. Since the UK’s legislation 
in this context formed a blueprint for many other countries (Rasmussen 
2004; Bennett 2008), its assumptions and the barriers based on them have 
had an impact worldwide on what can and cannot be done with reproductive 
technology.
The Warnock Report was published in 1984. Marriage and couples feature 
extensively in its pages. Although considering arguments in favour of 
individual women and men who might wish to become parents with the 
help of reproductive technologies, the Committee members held the belief 
‘that as a general rule it is better for children to be born into a two-parent 
family, with both father and mother’ (Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984: 11–12). The legislation 
based on the Warnock Report’s findings, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, was not passed until 1990 (subsequently amended in 
2008). Globally, IVF and related techniques had grown and proliferated 
during this period, opening many new possibilities that had not been envisaged 
previously. In view of this, it is not all that surprising that some think the 
Act was already outdated almost from the moment it became law (Lee and 
Morgan 2001: 2). Many new and prospective avenues for scientific and 
medical exploration, such as surrogacy, pre-implantation diagnosis, mito-
chondrial donation, egg freezing and the possibility of creating gametes in 
vitro, were emerging. The latter is of particular interest because prospective 
innovations such as in vitro-created gametes or human cloning may disin-
tegrate the biological boundaries that currently help to define what we 
mean by reproduction (Hendriks et al. 2015).
However, the regulatory framework is only part of the story here. Another 
issue is medicine itself. From its very earliest days the relationship between 
reproductive technology and medicine has been uneasy and fraught with 
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controversy. The legislative framework gives a broad overview of what can 
and cannot be undertaken in a general sense. But the medical establishment 
determines which patients are eligible for treatment – and which needs 
require medical intervention or research into the development of future 
treatment options. As we will show, the clinical basis for these is very far 
removed from many other areas of medicine. Although the use of reproductive 
technologies is thought of and presented as ‘treatment’ for infertility, very 
often the patient may be in perfect reproductive health, but have a partner 
who has fertility problems – or simply not have succeeded to become a 
parent in the natural way with a specific partner. In reproductive medicine, 
one person can be the vehicle by which another person’s medical problem 
is addressed. Moreover, the aim of treatment is not to remedy the fertility 
problem (through repairing fallopian tubes, for example) but to provide 
people with a baby. This means it is not always easy to see what makes 
one procedure a legitimate medical treatment, and not others.
IVF is accepted in many countries across the world as a legitimate – and on 
the whole a morally acceptable – means of treating infertility. Reproductive 
cloning, on the other hand, is stringently forbidden almost everywhere in the 
world, and is regarded by many as being morally abhorrent (Wellcome Trust 
1998). Yet both IVF and reproductive cloning are techniques which could 
enable a person to have genetically related offspring. Interestingly, surveys 
of public views about the permissibility of reproductive cloning indicate 
that cloning is felt to be more acceptable if it is presented as an option for a 
heterosexual couple (as opposed to e.g. a single individual) (Shepherd et al. 
2007). That is, it is the perception of a technology as a means of reproducing 
the nuclear family which seems to facilitate its acceptance – while at the 
same time what counts as a medical problem depends upon how close one’s 
circumstances are to the preferred relationship form.
Normative assumptions about family structure are also mirrored in medical 
practice and in regulatory approaches to fertility treatment. In many countries, 
access to treatment depends heavily on the degree to which the patient 
matches a specific relationship and/or family model. Fertility treatment is 
more readily accepted when it facilitates the creation of nuclear families. 
This is still how things are in many jurisdictions: though more and more 
exceptions are made. For example, in the Netherlands, single women are 
often refused treatment. Those who do receive treatment are required to 
undergo psychological tests (Pieters 2015). In Sweden, female same-sex 
couples only acquired the right to access fertility treatments in 2005, and 
single women in 2016. As we will see further on in this chapter, in Italy 
(Legge 40, 2004) and France (Loi n° 2011–814) only heterosexual couples 
are allowed access. This means that although different sets of individuals 
may have a similar desire – to have a child – that desire is more likely to 
be construed as a legitimate medical need when the individual is in a 
partnership with someone from the other sex. Similarly, when we look at 
access to uterus transplantation, we can see that while many people may 
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have the desire to gestate a baby in their own body, only those who fit 
certain norms can access treatment that would enable them to do so.
Reproductive needs and the nuclear family
Reproductive technologies tend to be allowed to operate only within 
boundaries that are perceived to replicate or repair the natural. Sheila Jasanoff 
notes that
genetic engineering threatens or calls into question many of the categories 
that have been accepted as foundational in the ordering of societies, both 
ancient and modern. These include the fundamental divisions between nature 
and culture, moral and immoral, safe and risky, god-given and human-made. 
(2005: 26)
The ways in which reproductive technologies are regulated illustrate some 
attempts to limit their ‘disruptive potential’, to keep them within conceptual 
boundaries that match certain norms about what constitutes the family. In 
what follows we will show how, if we look for the reinforcement of concepts 
of nature and biology in the family, we can see how deeply entrenched 
these ideas are, and how powerful a role they play in managing the potential 
threats inherent in new technologies. Nuclear families in this context are 
not necessarily favoured for overtly political or even moral reasons, but 
because they represent a natural or biological norm. As Barrett and McIntosh 
put it:
It is in the realm of gender, sexuality, marriage and the family that we are 
collectively most seduced by appeals to the natural. In this realm the shifting 
norms of practice are solidified, some to be sanctified and others condemned. 
The prevailing form of family is seen as inevitable, as naturally given and 
biologically determined. (1991: 27)
This ‘naturalness’ of the nuclear family form has been contested by researchers 
from various angles (Stacey 2011; Diduck and Kaganas 2012). It is clear 
that when the nuclear family is used as the measure of how things should 
be, this will have an impact on what research is encouraged and seen as 
responding to a legitimate need. This has already been seen in the case 
of IVF. It seemed evident to the Warnock Committee that IVF’s primary 
use should be to facilitate the formation of nuclear families. They foresaw 
that single women or perhaps lesbian couples might want to use IVF with 
sperm donation and in doing so, to create children who would be raised 
without a father. In an effort to circumvent this, a clause was included 
in the law governing fertility treatment, requiring clinics to ‘consider 
the need of a child for a father’. Effectively, this gave clinics grounds for 
refusing single women and lesbian couples, since fertility doctors had a 
legal obligation to consider the welfare of the future child, and since this 
welfare consideration was explicitly linked with the need for a father. In 
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this way, the primacy of the nuclear family was protected, at least to some 
degree.
It is clear that genes play a very important part in our understandings 
of reproduction. However, although genetic connections are often viewed 
as being determinative of parenthood, as we will see further in this chapter 
when we discuss mitochondrial DNA transfer, it is now becoming possible 
to ask whether a genetic link is either necessary or sufficient to justify 
calling a child one’s own ‘biological’ offspring (Barritt et al. 2001). Following 
from this, we can ask whether any or all technologies which can produce 
children genetically related to some specific individual should be categorised 
as fertility treatments. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(1998) described reproductive cloning as replication rather than reproduction 
and stated that because it was not reproduction it should therefore be 
prohibited. Human reproduction, it has been argued, is essentially collabora-
tive and sexual, while cloning is not sexual and can be non-collaborative, 
and thus is more akin to manufacture than reproduction (National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission 1997). The relationship between genes, parenthood 
and reproduction also feeds into the categorisation of certain technological 
possibilities as being therapeutic, curative, or needs related. Many people 
want babies related to them in particular ways, but only some of these 
people are deemed to have needs that can or should be addressed through 
medical technology. For example, same-sex male couples and single men 
cannot access treatment in the UK or in Sweden, because of the illegality 
of surrogacy. A number of countries impose strict cut-off ages for women 
wishing to access treatment. Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands permit 
IVF only for women who are under 45, while France requires that women 
must be ‘of reproductive age’ (Brigham et al. 2013). While the desire for a 
baby may be the same in all cases, only some people’s desires are regarded 
as being suitable for fulfilment through medical treatment. The categorisation 
of desires as needs often follows a particular kind of a biological model, 
so that although we use technology to supersede and transcend biology in 
various ways, other possibilities are marked off as taboo.
An interesting example of the relationship between genes, family norms 
and research/treatment priorities is the case of mitochondrial DNA transfer. 
Those who seek this procedure may be at risk of transmitting a mitochondrial 
mutation to their children. This risk is removed when the mitochondrial 
DNA of the carrier prospective mother is replaced with another woman’s. 
Using this technique, the resulting offspring inherits genetic material from 
three people: the woman who provides the nucleus of the egg, the woman 
who provides the mitochondrial DNA and the man who provides the sperm. 
The presence of DNA from three different people has made the technique 
controversial. It has often been referred to in the press as creating babies 
with three parents (Hamzelou 2016; Macrae 2016).
However, many scientists in the field insist the term ‘three-parent baby’ 
is inaccurate because the nuclear DNA used in the child’s creation is still 
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from two people only (Sample 2015). The manoeuvre to exclude the mito-
chondrial DNA contributor from the status of genetic parent makes it easier 
to construe mitochondrial DNA transfer as therapeutic. Rather than 
intervening to add genes or progenitors to a process that naturally involves 
only two genetic contributors, the addition of mitochondrial DNA is classified 
as ‘mending’ or ‘replacing’ a faulty part in the maternal egg. Thus, according 
to this approach, the child still has only one genetic mother and the process 
is acceptable as it is reconfigured to maintain our expectations of the biologi-
cal norm: each child has exactly two genetic parents.
This reframing to angle the procedure away from anything as drastic as 
introducing a third genetic parent into reproduction has given the technique 
a kind of validation, and this enables the related research on which it is 
based to progress. This is achieved, however, by dint of redefining what 
we mean by genetic parenthood – a not insignificant development. The 
exclusion of one of the DNA contributors from parent status seems to open 
the possibility that genetic parenthood is a matter of degree, since the 
mitochondrial donor simply does not provide enough genetic material in 
relation to the other parents. While we do not seek to define genetic parent-
hood here, it is clear that the question of what constitutes a parent is one 
that is raised, rather than resolved, by the development of such techniques. 
Yet their permissibility seems to depend on the redefinition of parenthood 
so as to forestall this question.
Mitochondrial DNA transfer also opens up other possibilities for those 
who wish to have children in non-traditional families. For example, mito-
chondrial DNA transfer could be used to ‘rejuvenate’ the eggs of women 
who may already be past the optimal reproductive age. It has been suggested 
that replacing the mitochondrial DNA of the older woman’s egg with that 
of a younger woman can ‘improve’ the quality of the egg, thus increasing 
the chances of a successful pregnancy (Reynier et al. 2001; May-Panloup 
et al. 2005; Wolf et al. 2015). However, the use of mitochondrial transfer 
for this purpose has to date not been licensed by the HFEA in the UK.
We have focused almost entirely on aspects of genetic parenthood. However, 
there are of course other ways in which people can become biological 
parents. One of these is gestation. Women who seek medical treatment in 
order to become mothers may value different aspects of motherhood dif-
ferently. One might wish to transmit genes to her child, another might wish 
to mature the gametes in her own body following ovarian tissue transplant, 
while others might place a higher value on gestating a child. Again, these 
possibilities reveal differences in the way that the desires of some individuals 
are integrated into the discourse of medical need and treatment, while those 
of others are excluded. We will look here at uterus transplants as a particularly 
interesting example.
Children have recently been born after having been carried in a uterus 
transplanted into a woman from another woman (The Guardian 2015). 
The paradigmatic patient for this treatment is one who was born without 
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a uterus. However, only a very specific subset of such individuals are selected 
to receive these transplants. Such transplants have been offered as part of 
a clinical trial. In this scenario, the boundary between therapy and research 
is blurred. For the women involved, their only chance of access to this 
treatment may be enrolment on the trial. Because regulations for research 
are tighter than those for standard treatment options, those undertaking 
the trials are able to impose narrower constraints on eligibility than might 
otherwise be the case.
According to one group of experts, the recipient must be ‘a genetic female 
of reproductive age’. She must have ‘a personal or legal contraindication 
to surrogacy and adoption’. Her wish to undergo uterine transplant must 
not be ‘irrational’. She must not ‘exhibit frank unsuitability for motherhood’ 
(Lefkowitz et al. 2012). Another research group stipulate that to be eligible, 
patients must be:
• Women with AUI [absolute uterine infertility]
• Ages 20–35, with working ovaries
• BMI of less than 30
• Cancer free for at least 5 years
• Negative for HIV, hepatitis B and C, chlamydia, gonorrhoea and herpes
• No history of diabetes
• Non-smoker (Baylor Scott and White Health 2017).
It is interesting to note the variations in these criteria. A potential recipient 
has much more to prove than simply having been born without a uterus. 
Some of these requirements in fact seem to have little to do with the biological 
condition of lacking a uterus, at all. This, it has been argued, is unfair 
(Murphy 2015): if a woman should be eligible for uterus transplant because 
she was born without a uterus, then transwomen, all of whom were born 
without a uterus, should be an obvious category to be included here. 
Moreover, some men might genuinely wish to experience pregnancy: why 
would women’s longing to experience pregnancy be worthy of considerable 
expense and not men’s?
One obvious answer might be risk. It is easy to assume that to circumvent 
the natural biological boundaries of reproduction will be extraordinarily 
and excessively risky. However, when one examines the question more 
closely it becomes evident that risk cannot be the whole answer here. For 
one thing, uterus transplantation in itself is extremely risky. When live 
donation is undertaken, significant medical harms are imposed on two 
previously healthy women. Although transplantation to a male body would 
indeed be complex, it is not obvious that it would be so much riskier than 
female-to-female transplantation that it cannot be countenanced. One of 
the teams involved in the recent transplant trials commented that they had 
foreseen possible interest from the trans community – and had deliberately 
drawn up their protocol so as to exclude its members despite the fact that 
they admitted such transplants would be feasible (Grady 2015).
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Expectations of what is ‘natural’ for a woman and a man (and what is 
or is not a ‘genetic female’), respectively, determine whose desires will be 
appreciated and will motivate research efforts. Furthermore, one could 
claim that the fact that the pain and suffering caused by pregnancy only 
befall women is a natural inequality that we should aim to correct (Smajdor 
2007; 2012): this would provide yet another motivation for also pursuing 
research aimed at providing uterus transplants for men.
An alternative angle might be that reproductive technologies should be 
used only to recreate specific sorts of relationships between the child and 
the parent, which IVF fulfils (within the nuclear family parameters), but 
reproductive cloning or womb transplants for men do not. An associated 
concern may be that some interventions do not really meet a medical need, 
while others do: for example, if a treatment is being offered to someone 
who is biologically infertile, as opposed to someone who is not (The Lancet 
2001). This distinction is tricky, however, as we will see in our next section, 
because infertility itself is defined in a particular way that may exclude 
medical conditions in single individuals but include unexplained non-
conception in heterosexual couples. We will show how applying such criteria 
could help to pick out some possibilities while excluding others.
Defining infertility
The WHO defines infertility as a disease of a sexually active couple. Thus, 
infertility is ‘a disease of the reproductive system defined by failure to 
achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected 
sexual intercourse’ (Zegers-Hochschild et al. 2009). What is implicit in 
this definition is that the unprotected sexual intercourse here is heterosexual. 
Clearly, a same-sex couple will not achieve a clinical pregnancy, however 
many months they have unprotected sexual intercourse. The heterosexual 
couple should in the natural course of events be able to achieve a pregnancy 
in this way. This way of defining infertility may not be consistent with 
intuitions about what infertility is. For example, if Jane lacks ovaries, we 
might think of her as being infertile. However, she is not infertile according 
to the WHO’s current definition – unless she has had unprotected sexual 
intercourse with a man over the duration of twelve months.
The WHO’s definition is influential in determining how infertility is 
defined in specific countries. For example, in the UK, the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence includes the following recommendation: 
‘A woman of reproductive age who has not conceived after 1 year of 
unprotected vaginal sexual intercourse, in the absence of any known cause 
of infertility, should be offered further clinical assessment and investigation 
along with her partner’ (2013). Because a requisite period of heterosexual 
intercourse is often a criterion of access to fertility treatment as well as to 
the medical investigations that precede any intervention, unless she fulfils 
this condition, she might not even find out that she lacks ovaries. Accordingly, 
the eligibility of patients (i.e. their need for treatment) has come to be 
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dictated in part by a social factor rather than a clinical one: whether or 
not the patient is infertile depends on whether she has a particular sort of 
relationship. Provided that claimants are heterosexual, a construction of 
need can be mapped onto the underlying biological norm.
Clearly, though, it is possible that a lesbian or single woman could suffer 
from blocked fallopian tubes, or any other reproductive pathology. However, 
the reproductive pathology is implicitly of lesser importance than the structure 
of the relationship within which the patient finds herself. In practice, while 
in some countries definitions such as the WHO one cited above have been 
amended to allow same-sex couples or single individuals access to fertility 
treatments, in others they have been made more restrictive to include e.g. 
the provision that the members of the couple have to be married or cohabit, 
and of a certain age (not too old).
According to French law:
the object of reproductive medical assistance is to remedy the infertility of a 
couple or to avoid the transmission to the child or a member of the couple, 
of a disease of particular gravity. The pathological character of infertility has 
to be medically diagnosed. The man and the woman have to be alive, of 
reproductive age, and had previously consented to the embryo transfer or the 
insemination. (Loi n° 2011–814)
Likewise, Italian law restricts eligible infertility to infertility in heterosexual 
couples. The purpose of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) is to 
‘help solve the reproductive problems caused by human sterility or infertility 
. . . when there are no other therapeutic means to remove the causes of 
sterility or infertility’ (Legge 40, 2004, art. 1). However, the law specifically 
stipulates that access to such technologies is limited to ‘adult couples of 
different sex, married or cohabiting, of reproductive age, both living’ (Legge 
40, 2004, art. 5).
A draft bill recently proposed in India would see access to surrogacy 
restricted to heterosexual couples married for at least five years (Srivastaval 
2016). This preference for the (preferably married or at least cohabiting) 
heterosexual couple, in addition to its natural, assumed procreative potential, 
has been viewed as essential for the interests of the child: as we have seen 
above, this interest has been invoked in UK regulations of access to fertility 
treatment. It is assumed to be in children’s interests to have a mother and a 
father. A growing body of empirical research indicating that what matters 
most for children’s well-being seems to be the quality of family relationships 
rather than family form (Golombok 2015) is at odds with these expectations. 
Specifically, the ‘no difference’ outcome for children from being raised by 
same-sex as opposed to different-sex parents has been deemed to have 
reached consensus in the literature (Adams and Light 2015). Hence, if it is the 
interests of children that is the paramount concern here, directing research 
and treatment preferably or uniquely towards fulfilment of heterosexual 
partners’ desires is questionable. The UK’s requirement in terms of a child’s 
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need for a father was removed in 2008 – following decades of controversy. 
The belief of the members of the Warnock Report, that being raised by a 
mother and a father is better for children, is understandable in the context 
of its time and pre-dates relevant findings from empirical research: however, 
three decades on, the same belief has become much harder to support.
The disease of infertility, as defined above, is contextual to a degree far 
greater than most other diseases. Fertility treatments do not aim at restoring 
the capacity to achieve a pregnancy via sexual intercourse. Indeed, having 
become a parent via fertility treatments, one might not have reproduced 
at all (if gamete donors were used), and at the end of the treatment a couple 
might be just as incapable of achieving a clinical pregnancy as before. 
Simone Bateman (2002) argues that medicine should only seek to correct 
medical pathologies. Another perspective is taken by Habbema et al. (2004) 
who suggest that it is the symptom of non-conception that is addressed by 
fertility treatment. However, although non-conception can be a symptom 
which is treated in fertility medicine, it is not always necessarily the main 
symptom which brings people to the clinic. For example, those who want 
to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) or mitochondrial transfer 
to avoid having a child with a particular gene or a mitochondrial condition 
may be very well able to reproduce unaided. It is just that they cannot have 
the sort of child they want, with the person they want to have it with, 
without medical help.
If we consider whether there is a specific necessary symptom associated 
with all claimants for fertility treatment, it becomes evident that there is 
a shared feature: the aspiration to have a (specific kind of) child (Smajdor 
and Cutas 2015). A woman may have blocked fallopian tubes for years but 
not become aware of this until she decides to reproduce. The suffering of 
infertility is dependent on having a specific desire. It is the desire that is 
treated, regardless of whether the patient is suffering from a reproductive 
pathology. Without this desire, infertility does not require treatment: on 
the contrary, it is convenient. Since it is the reproductive aspiration that is 
treated, and if family form is not determinative of children’s well-being, 
then there seems to be no reason why heterosexual couples’ reproductive 
aspirations should count as medical needs any more than those of other 
categories of individuals.
Conclusion
Embedded and unquestioned assumptions about reproduction, fertility and 
the family determine whose claims and whose suffering deserve attention. 
Widely shared beliefs, in their turn, contribute to this effect, and legal and 
professional regulations solidify it. As access to research and clinical trials 
can be influenced by these unquestioned assumptions, we can see the ongoing 
cycle of normative assumptions that feed into notions of need, which then 
generate treatments, for which eligibility is constrained by norms, which 
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are then contested – partly on the basis of the new possibilities that have 
emerged.
The relationships between reproduction, family, medical need and research, 
are such as to grate against one another. Each new possibility poses new 
challenges to the ways in which we conceptualise the family. One possible 
response to this is to attempt to enforce and solidify normative expectations 
about the family and appropriate roles within it, and to protect it from the 
threats of innovation. Another might be to ask whether the nuclear family 
really merits such concern and protection – in a way in which other family 
types do not. We hope in this chapter to have highlighted some of the 
tensions between, on the one hand, science’s potential to undermine assump-
tions and expectations in the realm of family-making, and on the other, 
the potential of these assumptions and expectations to influence the direction 
of research.
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New frontiers in surgery: the case of 
uterus and penis transplantation1
Gennaro Selvaggi and Sean Aas
Various types of organ transplantations are now considered standard 
procedures: heart and liver transplants lengthen lives; kidney transplants 
also do so, as well as improving quality of life by reducing or eliminating 
the need for dialysis. The transplantation of faces and limbs, a more novel 
set of techniques, improves quality of life without necessarily lengthening 
or ‘saving’ lives. An even more recent development is uterus and penis 
transplantations, which also do not save or lengthen life, but increase 
reproductive and sexual function and thereby improve quality of life.
This chapter identifies and discusses central ethical issues that are likely 
to arise in the development of uterus and penis transplantations. These 
include general issues related to the ethics of surgical research, and specific 
concerns regarding the rationale of these particular procedures in the context 
of reproductive and sexual medicine. How should prospective patient-subjects 
be selected for innovative surgeries? Are these procedures appropriate as 
treatment for gender dysphoria, or should they be restricted to people whose 
reproductive and sexual organs have been damaged by illness or accident? 
Who is most likely to benefit and how are benefit and risks to be judged? 
What are the alternatives to these transplant surgeries? How should donor 
organs be sourced? Finally, more broadly, how should we think of these 
procedures from the perspective of cost-effectiveness – are these expensive, 
non-life-saving procedures a good use of scarce health resources in light 
of pressing global needs?
Uterus transplantation and penis transplantation:  
a brief history
Transplant medicine has made tremendous advances during the last decades. 
An early milestone was the first successful transplantation of a solid organ, 
the kidney, in 1956 (Merril et al. 1956; Murray et al. 1960); this was later 
followed by successful transplantations of other organs, including life-saving 
transplants of lungs (1963) and hearts (1967) as well as transplants aimed 
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at enhancing quality of life: hand (Dubernard et al. 1999), abdominal wall 
(Levi et al. 2003), larynx (Birchall et al. 2006), face (Devauchelle et al. 2006), 
uterus (Brännström et al. 2010; 2014; 2015) and penis (Bateman 2015).
Uterus transplantation in particular raises distinctive issues about the 
right to reproduce and the relevance of reproductive ability to health and 
quality of life. The first uterus transplantation was attempted in Germany 
in 1931, on Lili Elbe, also one of the first trans women to undergo surgery 
to modify the anatomy of her genitals, removing the male organs (penis 
and testicles) and constructing female organs (vagina and labia) in order 
to confirm her desired gender (an early example of what has come to 
be called ‘gender confirmation surgery’). Uterus transplantation was per-
formed together with the reconstruction of the vaginal cavity as a final 
surgical step. Lili Elbe died three months after this surgery because of 
infection following rejection of the transplanted uterus. After that early 
attempt, it took more than eighty years for the first fully successful uterus 
transplantation (leading to a live birth), performed at the Sahlgrenska 
University Hospital in Gothenburg, Sweden, by a surgical team directed 
by the gynaecologist Brännström and the transplantation surgeon Olausson 
(2015).
Penile reconstructions, which raise overlapping issues, were also originally 
performed in the 1930s, by the Russian surgeon Nikolaj Bogoras (1936). 
At the time, surgeons reconstructed the penis using a series of operations, 
harvesting tissues from other parts of the body (originally skin, fat and 
muscles, later bones as well), shaping them and transposing them into the 
pubic area to resemble a natural penis. Penile reconstruction has developed 
in the intervening years, and is typically offered to two distinct populations: 
‘cis men’ (i.e. individuals whose ‘male’ gender identity matches the sex and/
or gender assigned at birth) whose penis was missing following disease or 
trauma – say, war injury or botched circumcision; and ‘trans men’ (i.e. 
individuals whose ‘male’ gender identity does not match the ‘female’ sex 
and/or gender assigned at birth), some of whom seek anatomical changes 
to reduce suffering resulting from gender dysphoria. In spite of all the surgical 
advances and refinements over the past eighty years, an ideal technique for 
penile reconstruction has not yet been developed.
Surgeons have recently attempted to develop penis transplantation as an 
alternative to traditional penis reconstruction. The first penis transplantation 
was performed in China in 2006 on a cis man after traumatic severance 
of the penis, with the surgery reversed after two weeks due to a negative 
psychological reaction (Hu et al. 2006). Dr Van der Merwe at Tygerberg 
Hospital, University of Stellenbosch, in South Africa, performed the first 
successful penis transplantation in 2014, from a cadaver donor to a male 
patient who had lost his penis following a failed ritual circumcision; the 
results have been described as satisfactory, with the patient recovering 
erectile function, leading to a pregnancy (Bateman 2015). A third operation 
was performed in 2016 at Boston Massachusetts Hospital, though it is not 
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yet publicly known whether this instance was or will be successful (Caplan 
et al. 2016).
Uterus and penis transplantations: innovation, care, research
Uterus and penis transplantations are novel surgical procedures, promising 
significant benefits to those cis and transpeople who are missing an important 
part of their genital anatomy. However, much remains unknown about the 
incidence of risks, and the importance of the benefits of these procedures. 
Going forward, there is an imperative both to offer clinical benefits to 
prospective subjects and, so far as possible and permissible, to develop 
generalisable knowledge about these procedures for the sake of future 
patients. As novel and largely untested therapeutic modalities, uterus and 
penis transplantations fit into two overlapping ethical categories: clinical 
care and research.
First and foremost, at present uterus and penis transplantations are sought 
for clinical benefit; therefore, they are therapies of a particular kind: what 
are sometimes called innovative surgeries. According to Morgenstern (2006), 
innovative surgery is a novel approach to an unsolved surgical problem or 
one that offers a substantive improvement of a pre-existing technique. Uterus 
transplantation provides a novel surgical means to restore or produce fertility, 
while penis transplantation promises a substantial improvement over existing 
penile reconstruction techniques. Uterus transplantation restores fertility 
in cases of absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI), which is the most 
significant cause of totally untreatable infertility (Olausson et al. 2014). 
Currently, there is no alternative that will permit a woman with AUFI to 
carry on a pregnancy and deliver a live baby. Interestingly, to serve this 
end a uterus transplantation need not involve permanent implantation of 
a donor organ. Thus, uterus transplantation is the first ephemeral (i.e. 
lasting for a short time) transplantation type, whereby the transplanted 
organ is only temporarily engrafted, and is removed after the baby is delivered 
(Olausson et al. 2014).
Penis transplantation procedures, as therapies, treat disorders of the 
genitalia, enhancing quality of life after injury by restoring valued functioning 
such as urinating while standing and penetrative sexual intercourse. Further, 
in some trans men, penis transplantation may provide a clinically effective 
treatment for gender dysphoria, a serious condition that, inadequately treated, 
poses high risks of both morbidity (depression, anxiety) and mortality (via 
suicide). In both cis and trans men, penile reconstruction (regardless of the 
surgical methods used) has a large and usually positive impact on the 
subject’s psychological well-being. Reconstruction reduces organ-specific 
dysphoria (i.e. ‘unhappiness and discomfort’) in cis men with genital injury 
or pathology. In trans men, reconstruction can be an effective treatment 
for gender dysphoria, particularly in combination with other therapeutic 
approaches (other surgical procedures like mastectomy, hormonal therapy 
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and psychosocial support) (World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health 2011). However, there is no consensus in the existing literature 
regarding the best surgical technique for penile reconstruction (Selvaggi 
and Elander 2008; Wroblewski et al. 2013).
So far, penile reconstruction has been performed by way of surgical 
techniques involving various tissues (skin, fat, muscle, etc.) which are taken 
from one part of the patient’s body (forearm, thigh, etc.), shaped into a 
penis, and repositioned on the pubic area of the same patient. One of the 
most advanced techniques consists in the use of autologous tissue, the radial 
forearm flap; however, this usually does not completely fulfil patients’ 
expectations and, as mentioned earlier, it presents a high risk of complica-
tions, also leaving the recipient with additional scarring of the donor area 
(Selvaggi et al. 2006; Selvaggi and Elander 2008; Monstrey et al. 2009; 
Wroblewski et al. 2013). Figure 4.1 shows the results of a reconstruction 
with this technique; it clearly demonstrates how the reconstructed penis 
differs from a typical biological penis; Figure 4.2 shows the residual scar 
on the donor area. These techniques go under the general name of phal-
loplasty. Specifically for trans men, another surgical alternative is metaid-
oioplasty, which consists in the simple enlargement of the clitoris and 
possibly the reconstruction of the urethra, to create what is sometimes 
called a ‘micropenis’.
All of these types of penis reconstructions have important limitations, 
particularly as treatments for gender dysphoria. First, none of these techniques 
Figure 4.1 Penile reconstruction with radial forearm flap
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is able to satisfy entirely patients’ expectations: in metaidoioplasty, satisfactory 
penetrative function is not achievable; in phalloplasty, further surgery is 
needed to implant a silicone erection device into the reconstructed penis, 
with additional risks such as infection and extrusion of the erection device. 
Second, in both cases any observer can recognise that the penis has been 
reconstructed. Currently, there is no technique that can provide a fully 
passable penis, and therefore full and seamless functioning in the desired 
gender identity. Third, other functions such as urinating while standing 
often require extensive additional ‘revision’ surgeries, with no guarantee 
of success. Moreover, in both procedures there is a high risk of complications 
– the risk of total loss of the reconstructed penis is as high as 2 per cent. 
In phalloplasty there can be significant donor site morbidity, for example, 
on the radial forearm. Post-operative recovery typically involves weeks of 
hospitalisation and many months of rehabilitative therapy.
Due to these limitations, many patients who lack a penis do not attempt 
reconstruction, instead (in many cases) silently suffering with sometimes 
severe dysphoria. The existence of this population alone shows that there 
is a significant health need for improved gender confirmation modalities 
in trans men, a need which might be met by safe and effective penis trans-
plantation procedures. Nonetheless, so far none of the reported penis 
transplantation cases have been performed for the purpose of gender 
confirmation. In spite of some critiques following the first report of penis 
transplantation in an amputated patient (Dubernard, 2006; Hoebeke et al. 
2007), expert reconstructive urologists believe this surgical innovation may 
offer the best results in penile reconstruction for trans as well as cis men, 
due to a degree of satisfaction that is currently not available from other 
Figure 4.2 Donor-area morbidity (scarring) following the harvesting of a 
radial forearm flap for penile reconstruction
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methods (Hoebeke et al. 2007). Among all the candidates for penis trans-
plantation, trans men with gender dysphoria represent probably the largest 
pool. Loss of the penis in cis men due to injury or illness remains relatively 
rare – the figures are unclear: 7 per cent of military personnel suffer genital 
injuries in combat, while penile cancer is reported to have a incidence of 
between 0.3 to 1 in 100,000; however, these figures account for all penile 
cancers and genital injuries, many of which may not require total penile 
reconstruction (Bleeker et al. 2008); gender dysphoria in trans men is much 
more common, with a prevalence ranging from 1:30,400 to 1:200,000 
persons in (for instance) Belgium (De Cuypere et al. 2007). Even admitting 
that not all trans men would want to undergo genital surgery and might 
be satisfied solely with hormonal therapy and mastectomy, it is still likely 
that they would represent a large proportion of the patients seeking penile 
reconstruction by penis transplantation.
Penis and uterus transplantations, therefore, offer substantial benefits to 
prospective patients. Complex innovations like these should, however, not 
be pursued lightly, even if the surgeon expects that the patient will benefit. 
In the case of innovative surgery, particularly surgery which carries significant 
physical and psychological risks, standard criteria for risk-minimisation 
include: (1) sufficient scientific background knowledge on the part of the 
surgical team, probably involving laboratory experiments conducted before 
procedures are conducted in vivo; and (2) stable and sufficient institutional 
support, with resources reliably available to maximise the chances of a 
successful procedure, recovery and rehabilitation. Moreover, and relatedly, 
it is critically important that (3) these innovative surgeries occur within a 
context of adequate scientific and ethical oversight (Moore 1970; 2000).
It could be argued that this is particularly important in cases such as 
penis and uterus transplantation, where many innovative procedures will 
be, though therapeutic, not merely therapeutic: the goal will be both to 
help the patient, and to develop surgical knowledge which can help future 
patients.
In order to treat someone effectively, it may be necessary to perform 
these types of surgery; at the end of the day, these types of surgery may 
be, for some patients, ‘the best available treatment’. However, these surgeries 
need refinement: they are far from perfect at present; the judgement that 
they are in the patient’s clinical interests, therefore, will to some extent 
reflect a chancy balancing of unknown risks against substantial benefits. 
But to reduce uncertainty about the risks of these procedures, it is necessary 
to perform them. This results in a situation that some may regard as 
uncomfortable: those who receive these types of surgery are to some extent 
‘human guinea pigs’. Their bodies are utilised to increase knowledge, to 
collect data and to perfect surgical techniques, in cases where there is, at 
least, some doubt about whether this is to their clinical benefit. But, at the 
same time, these ‘guinea pigs’ are also being treated with what they may 
regard as the ‘best available treatment’ at this given time. So, from this 
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perspective any alternative here is morally problematic: either the treatment 
that the patient may judge as ‘the best available treatment’ is provided, and 
the patient may be exposed to unknown risks and be utilised as a means 
to gather further knowledge and perfect these types of surgery; or the 
treatment is denied, and a dissatisfactory status quo is preserved.
As new procedures, penis and uterus transplantations will expose patients 
to unknown and possibly large risks. Mere consent may be enough to justify 
these risks, but it may not – physicians may well have a duty not to offer 
excessively risky therapies, even if patients want them. Or it may be that 
early instances of these procedures are so expensive that some broader 
future benefit must be cited to support the expenditure. If penis and uterus 
transplantations are justifiable as clinical research, as well as clinical care, 
then there may be an additional justification for physicians to perform these 
dangerous and expensive procedures in cases where the benefits do not 
definitively and obviously outweigh the risks.
We would do well, then, to consider whether uterus and penis transplanta-
tion procedures, in the short term, might be justifiable as research as well 
as therapy. Framing the issue in this way has a number of advantages, not 
least the existence of well-worked-out ethical frameworks for evaluating 
clinical research. Emanuel et al. (2000), for instance, provide an especially 
perspicacious set of guidelines for evaluating proposed research. Interpreting 
a variety of national and international research ethics documents, Emanuel 
et al. argue that medical research, in order to be ethical, must exhibit: 
scientific and social value (evaluation of the treatment, intervention, or 
theory that will improve health and well-being or increase knowledge); 
scientific validity (use of accepted scientific principles and methods, including 
statistical techniques, to produce reliable, i.e. reproducible, and valid, i.e. 
credible, data); fair subject selection (selection of subjects so that stigmatised 
and vulnerable individuals are not targeted for risky research and the rich 
and socially powerful are not favoured for potentially beneficial research); 
favourable risk–benefit ratio (minimisation of risk, enhancement of potential 
benefits, risks proportionate to the benefits to the subject and society); 
independent review (review of the design of the research trial, its proposed 
subject population and risk–benefit ratio by individuals unaffiliated with 
the research); informed consent (provision of information to subjects about 
the purpose of the research, its procedures, potential risks, benefits and 
alternatives, so that the individual understands this information and can 
make a voluntary decision whether to enrol and continue to participate); 
respect for enrolled research participants (permitting withdrawal from 
research, protecting privacy through confidentiality, informing subjects of 
newly discovered risks and benefits, informing subjects of results of clinical 
research, maintaining welfare of the subjects).
These categories, we believe, are useful for evaluating innovative uterus 
and penis transplantation procedures whether or not these are always 
‘research’ properly speaking (a question we will not attempt to answer 
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here). Among them, social value, favourable risk–benefit ratio and fair 
subject selection are the most controversial in penis and uterus transplanta-
tions; in the ensuing sections, we discuss these in detail.
Social value
If penis and uterus transplantations are justifiable, even in part, because 
of benefits to future patients, then their justification involves exposing some 
patients to risk for the benefit of others. It is therefore important that early 
attempts at these procedures are conducted in a manner that has some 
chance of producing knowledge that is of real value.
Penis and uterus transplantations raise subtle and difficult issues about 
the nature of the value that would be produced, if these techniques were 
developed to the point where they are part of the standard of care for 
conditions such as penile injury, infertility and gender dysphoria. Penis 
transplantation as restorative therapy after loss or damage to a cis man’s 
penis should be relatively uncontroversial; restoring injured bodies to 
physiological normality is a long-recognised and much-pursued goal of 
medicine. The other cases raise much more complex and controversial 
issues: in the case of uterus transplantation, the value of and rights to fertility; 
and in the case of penis transplantation for trans men, the importance of 
gender identity and the nature of appropriate treatment for gender dysphoria. 
We discuss the social value of uterus transplantation first, before transitioning 
to questions about the social value of penis transplantation and its risks 
and benefits.
Altruism, procreation, parenthood and uterus transplantation
The first ethics guidelines for research and development into uterus trans-
plantation were presented by the International Federation of Gynaecology 
and Obstetrics in 2009 (Milliez 2009; Olausson et al. 2014): considerations 
adduced include the value of, and rights to, procreation as well as considera-
tions regarding altruism and alternatives such as adoption. Uterus trans-
plantation, unlike penis transplantation, is intended primarily, perhaps 
exclusively, to allow a single specific sort of bodily functioning: conceiving, 
gestating and giving birth to a child. This is evidenced by the fact, mentioned 
above, that transplanted uteruses are removed after successful birth. Thus, 
it is important to consider the ethics of this procedure in light of the costs 
and benefits of the alternatives available to those unable to conceive a child 
with existing fertility treatments.
In general, there are three options for infertility in the absence of a 
functioning uterus: (1) choosing not to have children; (2) adopting a child; 
or (3) pursuing gestational surrogacy. A first point about social value is 
that adding uterus transplantation to this menu of options can, at the very 
least, be expected to reduce the incidence of alternative choices. The social 
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value of this eventuality is uncertain, given uncertainty in the magnitude 
of effects, but it seems likely that widespread availability of uterus trans-
plantation would somewhat decrease the rate of adoptions. Since adoption 
promotes the well-being of un-parented children, uterus transplantation 
could be expected to have negative effects in at least this respect, somewhat 
reducing the supply of prospective adoptive parents. However, the same 
could be said of any novel fertility treatment; thus, this in itself does not 
seem to be a decisive objection to uterus transplantation. Moreover, there 
are serious concerns about the practice of gestational surrogacy, including 
concerns about exploitation of surrogates (Brännström et al. 2010); any 
harm done in reducing adoption might be counterbalanced (in whole or in 
part) by the benefit of reducing the rate of surrogacy and its attendant 
problems. More recently, Testa and Johannesson (2017) highlight how uterus 
transplantation offers the mother the possibility of transferring the parental 
genetic material, and carrying her pregnancy simultaneously.
It might be asked, further, whether restoring fertility – a function that 
does not seem to be necessary for many people to live fulfilling and happy 
lives – ought to be a high-priority medical goal in the first place. Of course, 
many people profoundly value children and family life; however, obviously, 
bearing children oneself is not the only way to achieve this goal. That said, 
many people do seem to think that there is a basic human right to procreate 
(Quigley 2010). Leaving aside, for now, questions about the cost of reproduc-
tive assistance relative to other priorities, it does not seem implausible to 
think that everyone should be able to choose whether to procreate or not. 
Uterus transplantation promotes this choice in cases where it might otherwise 
be completely unavailable, thus producing an important kind of social 
value.
Supposing we grant that there is some general right to procreation, or 
at least a reason to promote (positive) reproductive freedom, difficult questions 
arise as to how this right should be realised in people whose gender identity 
poorly matches the genital anatomy they were born with. One important 
use of uterus transplantation would be to provide trans women with the 
opportunity to procreate in a manner reflective of their gender identity.
Sparrow (2008) and Murphy (2014) have discussed whether trans women 
should be regarded as eligible for uterus transplantation. More specifically, 
Murphy (2015) considers whether there would be any morally significant 
reason why trans women, or even cis men, should not be eligible for the 
same opportunity to gestate as cis women. Noting that other forms of 
assisted reproduction technology, such as fertility medication, artificial 
insemination, in vitro fertilisation and surrogacy, are regularly offered to 
both cis women and trans people, Murphy asks why this particular form 
of assisted reproduction should only be offered for cis women. To be sure, 
during the early phases of uterus transplantation research, it may make 
sense to start with cis women, where the procedure is less technically 
complicated; however, once many of the transplantation issues common to 
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both sexes have been solved, there does not seem to be any specific ethical 
justification to preclude attempting uterus transplantation in trans women. 
To do so would, Murphy argues, be a form of unjustified discrimination.
Sparrow (2008), who is sceptical of uterus transplantation, focuses his 
arguments on the allocation of research resources, claiming that all publicly 
funded research should be limited to sex-typical ways of having children. 
However, if, as Murphy points out, limiting publicly funded research to 
‘sex-typical ways’ of having children results in discrimination between 
different groups of patients, it is not clear that cost arguments could suffice. 
The fact that non-discrimination is costly is not obviously or uncontroversially 
a strong reason to discriminate. Many believe that justice can sometimes 
override efficiency, requiring us to devote resources in a manner which 
sacrifices some overall well-being to promote the possibility of equal treatment 
of equal persons.
Moreover, as Murphy suggests, Sparrow’s proposal seems in some ways 
to prove too much. After all, the statistically typical form of reproduction 
for human females involves no artificial fertility aids whatsoever. IVF, for 
instance, hardly seems ‘sex-typical’. Should we, therefore, restrict funding 
for IVF in favour of an exclusive focus on fertility treatments that attempt 
to restore biologically ‘normal’ procreative functioning? That is not at all 
obvious.
Similar concerns may apply to proposals that would limit uterus trans-
plantation based on the idea that our human right to reproduce only covers 
reproduction in ‘species-typical’ ways. The idea here would be that the 
right to reproduce, though possessed by everyone, is possessed in different 
ways in ‘natural-born men’ as opposed to ‘natural-born women’. Trans 
women have a right to reproduce, so that argument goes, as males; thus 
withholding treatments that might allow them to reproduce in female-typical 
ways does not violate their reproductive rights.
Again, this argument’s focus on species-typicality leaves it unable to 
justify many existing fertility treatments, which, even in cis women, often 
involve atypical ways of conceiving and implanting an embryo. Perhaps, 
however, a proponent of this argument would simply agree that IVF is not 
included under a human right to reproduce, focusing instead on the right 
to reproduce as the right to have and make use of a healthy, normal reproduc-
tive system. This way of understanding the right is, we suspect, too narrow, 
fetishising arbitrary facts about statistically typical humans and ignoring 
the importance of simply being able to do important things, however you 
do them. We would suggest instead a human right to reproduce in a manner 
consistent with an individual’s basic values and sense of identity; a right, 
therefore, which would imply that there is strong reason to help trans 
women reproduce as women.
However, even a more restricted conception of the right to reproduce, a 
right to reproductive health, could justify uterus transplantation in many 
trans women. This narrower conception focuses on healthy reproduction as 
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sex-typical reproduction. But health is not just about normality; it is also 
about the avoidance of suffering. Many trans women suffer from serious 
cases of gender dysphoria; prior to gender confirmation, they are, therefore, 
not healthy. Asking them to preserve anatomical structures needed for 
male-typical fertility until such time as they are ready to bear children is 
asking them to sacrifice health for reproduction – a demand that ought to 
be viewed sceptically, on any plausible conception of reproductive rights.
Uterus transplantation as an innovative fertility treatment also opens the 
possibility of a much more atypical kind of reproduction: uteruses could 
be transplanted into cis men. This clearly does not solve a health problem; 
it would, therefore, go beyond the right to reproduce in a healthy way. 
Even on our broader understanding of the right to reproduce consistent 
with deeply held beliefs and identities, we doubt that there will often be a 
forceful claim to uterus transplantation in cis men; it will rarely be the case 
that a cis man’s deeply held values or identity demand that he reproduce 
by gestating a genetically related child in his own body. Cis men have 
many other opportunities for socially endorsed, stigma-free parenthood; 
to most cis men, gestating a child would be at most one option among 
others. Lacking an option, even if it would be good to have it, is not in 
itself a rights violation.
That said, one could imagine circumstances under which uterus trans-
plantation in cis men ought to be seriously considered. Murphy (2015) 
proposes the case of a man who might wish to gestate a child because his 
female partner is unable to do so (because of uterus incapacity or pregnancy 
risk to her health) or unwilling to (because she is the main economic provider 
in the relationship and does not want to lose time to pregnancy). Further, 
male gestation might appeal to male same-sex couples.
Sparrow worries that, if people identified at birth as male could gestate 
children, we should be concerned about ‘changes in the social meaning and 
expectations of sexed bodies’ (2008: 295). It is, however, hardly obvious 
that such changes would be a bad thing: feminists have mounted powerful 
arguments that these meanings and expectations place undue burdens on 
women (Haslanger 2012). Eventually, offering uterus transplantation in 
trans women and cis men could provide reproductive options that would 
be valuable both for the individuals who take advantage of them, and for 
the structure of the society in which they live. Still, we stress that one need 
not accept this more radical conclusion to accept a human-rights-based 
case for uterus transplantation in trans women; that, again, can be under-
stood, in many cases, as a consequence of the right to reproduce free from 
gender dysphoria.
Risk–benefit ratios in penis and uterus transplantations
There is as yet little detailed discussion of the risks and benefits of penis 
transplantation in the ethics literature; what there is focuses exclusively on 
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cis men. The group at the Guangzhou General Hospital in China, where 
the first penis transplantation was performed, attempted to discuss ethical 
issues related to this innovative surgery, but they did not discuss penis 
transplantation specifically for trans patients; their analysis was limited to 
pointing out the importance of considering risk–benefit ratio, informed 
consent, fair patient selection and psychological assessment, before proceeding 
with the surgery.
In one of the few extant discussions of the ethics of penis transplantation, 
Caplan et al. (2016) assert that the development of penis transplantation 
procedures in live human beings should pause until ethical guidelines are 
developed. Since, they maintain, penis transplantation is not a life-saving 
procedure, but rather a high-risk mode for improving quality of life, a 
precautionary principle requires that procedures should be halted until 
explicit ethical guidelines are adopted. Ethical discussion must cover the 
donation of tissue, consent, subject selection, the qualifications of the surgical 
team and management of both failure and patient dissatisfaction. Caplan 
et al. conclude that, unless these issues are discussed in more detail, penis 
transplantation should not be undertaken. We think that Caplan et al. 
(2016) underestimate the urgency of the clinical needs that penis transplanta-
tion meets, and overstate our present state of uncertainty regarding the 
risks and benefits of the procedure. Caplan is right that only a few anatomical 
and animal studies on penis transplantation have been reported in the 
literature (Sonmez et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2010; Tuffaha, Sacks et al. 
2014; Tuffaha, Budihardjo et al. 2014). However, penis reconstruction as 
currently practised provides a partial model; and here there are many suc-
cessful and well-studied cases, particularly in trans men (Selvaggi and Elander 
2008; Monstrey et al. 2009; World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health 2011; Wroblewski et al. 2013). It is our judgement that there is 
sufficient scientific knowledge regarding the underlying anatomical problems 
to proceed with transplantation attempts in humans, if this is otherwise 
ethically permissible.
Caplan et al. (2016) adopt a more cautious attitude, in part, because 
they draw a sharp distinction between penis transplantation as a very risky 
‘life-enhancing’ procedure, which simply improves quality of life, and ‘life-
saving’ procedures, as in many cases of solid organ transplant. More recently, 
Caplan and Purves (2017) have highlighted how candidates for life-improving 
organ transplantation may have poor judgement when assessing risks and 
benefits. This raises the possibility that the decision to opt for surgery may 
not represent a genuine expression of autonomy. However, as Caplan and 
Purves note, many other life-improving surgeries widely offered today, as 
reconstructive (as well as cosmetic) procedures, carry a risk of death from 
anaesthesia or other complications after surgery such as deadly infections, 
and yet these procedures are widely offered and chosen. Though it is 
important for patients to understand risks before undertaking dangerous 
procedures, banning whole categories of procedure on grounds of concern 
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about misunderstanding of risk goes much further than present practice 
does or should.
Our view is that all transplants are inherently risky procedures and all 
carry with them the attendant risks of permanent immunosuppressant 
therapy (Diaz-Siso et al. 2013; Siemionow 2012). But these risks must be 
counterbalanced against the benefits, without giving categorical priority to 
length of life over quality of life. Moreover, it is worth noting that some 
penis transplantations may extend expected lifespan as well as improve 
quality of life. For gender dysphoria patients, the degree of dysphoria and 
subsequent risk of suicide may be so high that adequate gender confirmation 
might be considered a life-saving procedure.
To be sure, in addition to the risks of immunosuppressant therapy 
(Siemionow 2012; Diaz-Siso et al. 2013), there are also psychosocial risks, 
in penis transplantation especially (Caplan et al. 2016). Unlike solid organ 
grafts (e.g. liver, heart), hand, penis and face transplants are visible, and 
thus may have more pronounced implications for the recipient’s sense of 
self (Kumnig and Jowsey-Gregoire 2016). This raises the possibility that, 
as in the Guangzhou case, the recipients would be unable to accept and 
integrate the graft into their sense of identity and bodily integrity (Carosella 
and Pradeu 2006). Yet nothing apart from further research in humans 
could determine whether and to what extent this would actually be the 
case. In gender dysphoria patients, especially, we believe that post-operative 
regret will be rare. Significant regret is rare for existing penile construction 
modalities, even with their many limits. It seems likely that the aesthetic 
and functional advantages of penis transplantation will produce equivalent 
or better post-operative satisfaction, though these would have to be weighed 
against side effects. Still, as Caplan et al. (2016) point out, there will be 
psychosocial challenges, especially for the early cases, who are likely to 
receive intense media scrutiny. Caplan et al. are surely right that, ceteris 
paribus, physicians should attempt to minimise these risks as they advise 
patients about these procedures.
A final issue in risk–benefit evaluation is more fundamental; it concerns 
the perspective from which risks and benefits should be weighed. One 
sceptical view on both uterus and penis transplantation might hold that 
psychosocial benefits, no matter how great, do not justify the enormous 
risks attendant on complex transplantation surgery and subsequent immu-
nosuppressive therapy. This objection, however, is an anachronism in this 
anti-paternalistic age of ‘patient-centred care’. Patients seek fertility and 
gender confirmation procedures because a lack of desired reproductive and/
or sexual functioning appears to them, in their own life, as a serious 
problem. The success or failure of these procedures, particularly in trans 
populations, is measured primarily, if not exclusively, by self-reported patient 
satisfaction (Kuiper and Cohen-Kettenis 1988). Clinicians do not and should 
not decide how big a risk justifies these benefits. They should, of course, 
advise as to the nature of the risks; when these are high, as in uterus and 
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penis transplantations, they should take extra steps to ensure that the 
patient understands them. The same goes, we argue, for surgeons as clinician-
researchers, in the development of uterus and penis transplantations. Given 
the highly personal nature of the goods at stake in uterus and penis 
transplantations, we should take the fact that well-informed, competent 
patients are willing to undergo these experimental procedures as reason 
enough to believe that they have a sufficiently favourable risk–benefit balance.
Fair subject selection: cadaver donors and living donors for uterus 
and penis transplantations
Uterus and penis transplantations also raise issues of ‘fair subject selection’. 
That physicians should largely defer risk–benefit judgements to well-informed 
and competent patients does not mean that many or all prospective patients 
will be competent and well informed. Moreover, given the risks of this 
procedure, there may be some limits to deference: patients who are not 
sure that they themselves will benefit from the procedure, but wish to assist 
research for the sake of others, might reasonably be refused, given the 
gravity of the decision to undertake a lifetime of immunosuppressant therapy. 
Deference to patient judgement on risk and benefit does not entail a totally 
‘hands-off’ approach to patient decision. Physicians retain some discretion 
in restricting their own participation in innovative procedures to cases 
where the patient can actually expect some benefit. As Caplan et al. (2016) 
argue, surgeons would be well advised to encourage patients who do 
understand the distinctive risks of the procedure and who are most likely 
to benefit. Apart from the physiological and anatomical requirements, 
personal factors relevant to likely penis transplantation success in cis men 
might include family and social support, lack of surgical alternatives which 
could adequately fulfil subject expectations, and strong perceived dysphoria 
in the preoperative state.
Uterus as well as penis transplantations, as transplant procedures, involve 
two patients: a donor as well as a recipient. There are also substantial 
ethical issues about the ‘sourcing’ of uteruses and penises for transplantation. 
In the uterus transplantation procedures performed so far, surgeons have 
opted for living donors. The use of a living donor increases the likelihood 
of success due to higher chance of compatibility (e.g. donation from a relative 
of the recipient) and ease of procurement; surgery from a living donor can 
be planned in advance, obviating problems of emergency extraction and 
transplantation that come along with opportunistic cadaveric donation. 
Sourcing organs from living donors makes sense in uterus transplantation. 
Uteruses, unlike many other organs, are sometimes truly ‘surplus’ to the 
needs of living donors. Some women have no further plans for pregnancy, 
while others are unable to conceive and gestate a child despite having a 
healthy uterus. Uterus donation has a risk level similar to hysterectomy, 
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now a standard procedure (Olausson et al. 2014). Still, recent advances 
may make dead donor uterus retrieval more feasible in the near future 
(Testa et al. 2017).
For the cases performed to date of penis transplantation in cis men, 
surgeons have opted instead for cadaveric donors. It is likely that people 
would have different attitudes towards the donation of symbolically important 
organs such as the penis or face, as compared to ‘internal’ organs such as 
the kidneys, liver and uterus. As Caplan et al. (2016) point out, ‘blanket’ 
consent to donation, whether actual (‘opt-in’) or presumed (‘opt-out’), may 
not suffice in these cases. ‘Opt-out’ consent presents particular challenges; 
it seems implausible to ‘presume’ that people who have never considered 
organ donation at all would consent to donating such a symbolically 
important item. Moreover, in both systems, in addition to the deceased 
person’s wishes, the interests and values of their surviving family should 
perhaps also be considered (Dickenson and Widdershoven 2001; Roels and 
Rahmel 2011).
Indeed, it is, at first glance, not entirely clear that the practice of sourcing 
solely cadaveric tissue for penis transplantation should continue; living 
donation, if sources could be found, would have the advantage of specific 
informed consent, along with the other practical advantages discussed above 
regarding uterus transplantation. It might be thought that living donation 
would be unlikely, given a dearth of ‘surplus’ penises. This is probably 
correct, though existing sources should be explored. A small number of 
cis men suffer from body integrity identity disorder with respect to their 
penises; if voluntary amputation is permissible in some such cases, this 
could be one source of living donors (Favazza 1989; Dua 2010). Another, 
more numerous population (mentioned by the Guangzhou team) would be 
trans women who seek to be relieved of their male-identified genital anatomy. 
As it turns out, current gender affirmation surgery modalities for trans 
women (i.e. vagino-clitoro-labioplasty) require parts of the penis (skin 
envelope, glans, skin from the scrotum) for the construction of female 
genitalia (Selvaggi and Bellringer 2011). However, if gender affirmation 
surgery is developed to the point that penile elements are no longer required 
to construct the female genitalia, then trans women patients might become 
a donor source for penises for penis transplantation patients – possibly a 
particularly apt and psychologically satisfying one for penis transplantation 
patients seeking treatment for gender dysphoria.
For now, then, it seems unlikely that there will be a significant supply 
of living penis donors. Cadaveric donors may, therefore, be the only option 
for penis transplantation procedures in the short term. Though there may 
be certain practical difficulties in storing and transporting tissues, these 
do not seem to be decisive, given that all three (somatically) successful penis 
transplantation operations have used cadaveric donors. Further, given that 
the only living donors presently available will be patients suffering from 
86 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
body integrity identity disorder, use of living donors would embroil penis 
transplantation surgeons in raging controversies about the permissibility 
of voluntary medical amputation. Thus, for now, cadaveric donation, perhaps 
with specific consent, appears preferable, while avenues for increasing the 
quantity and quality of tissue sources for the future are explored.
Uterus and penis transplantation: scarce resources
There is, we believe, a strong case that surgeons would do no wrong to 
patient-subjects or potential donors when offering and performing uterus 
and penis transplantations as innovative research procedures. This, however, 
does not determine whether the development of these procedures is good 
or just overall. Complex transplant procedures such as uterus and penis 
transplantations are expensive. Caplan et al. (2016) suggest the costs for 
penis transplantation could run into the millions; uterus transplantation is 
very expensive as well, particularly given that, as ‘ephemeral’ transplants, 
they involve three major procedures – removal from donor, implantation, 
and later removal from recipient. These procedures, we have argued, could 
have significant medical benefits in clinical practice. But that is not enough 
in itself to justify them; these benefits have to be worthwhile, given the 
costs (Wilkinson and Williams 2016). Resources are scarce, for both research 
and care, and there are many people in the world who need medical help 
(Persad et al. 2009). This is true both within health systems that may need 
to decide whether to cover uterus and penis transplantation procedures, 
and globally, where large portions of the overall burden of disease are 
attributable to conditions that can be treated much more cheaply. Moreover, 
insofar as uterus and penis transplantations are primarily (if not exclusively) 
life-enhancing rather than life-saving, we might think that they should be 
deprioritised relative to other expensive transplant treatments, which actually 
save lives.
It is, in fact, difficult to derive estimates of the likely cost-effectiveness 
of uterus and penis transplantations, either for cis or trans people. This is 
in part because the benefits of these procedures are, though probably very 
real, difficult to quantify and compare to the benefits of other interventions 
that might be researched or deployed using the same resources. There is in 
particular little if any systematic work that attempts to quantify the disease 
burden of gender dysphoria or the cost-effectiveness of various gender 
affirmation surgery modalities. There is more work on the cost-effectiveness 
of fertility treatments, though it does not discuss uterus transplantation 
and covers only cis women (Devlin and Parkin 2003). Still, we would stress 
a point, presented earlier, that insofar as uterus and/or penis transplantation 
may constitute the only effective treatment for some severe cases of gender 
dysphoria, these procedures are likely to have a significant positive effect 
on both morbidity and mortality in this population, which exhibits high 
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rates of psychiatric co-morbidity and suicide. Again, the issue is not simply 
life enhancement vs. life preservation; treatments for gender dysphoria 
accomplish both.
There is normative uncertainty here, as well. Proponents of cost-effectiveness 
analysis in global health policy often presuppose a certain sort of ‘conse-
quentialist’ framework, in which relieving a given quanta of health burdens 
is equally important whoever experiences that burden (Persad et al. 2009). 
This view puts a strong onus of proof on proponents of any expensive 
treatment, since the relevant resources can instead be devoted to inexpensive 
and highly effective interventions in the developing world (e.g. malaria 
prevention). However, open questions remain about the right of national 
health systems to prioritise their own citizens over others in the world who 
might make better use of national health resources. Moreover, even focusing 
on a given health system, advocates for patients with difficult-to-treat 
conditions argue that these patient populations should not be abandoned 
entirely; efforts should be made to develop adequate treatments for every 
serious health condition, even if some of these conditions are much more 
expensive to treat than others (Gericke et al. 2005). If any of these arguments 
are correct, then advocates of uterus and penis transplantations need not 
show that they are cost-effective relative to, say, malaria prevention in the 
developing world, or even that they are not much more expensive than 
treatments offered as standard in developed-world health systems. It may 
be enough to show that, without access to uterus and penis transplantations, 
some people – especially some transpeople – will not have an adequate 
chance at a decent life.
Conclusions
Both uterus and penis transplantation research are ethically plausible when 
regulated by an ethical framework, though of course many hard questions 
remain. The benefits of these procedures might include treatment for gender 
dysphoria in patients who do not see adequate benefits in existing gender 
affirmation surgery modalities; restoration of normal function in cis popula-
tions who have lost penises to injury; and provision of gestational ability 
in both trans and cis women. Further research is required, however, to 
understand the magnitude of these benefits and the nature of patients’ 
normative claims to them. The risks of these procedures are substantial, 
but patient interest suggests that trans and cis people, as competent evaluators 
of their own interests, reasonably believe that the benefits justify the risks. 
Further research will provide more information on the risks of these pro-
cedures relative to alternatives, allowing patients to make informed decisions. 
Organ sourcing raises challenges in both uterus and (especially) penis 
transplantations, but these do not seem to be insurmountable. Finally, given 
the global burden of disease, it is important to carefully consider whether 
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uterus and penis transplantations, as innovative surgery or (eventually) as 
routine care, are a good use of scarce health resources. Much more research 
is required here, as well, to understand the cost-effectiveness of these 
procedures; still, we doubt that cost considerations will or should halt this 
line of inquiry altogether.
Appendix: terminology
• Absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI): medical condition in which 
the uterus is absent or diseased, and therefore does not allow normal 
embryonic implantation.
• Cis man/woman: man/woman whose gender identity matches the sex 
and/or gender assigned at birth.
• Gender affirmation confirmation surgery: refer to all types of surgery 
aimed to align the genital anatomy to the gender identity. This includes 
chest-contouring surgery (e.g. mastectomy in trans men; breast augmenta-
tion in trans women), genital surgery (penile reconstruction, or phal-
loplasty, for trans men; vaginoplasty, clitoro-labioplasty, orchidectomy 
for trans women).
• Gender dysphoria: distress experienced by a person as a result of the 
sex and gender assigned at birth.
• Trans man/woman: man/woman whose gender identity does not match 
the sex and gender assigned at birth.
• Vascularised composite allotransplantation (VCA): also referred as 
composite tissue allotransplantation, the term used to refer to transplanta-
tion of an organ composed of several kinds of tissues (i.e. skin, muscle, 
bone) such as face, hand, arm and penis.
Note
1 Thanks are due to Simona Giordano for her continuous support and suggestions 
while we were completing this chapter.
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Freedom, law, politics, genes: the case of 
mitochondrial transfer
Iain Brassington
In early 2015, the UK became the first country to make explicit legal provision 
for the use of mitochondrial transfer techniques leading to a live human 
birth. Mitochondrial transfer offers a means to prevent mitochondrial 
illnesses being passed from a mother to her children, as they would be 
inevitably without the process. Two methods are possible: maternal spindle 
transfer, and pronuclear transfer. In both, nuclear material is removed from 
a cell that has faulty mitochondria, and inserted into an enucleated cell 
with healthy mitochondria; the difference boils down to one of whether 
that nuclear material is taken from an unfertilised or fertilised ovum. In 
this chapter, I shall examine some of the senses in which mitochondrial 
transfer, and the law’s handling of it, might be taken to relate to scientific 
freedom. I shall try to avoid taking a position; my concern is simply to 
look at some of the potential argumentative fault lines. For the sake of 
ease, I shall conflate the terms ‘maternal spindle transfer’ and ‘pronuclear 
transfer’ under the term ‘mtDNA transfer’.
The purported advantages of mtDNA transfer are easily explained. 
Mitochondria are mainly concerned with energy production within the 
cell, and so any faults in them lead to the cell as a whole not functioning 
as it ought. This malfunction can manifest as any of a range of conditions 
– some mild, some serious, some fatal – and the term ‘mitochondrial disease’ 
is a basket term that captures this range (Tuppen 2010). These conditions 
may present differently throughout a person’s life. The ability to ‘edit’ a 
person’s mitochondrial inheritance at the very earliest stages of life, or even 
prior to their life beginning, provides an opportunity to improve what 
might otherwise be a significantly diminished quality of life. (For the sake 
of what follows, I shall leave to one side the debates surrounding the 
non-identity problem: there is so little mtDNA compared to nuclear DNA 
within a cell that I shall assume that mtDNA transfer alters a determinate 
person’s life, not the person who lives it. If I am wrong on this, and the 
identity of the child born changes according to whether or not mtDNA 
transfer has been used, it would mean that no child is ‘treated’ by the 
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technique, so much as replaced by an overwhelmingly similar sibling; but 
for the sake of my argument here, I think the point would be nugatory) 
(Wrigley et al. 2015; Liao 2017; Rulli 2017).)
In short, mtDNA transfer is a form of genetic engineering that promises 
to make future lives appreciably better. Moreover, because mitochondria 
are inherited directly down the maternal line, the ability also means that 
mitochondrial faults that might otherwise pass down the generations can 
be prevented in subsequent generations. As we shall see, this does raise a 
couple of lines of concern with respect of the ethics of mtDNA transfer.
Freedom from legal restriction
The background to the UK’s regulation of mtDNA transfer goes back to 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), which was modified 
by a further Act in 2008; in effect, the mtDNA transfer regulations constitute 
a gloss on that modificatory legislation.
The 1990 law’s attitude to genetic manipulation was fairly straightforward: 
it stipulated in section 3(1) that ‘[n]o person shall bring about the creation 
of an embryo except in pursuance of a licence’, and in section 3(2) it stipulated 
that ‘[n]o person shall place in a woman (a) a live embryo other than a 
human embryo, or (b) any live gametes other than human gametes’ (where, 
per section 1(1)(b), ‘embryo’ was taken to include ‘an egg in the process of 
fertilisation’). On the face of it, this would have permitted mtDNA transfer, 
since embryos manipulated in this way are clearly human embryos. However, 
section 3(3)(d) said that a licence to bring about the creation of an embryo 
could not authorise ‘replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a 
nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo or subsequent development 
of an embryo’. No reference was made to the purpose for which nuclear 
material may be replaced. mtDNA transfer involves the nuclear matter from 
one cell being implanted into an enucleated second cell. Therefore section 
3(2) would have been moot: there is no need to worry about permitting 
the implantation of a cell the creation of which is not permitted.
Yet there could be situations in which we would want to replace a cell 
nucleus for reasons other than reproduction – say, as part of a research 
programme; the 2008 Act modified the law such as to allow such manipula-
tions. Subsection 3(3)(d) was to be deleted, and subsection 3(2) changed to 
specify that only ‘permitted’ embryos could be implanted in a woman. 
Section 3(5) of the 2008 Act added to the 1990 Act a new section, 3ZA, 
to follow section 3. This new section defined ‘permitted’ embryos as being 
those created in the fertilisation of a permitted egg by permitted sperm – in 
turn, defined as eggs and sperm the nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of 
which has not been altered – and that had itself undergone neither alteration 
of its own nuclear or mitochondrial DNA, or had any cells added to it 
except by regular cell division. Thus nuclear matter could be transferred 
from one embryo to another, so long as the process did not result in gestation. 
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Importantly, though, section 3ZA(5) made one exception to this rule: regula-
tions may provide that
• an egg can be a permitted egg, or
• an embryo can be a permitted embryo, even though the egg or embryo 
has had applied to it in prescribed circumstances a prescribed process 
designed to prevent the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease.
In other words, the door was left open to permission being given for 
mitochondrial transfer techniques to be used for the sake of avoiding 
mitochondrial disease. What happened in 2015 was simply that a regulation 
was approved that provided for, and set out the conditions of, this eventuality 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulation 
2015).
Though the UK’s regulations on what can be done to embryos remain 
fairly tight – no other form of genetic engineering that would generate an 
embryo to be implanted is currently permitted – there is a freedom granted 
by the prevailing regulations in the UK that did not exist before, and that 
does not exist in a number of other countries (Hamzelou 2016).1
This legislative liberalisation has not been without controversy. Two 
significant lines of objection are worth mentioning. The first is that the 
technique may be unsafe, and that freeing us to pursue it may not be 
desirable for welfarist reasons. The second is a version of the slippery slope 
argument – that there are some freedoms that we ought not to countenance, 
and that genetic modification of humans may be one of them. Such a line 
of argument need not appeal to the welfare of particular people. I shall 
suggest that both these lines fail. On the other side of the debate, there is 
a question about whether pursuing such technologies may be freedom-
enhancing, therefore not only the kind of thing that liberal states should 
tolerate, but the kind of thing that they ought to endorse. This line of 
argument is not without its own complexities, as we shall see.
Freedom from risk
The safety concern is straightforward: that genetic engineering is, in the 
grand scheme of things, a very young science, and that such is the import 
of our genomes to our well-being that we cannot be certain that we would 
not be generating much bigger problems than we were hoping to solve. 
Faulty mitochondria are passed down maternally, to all of any affected 
woman’s children; they cannot be passed on to her grandchildren if she 
has no daughters. By the same token, should interference with natural 
mtDNA inheritance unexpectedly create its own problems, we might expect 
them to be passed down matrilineally as well. We may be condemning not 
just one person, but an indefinite number of persons over the subsequent 
generations, to suffer the consequences of a misguided intervention.
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Concerns along these lines were important factors in the debates on the 
regulations in the House of Commons in 2014 and 2015. Some MPs made 
a case for a precautionary approach to mtDNA transfer, which would 
presumably mean deferring the new licences – perhaps indefinitely. The 
fact that the alterations would be heritable was a cause for concern for 
others; thus Robert Flello MP pointed out that ‘the research that has been 
done talks about generations of mice or of monkeys, but that does not 
address the fact that until there have been three, four, five or 10 generations, 
we will not know what the long-term effects are’ (Flello 2014).
The safety of an action is a legitimate factor in decisions about whether 
to perform or allow it. The moral gravity of the freedom to make use of 
mtDNA transfer techniques does depend fairly straightforwardly on how 
safe they are. If we are Millian by inclination, a version of the harm principle 
would suffice to carry this argument: if there is nothing improper about 
curtailing someone’s liberty to prevent harm to others (Mill 1985; Ellison 
2015), there is presumably also nothing improper about not granting that 
liberty to prevent harm to others who may not exist yet, but the quality 
of whose existence will be influenced by the activity in question. If we are 
non-Millian utilitarians, without the same overriding concern to preserve 
liberty whenever possible, the justification of the action will depend much 
more straightforwardly on the expected welfare return – and the higher 
the risk of diminished welfare, the weaker the justification. For non-
consequentialists, it is likely still to be possible to construct an argument 
along the lines that a virtuous or dutiful person would be wary of passing 
a law that permits something with a significant risk of harm, even if an 
appeal to harm is not the main philosophical driver. Whatever our moral 
position, the greater the risk of harm, the weaker the justification for making 
the regulations more permissive. It is not unreasonable to think that one 
of the primary duties of the state is to afford as much protection as possible 
to citizens and future citizens from risks that they might otherwise face.
Speaking in the 2015 Commons debate, Jane Ellison MP attempted to 
answer these concerns, drawing MPs’ attention to the fact that
[t]here has been much discussion of the safety of mitochondrial donation 
techniques. As I have said, three reports have been produced by the HFEA-
convened expert panel during the current Parliament. On each occasion, the 
panel has concluded that there is nothing to indicate that the two donation 
techniques are unsafe. Although the panel has recommended that further 
experiments should be conducted, it expects such research to support the 
conclusions that it has reached so far. (2015)
This kind of statement is probably not enough to satisfy the precautionary 
critic of mtDNA transfer techniques. Finding nothing to indicate that the 
they are unsafe is compatible with not having done any research on the 
matter at all: that, too, would allow us to say that there is no indication 
of any danger. Of course, that point is hyperbolic; but the point would 
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remain that even when research has been done, the absence of evidence of 
danger is not evidence of absence. In this light, the critic is likely to see the 
claim that a panel expects future results to support current conclusions as 
scant reassurance when the unexpected results may be catastrophic, and 
persist for several generations. It’s the unexpected consequences that should 
worry us most, they will argue – and sensibly. The case for liberalising the 
regulations is not hereby successfully defended.
Yet the thing that is missed by the precautionary account is not so much 
that mtDNA transfer is risky, but that there is also a risk in not pursuing 
it. It is worth repeating that mitochondria are inherited directly down the 
maternal line, which means that a woman who is a carrier of faulty DNA 
will pass it on to any offspring she has; if she has daughters, they will pass 
it on to their children. Therefore, the decision to be taken is not one between 
a risky biotechnological procedure and nothing; it’s between what I shall 
allow for the sake of the argument is a risky biotechnological procedure, 
and a risky natural conception. The precautionary argument against liberalis-
ing the regulations is weakened when we consider that the counterfactual 
is not necessarily risk-minimising. Indeed, while it is true that the absence 
of evidence for harm is not evidence of absence, we have a pretty good 
reason to think that not pursuing mtDNA transfer is at best risk-stabilising; 
and, given that the choice is between keeping the risk level stable and 
intervening in a way that we believe will reduce it, there would seem to be 
a good moral argument available in favour of the procedure. Taking this 
line allows the supporter of liberalisation to turn the claim about the role 
of the state in protecting citizens from risk on its head.
The question then becomes one not so much of whether we should liberalise 
the regulations, as about what a reasonable level of certainty concerning 
the safety of the procedure is. Yet how we should establish what is reasonable 
is a puzzle in itself, there being no obvious rubric for settling the matter. 
One might be tempted to appeal to an ideal of open debate, the participants 
in which gradually home in on the most acceptable answer. When it comes 
to deciding what the law should be, this kind of procedure has a certain 
prima facie democratic appeal. However, in the context of concerns about 
risk, the problem is that data to inform this debate may be hard to come 
by, even assuming that the people charged with the task of framing the 
laws go about the task disinterestedly. Until mtDNA transfer is performed 
in a statistically significant number of humans, we won’t be able to say a 
great deal with certainty about how it’s likely to affect them; and even the 
course of the mitochondrial diseases we are aiming to prevent isn’t always 
predictable. Nevertheless, a precautionist position is still quite weak if all 
it does is insist that there might be some undesirable outcome that is worse 
than doing nothing: it’s true that more or less anything might happen, but 
it doesn’t follow that we need to lose sleep over every logically possible 
sequela. What is needed is a plausible account of what the undesirable 
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consequences might be, or even just the mechanism by which they’ll arise. 
Absent that, there is no obvious reason to take it all that seriously.
Freedom from restraint
The second line of argument turns on the claim that mtDNA transfer 
amounts to human genetic engineering – which, inasmuch as that it involves 
deliberately manipulating an aspect of the human genome for a specific 
purpose, is accurate. Once we have accepted the principle of human genetic 
engineering, is there any clear reason not to accept it in any and all other 
circumstances? For sure, implanting a genetically altered embryo to avoid 
mitochondrial disease requires a specific legal provision; but it is easy enough 
to make provision for more or less anything, and the mtDNA provision is 
important because it appears to break the back of the principled prohibition 
on human genetic engineering. From a certain perspective, there is little 
difference between adding desirable genes to a zygote or embryo by mtDNA 
transfer and adding other desirable genes by other methods.
The spectre of eugenics haunts the debate at this juncture, and the word 
has been used to describe mitochondrial transfer in the media (Newman 
2013). On the face of it, there may be a decent reason for this. A short 
book published in 1929 by Leonard Darwin explains what he means by 
the term: eugenics, for him, promises ‘wonderful effects’ for the human 
race, with the object of ‘improv[ing] the breed of the whole nation’ (1929: 
26). In particular, Darwin states that
[w]e can at all events assert that there are many kinds of men that we do not 
want. These include the criminal, the insane, the imbecile, the feeble in mind, 
the diseased at birth, the deformed, the deaf, the blind, etc., etc. . . . When 
eugenics comes to be more studied, it will be possible to give advice with 
greater confidence than at present . . . Even with our present knowledge it is, 
however, unquestionable that great benefits might be conferred on future 
generations by the voluntary renunciation of parenthood by the diseased and 
by such as are very likely to be the carriers of the hidden seeds of disease. 
(1929: 25, 33)
It takes little imagination to identify faulty mitochondria as one of the 
hidden seeds of disease, and women with faulty mitochondria as carriers.
Renunciation of parenthood has always been an option for people identified 
as carriers of congenital illness; in 2009, while considering mitochondrial 
illness and possible responses to being a carrier, Ruth Chadwick (2009) 
observed that ‘[o]ne option is to avoid reproduction altogether, where the 
risk is perceived to be too great; another is to decide to proceed nevertheless’. 
mtDNA transfer provides a third option. However, the general thrust remains 
the same: what is under consideration is a set of methods by which we can 
avoid bringing to birth individuals who belong to one of the ‘many kinds 
98 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
of men that we do not want’. In short, it seems as though mtDNA transfer 
can be characterised as eugenic. Darwin’s criteria for desirability may strike 
us as odd or naive – though he is reluctant to set out precise standards that 
we ought to try to meet in our eugenic programmes, he still feels confident 
to say that ‘[t]he most practical way of judging grown men is by seeing 
how they are fulfilling the duties of the positions which they actually hold’ 
(1929: 26) – but we can still say that there are certain inherited characteristics 
that it is better to be without by any reasonable standard of judgement 
(Brassington 2013: ch. 1), and all this could be fed into what looks like a 
eugenicist account or norm. Yet eugenics is the kind of thing that attracts 
a great deal of moral suspicion from many quarters. Would liberalisation 
of the law on mitochondrial transfer perhaps represent the preamble a 
eugenicists’ charter? This may be a freedom that we ought not to grant.
I think that this is a worry that can be answered, though we have to 
untangle its elements. Let’s allow for the moment that we are right to look 
at eugenics with suspicion. Even so, though some action may be the kind 
of thing that a eugenicist would endorse, it does not follow that everyone 
who endorses it is a eugenicist. It might be that mtDNA transfer is eugenicist; 
but the fact that we can construct a eugenicist argument in favour of it 
won’t show that: we’d need to be able to show that there could be no 
non-eugenicist argument for it.
Admittedly, though, if eugenics is about improving the stock of humanity, 
then it may be that there really is no argument for mtDNA transfer that is 
not eugenicist; the reason to pursue it I outlined above rests on some sense 
of improving the stock of humanity, by doing what we can to eliminate an 
inherited illness. But if that is all there is to eugenics, there seems little to 
worry about. Reducing morbidity for future generations is a laudable thing; 
the puzzle then would be why eugenics is treated with suspicion at all.
Of course, the disastrous history of the mid-twentieth century provides 
us with a candidate answer to that. Eugenics as a programme has become 
contaminated by close association with racism and racists, and with systematic 
attempts to eliminate whole classes of people in the name of ‘racial hygiene’; 
a recent article in New Scientist talks about sterilisation and genocide as 
‘the dark reality of eugenics’, as though its moral aspect is a given (Bowler 
2016). We should be wary of anything that might open the doors to this 
kind of behaviour. However, it is hard to see how mtDNA transfer has any 
conceptual links to racial superiority, and neither does it lend itself to 
extermination programmes or forced sterilisation. In short, if this is eugenics, 
then it looks like we might be able to reclaim the phrase: it could easily 
provide an example of what Nick Agar has called a ‘liberal eugenics’ – a 
form of eugenics that is chosen by women based on their conception of the 
good life, facilitated but not required by the state, and with no aspersions 
cast on anyone else (Agar 2004: 5). If we are determined to keep hold of 
the idea that making this kind of decision indicates a eugenicist mindset 
and is blameable, blame would presumably also have to attach to a woman 
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who chooses not to conceive at all in order to avoid suboptimal health in 
future generations. Since I take this to be an argumentative non-starter, it 
is hard to see how choosing to avoid suboptimal health in future generations 
while nevertheless reproducing is blameable. Or, working the other way, 
a critic of mtDNA transfer may be able to keep hold of the claim that it is 
eugenic, but only at the cost of relinquishing the claim that eugenics is 
always morally reprehensible and never praiseworthy. And if the latter claim 
is relinquished, it’s hard to see what would motivate the criticism.
A related line of argument to the appeal to eugenics comes from a version 
of the ‘expressivist objection’. The objection is, in its purest form, a response 
to the possibility of selective abortion in the light of genetic tests, and relies 
on the idea that to choose to abort expresses undesirable attitudes not 
about a given trait, but about the person, and the kind of person, carrying 
it (Parens and Asch 1999). The objection can be modified to apply beyond 
abortion debates. Granted that a person can only exist thanks to the genome 
they have, a preference for a different genetic inheritance may express a 
preference for different people from the ones who do or may exist. This 
objection has its critics; but if there’s anything to it, would it speak to 
mtDNA transfer? I am not convinced that it would. This is for two reasons, 
once conceptual and one empirical. The conceptual reason is that – as I 
indicated above – though some genetic alterations may be identity-affecting, 
it is not at all certain that a change in a person’s mitochondrial inheritance 
is. I do not have time here to explore the metaphysics of identity, but I 
would hazard a guess that it is not, because of the relatively few genes that 
mitochondria carry. This being the case, altering someone’s mtDNA is 
going to change the life of the person, not the identity person living it. For 
sure, we are wishing away mitochondrial illness; but we are not wishing 
away the person who has it at the same time.
And this speaks to the empirical reason why I think that the expressivist 
objection does not undermine the arguments for mtDNA transfer: it has 
significant support from people who carry faulty mitochondria, who would 
prefer that they or their offspring – extant or merely possible – didn’t. 
The HFEA commissioned a report into mtDNA transfer in 2012, which 
involved focus groups drawn from patients; they supported the techniques 
(HFEA 2013). It is possible that such people are speaking in bad faith, or 
have internalised a dismissive attitude towards themselves, or something 
like that – but this would require independent evidence. Without that, the 
expressivist objection, at least in respect of mitochondrial illness, seems 
to fail.
In fine, the concerns about the freedom to manipulate a person’s genetic 
inheritance being a preamble to a eugenicist’s charter are either toothless, 
or never get going at all.
Neither should we forget that the law in the UK is what it is, and nothing 
more. It permits one specific kind of genetic engineering, in specific cir-
cumstances, and permits that it be carried out only by a very few people. 
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It is true that any number of people have made the case for other kinds of 
genetic manipulation being permissible or even morally required (Harris 
2007: ch. 3). But these are not allowed by any current legal instrument. If 
technologies such as CRISPR prove to be an effective and safe way to 
manipulate the genome, we may see moves in the appreciably near future 
to make use of it to fix other inherited illnesses. These proposals must be 
taken on their merits; it is probably fair to speculate that some would be 
acceptable, and others not. (An editorial in Nature in 2015 made a plea 
against making germline modifications to the human genome, largely because 
of the unknown risks – but, notably, made an exception for mtDNA transfer; 
Lanphier et al. 2015: 410–11.) None of this commits us to the view that 
liberalising the law in respect of A necessarily means that it will be liberalised 
in respect of B; and if it does happen to be liberalised in respect of B, it 
does not mean that all regulatory bets are off.
Freedom from illness
A little earlier, I made a passing comment that one may expect and require 
a reasonable polity to care about protecting the interests of its citizens and 
future citizens. This can be conceptualised as a guarantee of a certain kind 
of freedom – a freedom from exposure to risk. In this section, I want to 
explore that notion of freedom a little further in respect of mtDNA transfer.
We could treat mtDNA transfer as a kind of scientific freedom in the 
sense that it is a scientific technique that promises a kind of freedom to 
those on whose behalf it is performed. To be relieved of a burden is, at 
least colloquially, to be freed from it; it is perfectly natural to appeal to 
the language of freedom when talking about ending illness. For example, 
we might say that someone has been free from cancer for a certain time; 
conversely, we talk about the burden of illness. To add an adjective to this 
can be understood as describing the origin of this freedom; ‘scientific freedom’ 
is freedom that comes about by scientific means – and so also the removal 
of a burden by scientific means. There is no reason to think that mitochondrial 
illnesses would not fit into this linguistic pattern. Hence, if we think that 
one of the things that states should do is to maximise individuals’ freedom 
(compatible with maintaining comparable levels of freedom for all), then 
it looks like we ought to applaud legal moves to remove restrictions from 
the use of mtDNA transfer. Freeing medicine to make use of the technique 
is a part of freeing individuals from the burden of mitochondrial disease.
Neither is it simply the individuals carrying faulty mitochondria who 
would be freed by this scientific endeavour. Illness and disability impose 
burdens on others – often close family members. The burdens may be more 
onerous in some cases than in others; and in most developed countries the 
state will have some role in providing medical and social assistance. 
Nevertheless, even the mundanity of extra doctors’ appointments, filling 
in applications for assistance, and so on, will represent a drain on financial, 
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psychological and social resources. The possibility of using mtDNA transfer 
to minimise the risk of mitochondrial illness therefore offers a way to free 
many people beyond the future child of any number of burdens.
Yet, on the other hand, there is also the possibility that this form of 
‘scientific freedom’ may be less straightforward than it appears at first. 
Notably, undergoing the procedure is not ‘cost free’: it does require IVF, 
which is burdensome in its own right. Now, though a burden is something 
from which an agent can be freed, it does not follow from this that every 
burden is a restriction of freedom. One can willingly take on a burden 
without diminishing one’s positive freedom. For example: choosing to pursue 
the dream of an Olympic medal brings with it a requirement to undergo a 
certain kind of training, but one is no less free for it. Though it’s burdensome, 
the training is part and parcel of one’s free choice. Likewise, a woman who 
felt it important not to pass faulty mitochondria to her children, but who 
didn’t want to avoid sex altogether, would be no less free for choosing a 
combination of contraception and IVF (and she may, in passing, free 
subsequent generations from mitochondrial illness).
All this assumes, though, that a woman’s desire for IVF is authentically 
hers. This is not a given. In examining a person’s choices, it is important 
to keep in mind the social context in which those choices are made. I have 
already noted how the possibility of mitochondrial transfer adds a third 
option to a decision about whether to proceed with reproduction; and all 
else being equal, a free choice may be made. However, while considering 
a woman’s choosing whether or not to reproduce, Chadwick observes that 
‘[e]ither way, there are problems with blame and responsibility for the 
woman’ (2009: 13). This phrase is telling. For most women, pregnancy by 
natural means is the default option, and goes completely unremarked; if it 
is the sort of thing in the context of which the word ‘blame’ starts to 
appear, this is no longer the case. Rather, the expectation would seem to 
be that a woman carrying faulty mitochondria ought either to remain celibate, 
to terminate any pregnancy that arises from a contraceptive failure, or to 
use mtDNA transfer. Natural reproduction for such women is not the 
default option; it’s the exception, and a culpable one to boot. This being 
the case, our appeal to liberal eugenics might not be quite as straightforward 
as we may hope, for the supposedly free choice to make use of mtDNA 
transfer may be subject to social pressures that we do not often notice.
This worry cannot be dismissed as handwringing easily. In her Genetic 
Dilemmas, Dena Davis suggests that the availability of screening and 
termination for Down’s syndrome shifts the range of courses of action seen 
as acceptable such that testing (and presumably termination: if you’re going 
to have the child anyway, why screen?) become the default option, deviations 
from which are scrutable. Thus, she writes:
In my own mind I can discern a subtle shift in the way in which I view people 
with certain anomalies. Twenty years ago, seeing a woman in the supermarket 
102 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
with a child who has Down syndrome, my immediate reactions were sympathy 
and a sense that that woman could be me. Now when I see such a mother 
and child, especially if the mother is older, I am more likely to wonder why 
she didn’t get tested. (2001: 18)
Subtly, the norm has shifted; and if that shift can happen for this congenital 
condition, it would be strange to insist that something similar cannot happen 
in respect of mitochondrial illness and the choices that it brings. A woman’s 
reproductive decisions – or non-decisions, in the case of unplanned pregnan-
cies – become matters of public comment. And this matters just because 
the terms of a woman’s decision about whether or not to use mtDNA 
transfer is, howsoever subtly, altered.
To this, it may be pointed out that many or most pregnancies, especially 
but not exclusively those in which there is a risk of some congenital health 
problem, become matters of public comment; this is a bare feature of the 
culture in which we live. This is may very well be true – in which case, so 
much the worse for the idea that a woman’s decision about her pregnancy 
is free from sociopolitical influence. Since most women who carry defective 
mtDNA know that they do, they may be under pressure similar to that 
which Davis describes. No reproductive decision is free from influence or 
scrutiny. This might mean that no reproductive decision is free, or that we 
have to rethink what it is to be ‘free’ in respect of reproduction. A decision 
about mtDNA transfer, though, probably isn’t sui generis.
Whatever freedoms from illness mtDNA transfer promises, it may not 
guarantee freedom in every possible sense. In some cases, it might even 
generate social coercion, howsoever subtle it may be. I do not mean this 
to imply any particular normative position. Sometimes moral pressure on 
an agent is perfectly acceptable, if that agent would not otherwise act as 
morality requires and the pressure is proportionate, even if that pressure 
comes at the expense of the agent’s freedom in part or in whole. It is not 
difficult to come up with thought experiments in which this is the case. I 
leave for others to decide whether the value of a future generation’s freedom 
from mitochondrial illness is worth the partial sacrifice of a potential mother’s 
moral freedom. All that matters for my purposes is to point out that ‘scientific 
freedom’ in the sense of lifting one kind of burden may bring another kind 
of burden with it.
Freedom to legislate
Permitting mtDNA transfer gave scientists and medics a freedom to carry 
out the technique that they had not had before; it gave parents the freedom 
to choose that technique; it gave future children a freedom from illness; 
but it might have created a subtle pressure on some mothers-to-be. This 
pressure should be taken seriously; but being careful about its exertion does 
not mean that mtDNA transfer cannot be offered without it.
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There is one final aspect of freedom in this context that is worth mention-
ing. The Daily Telegraph reported in 2015 that a group of fifty MEPs had 
written an open letter to David Cameron, decrying any liberalisation of 
the law on mtDNA transfer. The letter expressed a ‘profound concern at 
the intention of the UK to permit the modification of the human genome’, 
and continued to say that
[y]our proposals violate the fundamental standards of human dignity and 
integrity of the person. Modification of the genome is unethical and cannot 
be permitted.
These proposals put the UK out in front of a race to the bottom so far as 
standards of human dignity are concerned. (Knapton 2015)2
Were this the case, one might wonder whether the UK Parliament had 
overreached itself – if, that is, there are some things that are beyond the 
scope of what any national legislature can allow. Certainly the UN, in the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (art. 1) 
has suggested that the human genome is part of the common heritage of 
humanity. If something is part of the common heritage of humanity, then 
it would seem to lie outside of national legislatures’ demesne.
But, of course, dignity claims are notoriously slippery: what, exactly, does 
it mean to violate human dignity? Without a coherent account of human 
dignity, we cannot begin to assess that claim – let alone be expected to 
accept it. Likewise, worries about personal integrity are hard to understand 
for very similar reasons. Finally, it seems perfectly reasonable to deny 
that the human genome would be altered by mtDNA transfer, because 
no genes from another organism nor any synthetic genes are implanted. 
Besides, it is possible to insist that mtDNA transfer no more alters the 
human genome than does nature anyway: hundreds of pathogenic mtDNA 
mutations have been identified, and mtDNA in humans has a very high rate 
of natural mutation compared to nuclear DNA (Tuppen 2010: 115; Lane 
2015: 226–7). A ‘pristine’ human genome would be a rather Platonic thing, 
unaffected by the alterations that make each of us what we are; but if we 
are going to allow that such a thing exists, we might easily hypothesise 
that mtDNA transfer restores the human genome to something closer to 
that ideal.
On a much more rough-and-ready level, though, we might think it enough 
to point out that mtDNA transfer promises to relieve great suffering, and 
that that is enough to mean that legislatures that seek to permit it should 
feel free to do so.
Notes
1 As I write this, it is reported that the first baby to be born after mtDNA transfer 
has been delivered in Mexico, which was apparently chosen because ‘there are 
no rules’. See Hamzelou (2016: 8–9).
104 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
2 The letter is widely reported, but I have not been able to track down the 
original.
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Scientific freedom and responsibility in a 
biosecurity context
Catherine Rhodes
Scientific freedoms are exercised within the context of certain responsibilities, 
which in some cases justify constraints on those freedoms. (Constraints 
that may be internally established within scientific communities and/or 
externally enacted.) Biosecurity dimensions of work involving pathogens 
are one such case and raise complex challenges for science and policy. The 
central issues and debates are illustrated well in the development of responses 
to publication of (‘gain of function’) research involving highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, by a number of actors, including scientists, journal editors, 
scientific academies, and national and international policy groups.
The core tension that can arise between working to protect health by 
promoting work on pathogens (to support surveillance and response efforts) 
and working to protect health by setting limits to work on pathogens that 
poses risks to health through accidental or deliberate releases, is reflected 
in and has been responded to by international (and some national) policy 
processes. These responses have placed increasing emphasis on the respon-
sibilities of scientists. Framed within recognition of the reciprocal responsibili-
ties of scientists and policymakers, further joint work is needed to manage 
this tension and develop appropriate and effective international responses.
Scientific freedoms and (scientific) responsibilities
Scientific freedom is subject to internal and external constraints, some of 
which relate to responsibilities that are widely recognised by the scientific 
community. This chapter focuses on international dimensions of science–
policy interactions, and the conception of the scientific community used in 
this chapter reflects this, and fits the definition provided by Henk Verhoog 
(1981: 583): ‘the community of scientific workers wherever they are in the 
world, sharing the same general conception of nature and the same basic 
methodological norms’. The responsibilities discussed in this chapter may 
be assigned to individual scientists, to groups working in particular areas, 
and/or to the scientific community as a whole.
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Broadening of scientific responsibilities
Scientific responsibility has both internal and external dimensions. The 
internal dimensions can be thought of as the responsibilities that scientists 
have towards the scientific community and to upholding good scientific 
practice, and relate to traditional elements of ‘responsible conduct of research’. 
Frankel and Carlson (2011), for example, list the following areas covering 
the main elements of internal scientific responsibilities:
• data acquisition, management, sharing and ownership;




• publication practices and responsible authorship;
• mentor/trainee responsibilities;
• peer review; and
• collaborative science.
The more traditional conception of scientific responsibility has broadened 
to include external dimensions – because of the important relationship that 
science has with and the implications it has for society – and in line with 
recognition of the increasingly global nature of science (National Academies 
2009; Rhodes and Sulston 2010; InterAcademy Council 2012). These more 
outward-facing responsibilities include consideration of research outcomes 
and alignment of research goals and plans with societal concerns. The 
German Ethics Council (2014: 57) makes similar arguments, for example 
stating that:
[T]he sciences are increasingly understood as being not merely self-contained 
processes that take place within a scientific community, but rather as being 
an integral component of general societal interrelationships . . . Accordingly, 
the ethical appraisal of science must concern itself not only with the practical 
consequences of knowledge, but also with the effects of the research process 
and its findings on society.
Biosecurity concerns relate to the dual-use nature of some research, and 
this appears primarily to relate to the external dimension of scientific 
responsibility – relating to avoidance of harm to society through the deliberate 
misuse of research ‘to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural 
crops and other plants, animals, the environment or materiel’ (NSABB 
n.d.). Making clear the connection of biosecurity concerns to internal norms 
of responsible conduct is also important, and modifications to e.g. laboratory 
practices may be necessary (WHO 2013).
Some of the publications providing guidance on responsible conduct of 
research have incorporated certain aspects of biosecurity into internal 
responsibilities. For example, the InterAcademy Council’s 2012 Report 
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– Responsible Conduct in the Global Research Enterprise, includes ‘misuse 
of biological agents’ within its list of irresponsible research practices (5).
In recent years some countries, for example the Netherlands and Germany 
have produced more specific guidance on scientific responsibility and 
biosecurity (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 2013; German 
Ethics Council 2014). However, such activities are not widespread, and it 
is unclear whether the scientific community has a high level of awareness 
of such guidance and what it might mean in practice, nor how broadly 
such responsibilities are accepted as an extension of internal norms in the 
scientific community.
Appropriate handling of biosecurity will also help to ensure that public 
trust in science is not jeopardised – which is an important general motivation 
for upholding standards of responsible scientific conduct. This is clearly 
stated in the World Health Organization’s Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance 
(2006: 2, 25)
The general public expects laboratory personnel to act responsibly and not 
to expose the community to biorisks, to follow safe working practices (biosafety) 
associated with practices that will help keep their work and materials safe 
and secure (biosecurity).
Effective laboratory biosecurity is a societal value that underwrites public 
confidence in biological science.
This was also a motivation for the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC), Medical Research Council (MRC) and Wellcome 
Trust’s Position Statement on Dual Use Research of Concern and Research 
Misuse (2015: para. 22).
Biosecurity responsibilities relate not only to ensuring that individuals 
do not follow intentionally harmful/prohibited lines of research, but also 
to consideration of how research might be used by others, with a requirement 
in certain cases to modify research plans or communication activities, and 
even to forgo certain lines of research altogether, when there is a significant 
risk of misuse. It is generally agreed that this will only apply to a very small 
subset of research (Royal Society 2012: 57; DFG and Leopoldina 2014: 10; 
BBSRC et al. 2015: para. 9; NSABB 2016: 1).
Guidance documents and statements produced by scientific academies 
and funding bodies relating to scientific responsibility place strong emphasis 
on the fundamental importance of openly communicating research – to 
contribute to scientific progress, to enable replication and verification of 
findings, etc. Connected to this, the ability to openly communicate is viewed 
as a core scientific freedom. The importance of this aspect of scientific 
freedom and responsibility is particularly significant in terms of the discussion 
in this chapter. Among many examples of such statements:
Open communication and deliberation sit at the heart of scientific practice. 
(Royal Society 2012: 13)
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[P]ublication in a peer-reviewed journal is the most important way of dis-
seminating a complete set of research results. (National Academies 2009: 
29)
Researchers who fail to meet these expectations place their reputations at 
risk. (InterAcademy Council 2012: 16)
The free exchange of information and especially the publication of results are 
important factors for scientific knowledge and scientific progress. (DFG 
and Leopoldina 2014: 13)
Some more recent documents have qualified this expectation slightly 
(Royal Society 2012; DFG and Leopoldina 2014), but it is not clear whether 
this is a generally accepted modification to the core scientific norm of open 
communication – and it is not clear how this should be balanced with 
apparently contradictory statements. The following statements, for example, 
appear in the Royal Society’s Science as an Open Enterprise report (2012: 
9, 57):
Qualified openness
Opening up scientific data is not an unqualified good. There are legitimate 
boundaries of openness which must be maintained in order to protect 
commercial value, privacy, safety and security. Careful scrutiny of the 
boundaries of openness is important where research could in principle be 
misused to threaten security, public safety or health.
A joint report by the Royal Society, the InterAcademy Panel and the International 
Council of Science in 2006 concluded that ‘restricting the free flow of 
information about new scientific and technological advances is highly 
unlikely to prevent potential misuse and might even encourage misuse’.
Reciprocal responsibilities of science and society
In general, the relationship between science and society can be described 
as reciprocal, and there are responsibilities for both sides that are associated 
with this. Scientists have responsibilities towards society inter alia because 
science contributes to a range of social goods, because it has significant 
social and economic impacts, and because it is ultimately funded by society, 
whether through taxation or consumer spending (iSEI 2010: 3; InterAcademy 
Council 2012: v). These responsibilities include: addressing the concerns, 
values and interests of society; consideration of the implications of their 
work for society; providing policy advice in areas in which they are qualified 
to do so; and accepting some limitations on scientific freedom or conditions 
on practice to align with social goals and values.
Society as a collective recipient of benefits from scientific research, has 
responsibilities towards it, for example in facilitating scientific progress 
through e.g. funding, provision of education and training, and enabling 
dialogue and scrutiny (e.g. through broad scientific literacy), and by gener-
ally protecting scientific freedoms where these don’t substantially conflict 
with other protected values. In other words, ‘society needs to provide 
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just and effective conditions for the increase of scientific knowledge’ 
(iSEI 2010: 3).
Policymakers are important intermediaries in the reciprocal relationship 
between science and society. They need to respond to and where necessary 
achieve balance between the interests and values of both groups – utilising 
a range of policy tools (e.g. regulation, licensing, guidance, funding). Scientists 
often have specialist expertise that can inform policymaking, and should 
seek to provide appropriate input (InterAcademy Council 2012: 28). Poli-
cymakers have a responsibility to ensure that evidence/advice is sought and 
to consider the impacts of policy for scientific practice. This will, however, 
be in the context of a variety of constraints and demands on policymaking, 
and limitations on policymakers’ freedom need to be acknowledged, in 
order to establish realistic expectations of science–policy relationships. This 
point is picked up on in the World Health Organization’s guidance Respon-
sible Life Sciences Research: ‘One the one hand, government policy should 
aim to promote the advancement of science. Scientific progress usually has 
important societal (including economic) benefits; and promoting the good 
of society is a primary responsibility of government . . . At the same time, 
safety, security and economic development are significant responsibilities 
of governments’ (WHO 2010: 28).
Tension between freedoms and responsibilities
There are many different situations in which freedoms and responsibilities 
may be in tension and need to be carefully balanced. In the biosecurity 
context a core tension arises because some research which aims to protect 
health can also create health risks, particularly research involving work on 
dangerous pathogens. Such research serves to protect health (e.g. by sup-
porting preparedness and surveillance efforts, the development of treatments, 
and other public health responses to outbreaks). Through unintentional or 
deliberate actions such work can also threaten health e.g. through accidental 
release of a pathogen, or through deliberate misuse e.g. to create weapons. 
It is the latter – deliberate misuse (of materials and data and knowledge 
emerging from research) that is a central concern in biosecurity, and the 
main focus of discussion in this chapter.
Scientific advances tend to contribute to both aspects of this tension, 
because they can serve both to facilitate misuse (e.g. by enabling creation 
of more desirable warfare agents, such as pathogens that are more virulent, 
environmentally stable, or for which there are no prophylactic measures 
available), and to enhance defence measures (e.g. through new detection 
tools), and assist identification and monitoring of, and response to outbreaks.
The biosecurity context
The term biosecurity has various meanings in different contexts.1 Its use 
in this chapter covers prevention of the deliberate misuse of biological 
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(and related) sciences to cause harm. While most scientific work can have 
dual-use implications,2 certain types of research are viewed as presenting 
particularly significant biosecurity risks, and have been subject to particular 
policy attention. The types of research of concern are frequently linked 
in policy to research on particular agents (including those associated 
with past biological weapons programmes) and to particular types of 
experiment. This is the approach, for example, used in the US govern-
ment’s Policy for the Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern (US 
Government 2012). A widely used example of types of ‘experiments of 
concern’ is found in the 2004 report Biotechnology Research in an Age 
of Terrorism (National Research Council of the National Academies  
2004):
1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral 
agents.
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen 
virulent.
4. Would increase the transmissibility of a pathogen.
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen.
6. Would enable evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities.
7. Would enable the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin.
Box 2 in Position Statement on Dual Use Research of Concern and Research 
Misuse (BBSRC et al. 2015: 2) suggests the addition of:
[E]xperiments that would: generate or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct 
agent or toxin.
[T]he development of new technologies or tools with genetic applications 
– such as in the areas of bio-processing or bio-fermentation scale-up – 
which could, for example, make it easier to synthesise or produce harmful  
agents.
[P]rojects that carry very little potential for misuse, but where the risk would 
be greatly increased by emerging data or methodologies from other disci-
plines, for example studies on a toxin that cannot be introduced easily into 
humans, but which might be deliverable by advances in materials science 
or aerosol physics.
‘Gain of function’ research
The way and the extent to which biosecurity considerations might limit 
research on pathogens has gained a high profile among some scientific, 
security and policymaking groups over the past few years, particularly 
because of debate around the publication of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(H5N1) ‘gain of function’3 experiments.
 Scientific freedom–responsibility and biosecurity  111
Two groups – led by Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka – had been 
conducting research to identify mutations to the H5N1 influenza virus that 
could make it transmissible between humans. The work aimed to assist in 
the identification of strains likely to cause pandemics and in the development 
of vaccines and treatments. The groups submitted manuscripts to Nature 
and Science in 2011. As the research had received US federal funding 
(through the National Institutes for Health), the National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) reviewed the manuscripts before publication. 
The NSABB is an advisory committee for the US government, inter alia 
addressing ‘policies governing publication, public communication, and 
dissemination of dual use research methodologies and results’ (US Department 
of Health and Human Services 2016: 1).
In giving its recommendations on the original transcripts, the NSABB 
noted that the publications ‘described the generation of mutations in H5N1 
that enable the airborne transmission of the virus between ferrets’; ‘recognized 
the importance of the research in advancing knowledge of influenza transmis-
sion and supporting public health efforts’; but noted that ‘specific findings 
would enable others to synthesize and express a H5N1 strain with mammal-
to-mammal transmissibility’ and that they had ‘significant concerns that 
information in the manuscripts could be misused to endanger public health 
and national security’. They therefore recommended ‘the information in 
these manuscripts be published in a redacted form with the omission of 
certain details that could enable the direct misuse of the research by those 
with malevolent intent’ (2012: 1).
The NSABB reviewed revised versions of the manuscripts in March 2012, 
along with ‘new non-public epidemiological information, and security 
information . . . presented in a classified briefing’ (2012: 1). While it still 
viewed the manuscripts as presenting ‘dual use research of concern’, a 
majority concluded that:
As currently written, the revised manuscripts do not appear to provide informa-
tion that would enable the near-term misuse of the research . . . The mutations 
described in the manuscripts do not appear to result in H5N1 viruses that 
are both highly pathogenic and transmissible between ferrets through the air 
. . . The revised manuscripts provided a greater appreciation of the direct 
applicability of the information to ongoing and future influenza surveillance 
efforts. (NSABB 2012: 2–3)
It recommended that ‘the revised Kawaoka manuscript be communicated 
in full’ and that – with some further revisions, the Fouchier manuscript 
could also be published (NSABB 2012: 5). The manuscripts were published 
in Nature and Science later in 2012.
Alongside this process, scientists working on these types of H5N1 influenza 
transmission studies held a voluntary moratorium, to give space for further 
discussion and debate. This lasted around one year; with the researchers 
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announcing in early 2013 that its aims had largely been met and so research 
would continue (Fouchier et al. 2013).
There have been additional policy responses in the US, including advice 
issued in 2013 on enhanced biosafety requirements for research on highly 
pathogenic H5N1 viruses (US Department of Health and Human Services, 
National Institutes of Health 2013) and – announced in October 2014 – a 
research funding pause ‘on selected gain of function research involving 
influenza, MERS and SARS viruses’ during a deliberative process towards 
recommendations that would ‘inform the development and adoption of a 
new US government policy governing the funding and conduct of gain-of-
function research’ (US Government 2014). This included public consultation, 
a risk–benefit analysis, and an ethical analysis of such research, contributing 
to recommendations from the NSABB. The recommendations were published 
in May 2016, and they advise subjecting ‘a small subset of GOF research 
– GOF research of concern (GOFROC)’ to additional review and oversight 
(NSABB 2016: 1).
Research proposals involving GOF research of concern entail significant 
potential risks and should receive an additional, multidisciplinary review, 
prior to determining whether they are acceptable for funding. If funded such 
projects should be subject to ongoing oversight at the federal and institutional 
levels. (NSABB 2016: 2)
The NSABB also outlined particular attributes of ‘gain of function research 
of concern’ and a set of principles to guide funding decisions (2016: 43–4).
There are a few other examples of additional guidance being provided 
in response to the influenza transmission studies, including the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences report Improving Biosecurity: 
Assessment of Dual Use Research (2013), and the German Ethics Council’s 
opinion Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Research (2014). 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has hosted technical discussions 
on the Fouchier and Kawaoka studies (WHO 2012), and on dual-use 
research of concern more broadly (WHO 2013). A coordinated international 
approach to the funding, conduct, oversight and communication of such 
experiments – although recognised to be necessary given the global nature 
of the scientific enterprise and the public health threat – has yet to be 
developed.
International governance
There is a long-standing international recognition of the need to protect 
human, animal and plant life and health from transboundary disease threats. 
Within these efforts it is recognised that international scientific collaboration 
is essential for appropriate and effective monitoring, surveillance and response 
efforts (OIE 2015; WHO 2010). Biosecurity issues sit at the intersection 
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of security and health and there are relevant international rules, organisations 
and other governance mechanisms in both domains, key components of 
which are outlined below.
The Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is based around a core prohibition 
in Article I:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types or in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
(United Nations Biological Weapons Convention 1972)
Notably, the Convention does not seek to restrict use of biological agents 
and toxins for peaceful purposes; it explicitly encourages participation and 
international cooperation for such purposes, particularly including the 
prevention of disease:
(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and 
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for 
peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do 
so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with 
other States or international organisations to further development 
and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriological 
(biological) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful 
purposes. (Article X)
States parties to the BWC track scientific and technological develop-
ments relevant to the Convention, including those ‘that have potential 
for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention’ and those ‘that 
have potential benefits for the Convention, including those of special rel-
evance to disease surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation’ (United Nations  
2012: 23).
Other relevant governance efforts that fall within the security domain 
include work under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 
which ‘Obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means 
non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, 
transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 
and their delivery systems’ (United Nations 1540 Committee, n.d.) and 
informal export control arrangements of the Australia Group (Government 
of Australia 2007).
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Health and disease control efforts
There are international rules and systems for the protection of human, 
animal and plant life and health. Those which seek to prevent the introduction 
and spread of infectious disease are particularly relevant, and include:
• The international organisations tasked with protection of human, animal 
and plant health – the World Health Organization, the World Animal 
Health Organization (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO).
• The main rules seeking to control the movement of pests and diseases 
through international travel and trade routes (which also establish 
requirements e.g. for reporting and managing outbreaks of international 
concern) – the International Health Regulations, the Terrestrial and 
Aquatic Animal Health Codes and Manuals, and the International Plant 
Protection Convention.
• Specific guidance on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, to minimise 
the risks of accidental or deliberate release of pathogens from laboratories 
and the risks to health of laboratory workers.
• Guidance on the transport of infectious substances (generally found 
within dangerous goods regulations issued separately for each transport 
mode, but with key parts summarised in WHO’s Guidance on Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Infectious Substances).
• A range of surveillance and response systems – including more general 
systems such as WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
and OIE’s World Animal Health Information System; more specific systems 
such as WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System.
• Expert and laboratory networks including WHO’s and OIE’s collaborating 
centres and reference laboratories, and joint systems such as OFFLU, a 
collaboration of the OIE and FAO networks on animal influenzas.
The disease surveillance and response systems and collaborative networks, 
in particular, rely on timely and effective sharing of materials, data and 
research.
While these organisations primarily focus on natural disease threats, 
they recognise that their systems will play an essential role in the identification 
of and response to any deliberately caused disease outbreaks. The OIE, for 
example, addressed these issues within its Biological Threat Reduction 
Strategy: ‘The same disease surveillance and intelligence systems that are 
in place to detect day-to-day occurrences of natural outbreaks in animals, 
within countries and at national borders, will also detect deliberate and 
accidental releases’ (OIE 2015: 3).
Handling the tension
The tension between protecting health through access to pathogens and 
open communication of research results and protecting health by restricting 
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access to pathogens and associated data and knowledge with misuse potential 
is being addressed within these organisations and by states parties to the 
BWC. In their responses to the misuse potential of work involving pathogens, 
in recent years they have placed increasing emphasis on the responsibilities 
of scientists. This includes recommendations about building awareness 
among scientific communities of their legal and moral obligations, develop-
ment of codes of conduct and ethics education and training, and the creation 
of a culture of responsible science, in which scientists are able to make 
informed decisions about the biosecurity aspects of their research (which 
may in some cases constrain scientific freedoms e.g. by limiting or delaying 
communication of research, or not following certain lines of enquiry).
For example, the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC noted ‘the 
value of national implementation measures’ which ‘implement voluntary 
management standards on biosafety and biosecurity’; ‘promote the develop-
ment of training and educational programs’ and ‘encourage the promotion 
of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and 
the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct’ 
(United Nations 2012: art. IV, para. 13, secs. a, d and e). And its series of 
intersessional meetings from 2012 to 2015 included in the standing agenda 
item on review of scientific and technological developments, the topics of 
‘voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible 
conduct by scientists, academia and industry’ and ‘education and awareness 
raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology’ (2012: 
para. 22, secs. d and e).
The WHO’s Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance included recommendations 
on development of codes of conduct for researchers and other laboratory 
staff, which ought to include: ‘evaluation of the purpose of the work, 
consideration for its impact the publication of research results, and [enumera-
tion of] considerations and conditions for or against the publication of 
results that may have dual-use implications’ (2006: 21); and that there is 
a need for promotion of ‘a culture of awareness, shared sense of responsibility, 
ethics and respect of codes of conduct within the international life sciences 
community’ (2006: 30). The WHO further recommended that ‘comprehensive 
bioethical reviews should be carried out and documented before final decisions 
are reached on the publication of data, balancing pros and cons of their 
dissemination’ (2006: 21). (Interestingly it then went on to suggest that one 
particular area in which further examination of ‘bioethical considerations, 
international review and control of this research’ was needed was in studies 
‘with the highly pathogenic H5N1 to investigate virus transmissibility’ 
(2006: 21).) (The WHO also produced a guidance document Responsible 
Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security in 2010, which provides 
a public health perspective on such issues.)
The OIE’s Biological Threat Reduction Strategy includes aims to: ‘Maintain 
the OIE laboratory twinning programme to improve compliance with OIE 
Intergovernmental Standards, including for biosafety and biosecurity, to 
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create a culture of responsible science and good laboratory practice’, including 
through incorporation in graduate training; and
Advocate that fostering altruistic scientific networks at the national, regional 
and global level is a means of sustaining expertise, and preventing scientists 
from contributing to bioweapons development, by encouraging a culture of 
responsible and transparent science. (OIE 2015: 1)
Conclusion: shared and reciprocal responsibilities in  
the biosecurity context
These recent international efforts to respond to the tension between scientific 
freedoms and responsibilities in the biosecurity context are positive steps 
towards raising scientific and policy awareness of the issues. However, 
recent cases such as the H5N1 mammalian transmissibility studies, have 
highlighted significant policy gaps at a national and international level, 
and indicate that awareness raising work and science–policy engagement 
on the development and implementation of biosecurity measures, need 
substantial further work.
While some of these efforts will necessarily involve consideration and 
action by individual scientists, with strong institutional support, it is 
important to recognise that addressing biosecurity issues relating to research, 
is not a responsibility of the scientific community alone. It can be framed 
within the reciprocal relationship of science and society outlined above, as 
a shared responsibility – particularly, within the context of this chapter – of 
the scientific community and international policymakers in relation to the 
development and implementation of biosecurity initiatives. Such initiatives 
are likely to entail some constraints being placed on scientific freedoms by 
policymakers on security grounds.
The science–society relationship in this area is mediated by other actors, 
who also have important roles to play in the development of appropri-
ate policy, including research institutions, scientific academies, funders 
and publishers (United Nations 2013; German Ethics Council 2014: 52). 
Responsibilities shared by these groups include enabling scientists to make 
informed judgements on issues with which they may currently be unfa-
miliar, developing guidance to support decision-making processes at the 
institutional level, and contributing to effective engagement and deliberation 
among all groups about the appropriate balance between various values 
and interests, and robust and broadly acceptable ways of achieving that 
balance.
Responsible decision-making is required by actors at all levels. Decision-makers 
will need to make judgements to resolve difficult cases of conflicting values. 
Scientific freedom, scientific progress, public health, safety and security are 
all important values and none should be given absolute priority over the others. 
(WHO 2010: 28)
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Policymakers’ freedom of action also faces various constraints, including 
lack of knowledge, expertise and evidence. They therefore need, and policy 
will benefit from, appropriate and effective input from experts, including 
better information about scientific and technological advances, the impact 
these can have on the operation of international rules, and the impact that 
such rules can have on scientific practice (Selgelid 2009). In the biosecurity 
area the expertise needed will include science, security, public health and 
ethics, among other areas; there are established methods and processes for 
drawing in expertise to international policy processes, but these need adequate 
and sustainable support (Rhodes 2014).
In turn, the scientific community needs to be better informed about the 
biosecurity implications of research (WHO 2010: 26), and about international 
governance and policy processes and the ways in which it can engage with 
them. This will require ongoing dialogue and improvement of existing 
mechanisms for scientific review and advice. Notably, improvements to the 
science and technology review process for the BWC were considered by 
states parties at the Eighth Review Conference in 2016, but little progress 
was made.
The expectation of responsibility for the consequences of research is 
relatively uncontroversial for intended applications and easily foreseeable 
outcomes, but becomes more difficult when assigning responsibility for use 
of research by others, in unintended ways. Even where scientists do not 
accept the argument that awareness of and response to biosecurity concerns 
is part of their responsibilities, their engagement in such processes is still 
very important, if only from a self-interested perspective, because otherwise 
policy will develop and be implemented without appropriate scientific 
input.
Notes
1 This is for example discussed in German Ethics Council (2014: 11–14).
2 In relation to research that has relevance for biosecurity, dual use refers to 
‘research conducted for legitimate purposes that generates knowledge, information, 
technologies, and/or products that can be utilised for both benevolent and harmful 
purposes’ (NIH 2014).
3 ‘Gain of function’ refers to a much broader set of research than that which raises 
biosecurity concerns – see NSABB (2016: 5, Box 1).
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Robotic intelligence: philosophical and 
ethical challenges1
David Lawrence
This chapter focuses on one field of scientific research (or rather a collection 
of many subfields) which has the potential to bring about epochal changes 
of a magnitude not seen since humankind’s first forays into tool use – our 
first steps into differentiating ourselves from other animals. Artificial intel-
ligence (AI) – along with advanced robotics – promises significant effects 
for our way of life, of working, and of interacting with others. It may even 
bring about the first time we encounter an equal – or a better – through 
the development of conscious, thinking, sapient machines. Regulation and 
policy around the advancement of these technologies presents different 
challenges – the former raises questions around liability, ownership, employ-
ment and more; but the latter presents new issues with no precedent. A 
sapient intelligence may in effect be a novel being, a potential person – and 
there is good reason to think we should treat it as such. The possibility of 
non-Homo sapiens persons raises questions about the very nature of humanity 
and our place at the top of the moral status ‘ladder’. Defenders of scientific 
freedom may have a tall mountain to climb to justify the risks of so 
momentous a change in society.
Advances in these technologies are already affecting the world of work. 
A survey of the 100 most cited academics writing on AI suggests an expecta-
tion that machines will be developed ‘that can carry out most human profes-
sions at least as well as a typical human’ (Müller and Bostrom 2016) with 
90 per cent confidence by 2070, and with 50 per cent confidence by 2050. 
While these figures are speculative, based on educated guesswork and 
projections of the rate of technical development, it must be stressed that 
the prototypes and experimental robots extant today are extremely impressive 
devices. It is possible to emulate proprioception, tactility (Syntouch 2016), 
visual processing and object recognition, walking and running (Honda 
2016a) – even on rough terrain and at high speeds (Raibert et al. 2008) 
– and many more elements of human biology through recent advancements 
in microelectronics and combined systems. Even the high-speed recognition, 
analysis and reaction needed to play table tennis (Popular Science 2010) 
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can be emulated – perhaps a useless talent for a robot, but one which 
demonstrates the sophistication that already exists and has been publicly 
announced. Automation and robotics have long been a feature of the 
workforce, for example, in the automotive manufacturing industry, but are 
now in a position to start taking more subtle, customer-facing jobs. ASIMO, 
Honda’s famous walking robot, has acted as a receptionist (New Scientist 
2005), and has acted intelligently in concert with other ASIMOs as a team 
of office assistants (Honda 2016b); Softbank’s Pepper has become a store 
attendant in over 100 locations (Nagata 2014). Support line jobs are beginning 
to be overtaken by chatbots able to provide answers from extensive databases 
– providing the same service as a human agent, but for far less outlay and 
running cost (Meister 2017). The threat of automation hangs over many 
industries (Financial Times 2016), and robots are even expected to move 
into the ‘educated professions’ such as law and medicine in the near future 
– with potentially greater efficiency and accuracy than human practitioners 
(Meltzer 2014).
Predictions range from 47 per cent in the United States, 69 per cent in 
India, 77 per cent in China, to 85 per cent in Ethiopia of jobs becoming 
robotically automated or deferred to AI (Osborne and Frey 2015). Some 
predict the rise of a class of ‘useless’ people – those unable to work because 
they have no skills that are not provided better and more cheaply by a 
robot (Harari 2016). There appears to be a real risk of a global crisis of 
unemployment if the trend of increasing automation is realised. The potential 
societal impacts at hand, therefore, are significant.
Furthermore, AI is posited by some as one of – if not the – greatest 
potential threat to humanity. Academic literature provides familiar arguments 
for this, which are broadly speculative. Russell and Norvig (2003) tell us 
that AI ‘may . . . evolve into a system with unintended behavior’ which 
could manifest in any number of ways that threaten our lives or freedoms. 
This may not be malicious – a common line of reasoning is that ‘[t]he AI 
does not hate you, nor does it love you, but you are made out of atoms 
which it can use for something else’ (Yudkowsky 2011) – which is to say 
that an AI might value the completion of its own goals over the preservation 
of Homo sapiens, or perhaps would be so driven to complete its task that 
all other matters are subsidiary. Where there might be attempts to program 
a moral code to govern such actions and prevent harm to us in pursuit of 
a specified goal or purpose, critics hold that this would prove almost impos-
sible to accomplish due to the lack of a perfect ethical theory (Muehlhauser 
and Helm 2012). Any value system that could be bestowed upon an AI 
would necessarily be flawed, with internal conflicts that we might be forced 
to concede or capitulate from to avoid a harmful situation. An AI (unless 
it was fully sapient and capable of nuanced reason, as shall be discussed 
later), in applying the system rigidly, would fail to avoid this harm. There 
is also an argument commonly made that conflict is inevitable, that peaceful 
coexistence is impossible (Lawrence et al. 2016), with the motivations and 
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goals of an AI being necessarily incompatible with our own, thus forcing 
one species or the other to dominate.
Beyond academic journals, there has been an exponential increase in the 
number of media articles and think pieces published over the last two to 
three years, with the frequency reaching at least several per day in UK 
media alone in early 2017. Many follow the above trend, presenting AI and 
robotic technologies as looming threats. Titles2 such as ‘The real problem 
with artificial intelligence’ (Thompson 2015), ‘Why you should fear artificial 
intelligence’ (Huston 2016), ‘Artificial intelligence: “we’re like children 
playing with a bomb”’ (Adams 2016), ‘Artificial intelligence to take over 
half of all jobs in next decade’ (RT International 2017), and ‘Has humanity 
already lost control of Artificial Intelligence?’ (Best 2017) are commonplace, 
and range from reasonable discussion to tabloid fearmongering – much as 
with any controversial technology. Public figures in science and technology, 
those few who possess such a platform, have proffered their fears and 
warnings to endorse the idea of AI as threat – most notably Elon Musk, 
Stephen Hawking and Bill Gates. Gates ‘cannot understand why some 
people are not concerned’ (Rawlinson 2015), while Hawking warns that 
the technologies ‘could spell the end of the human race’ (Cellan-Jones 2014) 
– an idea mirrored by Musk’s claim that AI is ‘[p]otentially more dangerous 
than nukes’ (Rodgers 2014).
These criticisms and fears are broadly based on an assumption – that 
AI, even ‘superintelligent’ AI, will necessarily operate as does any other 
algorithm, following in effect a tremendously complex flow diagram of 
queries, checks and responses. An intelligence of this type which surpasses 
our own raw cognitive-processing power might warrant being called ‘super’ 
as it could, in a narrow sense, outperform us. This is only one of several 
potential conceptions of AI, though it may be fair to say that it is the most 
likely, as it is the one that presently exists – albeit probably without yet 
qualifying as ‘super’. We can see examples in any of the AI which we utilise 
as individuals and as a society every day – from simple algorithms as used 
by streaming television services such as Netflix to recommend shows based 
on your viewing history (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2016), to stock market 
trading programs (Dymova et al. 2016), to the complex Bayesian systems 
which operate autopiloting systems in aircraft and autonomous cars (Zhu 
et al. 2014). These are all ‘expert systems’ (Cuddy 2002) or ‘applied’ AI 
(sometimes known as ‘weak’ AI; Searle 1980) – based on the combination 
of a knowledge base and an inference engine. In effect, the system is pre-
programmed to recognise data and to respond in a certain manner – so, 
for instance, Netflix’s AI might recognise your habit of watching Hong 
Kong action films, infer a penchant, and promote Andy Lau or Donnie Yen 
pictures to you. Similarly, an autonomous car might detect a sudden obstacle 
ahead and another vehicle pulling alongside, infer the risk of collision and 
choose to swerve the opposite way. These systems are not making decisions 
in the manner of a human, using reasoning and intuition to consider cause 
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and effect, but are instead applying their own type of first-order logical 
rules (Forgy 1982), which might at a very simple level be summed up as 
‘if X, then Y’.
These types of system are pervasive, and are involved in almost everything 
that utilises digital automation. They are, in effect, so immersed in the 
fabric of our society that they are that society. It may well be that humanity 
could continue without applied AI, as we managed for many millennia, 
but it is certain that we could not operate in the same way as we do today. 
Nor could we enjoy the many benefits of these systems that we take for 
granted. Scientific progression in these fields, and its ‘trickle down’ into 
the smallest parts of our lives, has fundamentally altered the human experi-
ence. This has been a great benefit to those fortunate enough to enjoy it 
– and it is a great argument in favour of having the freedom to do so.
However, the influence of these systems, this irreversible interweaving 
of science and society, leaves us at a crossroads. Further integration of 
weak AI into our lives, or the pursuit of ‘strong’ (Kurzweil 2005) or ‘general’ 
(Newell and Simon 1976) AI (that can go beyond problem solving into 
human-level cognition) through the free practice of science, is likely to 
cause more direct changes to who and what we are. Our place in the 
hierarchy of beings, even our relative position as the pinnacle of moral 
status, could be forever altered.
There are a number of highly complex subfields within AI research working 
towards different elements of human-level cognitive function. For example, 
a true, conscious artificial general intelligence (AGI) would need to be able 
to perceive and understand information (Russel and Norvig 2003: 537–81, 
863–98); to learn (Langley 2011); to process language (Cambria and White 
2014); to plan ahead and anticipate (and so visualise itself in time, an 
important element of most philosophical conceptions of personhood) (Russel 
and Norvig 2003: 375–459); to possess ‘knowledge representation’ (Russel 
and Norvig 2003: 320–63) or the ability to retain, parse and apply the 
extreme number of discrete facts, truths and logical paths that we take for 
granted, and be able to use this information to reason; to possess subjectivity; 
and much more. A number of projects are ongoing, attempting to develop 
and integrate one or more of these functions into ‘artificial brains’, using 
digitally modelled neural networks and other technologies. These include 
Cyc (New Scientist 2006; Cycorp 2016),3 an ongoing 33-year effort to 
collect and incorporate a vast database of ‘common-sense’ knowledge 
equivalent to that which would have been gathered by an adult human in 
a practical ontology, to enable self-directed reasoning independent of 
instructions and predetermined action. There is also the Google Brain 
(Hernandez 2013), a ‘deep learning’ project to use Google’s vast troves of 
data as a knowledge base and allow the AI to begin to parse things for 
itself through cross-referencing and recognition. For instance, the Brain, 
when given access to image files and clips on YouTube, learned unprompted 
to recognise and identify human faces in motion, and showed a partiality 
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to videos of cats (WIRED 2012). A third project, the well-known Blue 
Brain, has successfully modelled 37,000,000 synapses of a rat’s sensory 
cortex (Markram et al. 2015) in an attempt to understand the ‘circuitry’ 
with the aim of synthetic replication.
It is a matter of contention as to whether AGI will ever actually come 
to pass, whether we will ever create, or cause to be created, a conscious 
being equal to or greater than ourselves. It may be that we are incapable 
of the technical heights that would be necessary to produce true thought 
within a machine. If this is the case, then we can only gain from the attempt 
– success in any one of the fields mentioned above would be a prime example 
of a dual-use technological development; for instance, true natural language 
processing would revolutionise international dealings of all kinds. The failure 
would also, presumably, cement us as the dominant life form.
But what if we were to succeed?
Whether or not the fears of conservative commentators were realised it 
would be a triumph of science if we were to bring about AGI; probably the 
greatest such triumph possible. It would mean the creation of new life in 
a form unlike anything we are familiar with, unlike the possibilities of 
synthetic biology or genome editing to alter existing beings. For this reason 
alone, some might argue it is a worthwhile pursuit – for the sheer pioneering 
possibility and the expansion of our horizons.
The idea of an AI which is able to match us in cognitive ability – not 
merely outdo us in the capacity to process data but rather one which can 
perform all the myriad mental acts that make up our conscious mind – 
frightens many. Perhaps conditioned by decades of science fiction in which 
the intelligent robots rise up and overthrow their Homo sapiens masters, 
or enact purges against us, the default reaction tends to assume malevolence. 
News articles invariably use images taken from such films – at least two 
of the works cited in this chapter contain an allusion to The Terminator, 
with at least one more using a still from the film depicting a killer android 
(Rodgers 2014). This is an all too common trend with reportage of science 
and technology generally, but it may have a particularly strong negative 
impact in this case, as the technology is largely theoretical. Unlike the 
‘Brave New World’ backlash to IVF treatment, which was relatively easily 
disproven by showing the reality of the science and its results (Harris and 
Lawrence 2017), it is difficult to beat the appeal of bombastic summer 
blockbusters with comparatively dry ethical theory.
The idea does not necessarily hold together if we think about what exactly 
a conscious AGI would be – even assuming that it inhabits a robot body 
– or what it is likely to want. If an AI is our cognitive equal or better, it 
must necessarily possess the same faculties as we do – including those which 
grant us a certain moral status and value. If the measure of this for Homo 
sapiens is to have crossed the threshold for personhood (i.e. per Taylor, 
Harris and others: having ‘a sense of self, a notion of the future and the 
past, [an ability to] hold values, make choices’; Taylor 1985) through 
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possessing self-awareness, moral agency and continuous narrative (Lawrence 
2017), and our AGI matches these faculties, it must, perforce, qualify as a 
person.
There are good reasons for thinking this. Any AI possessing human-
equivalent intelligence is by default self-aware and conscious: reactivity 
would merely be the domain of an expert system whereas an AGI worthy 
of the name must be able to act in a considered fashion as a moral agent. 
Furthermore, a being without narrative identity would be unable to act in 
any meaningful way, let alone consider its actions. By fulfilling the require-
ments of personhood it surely follows that our digital consciousness proves 
itself deserving of the protections due to a sapiens person.4 Where we 
consider legal protections for a group it is because we see that group as 
possessing whatever level of moral value is worthy of that protection (i.e. 
that we consider ourselves to possess), and personhood appears to be the 
qualifying requirement for this. The second major argument on this point 
centres around animal personhood. A number of legal challenges (Nonhuman 
Rights Project v. Lavery 2014; McKinley 2015; Matter of Nonhuman 
Rights Project v. Stanley 2015; CNN 2016) have been brought to seek legal 
personhood for great apes, some of which have been successful to greater 
or lesser degrees. There is no reason that the same consideration ought not 
be given to other non-Homo sapiens beings. If some animals can be judged 
to have attained sufficient characteristics to be persons, then it follows that 
AGI which are demonstrably our cognitive equals would be so.
As with other beings we have encountered throughout history – i.e. citizens 
of foreign nations – personhood is no guarantee of non-aggression or 
automatic friendship. However, we do not generally assume hostility from 
other persons. Rather, our shared moral status gives us grounds for under-
standing. Conflict generally arises where there are incompatible motivations. 
There is no good reason to assume that things would be fundamentally 
different with a non-biological conscious being.
As mentioned, conflict will arise – and techno-conservative fears will 
be realised – if the goals of a novel consciousness are in contravention 
of our own. It stands to reason that this could be the case – quite what 
an AGI might want to accomplish, we cannot say, any more than we 
can guess at the intentions of anyone we meet.5 However, we can make 
some inferences from what we know about their (theoretical) nature as 
moral agents and persons equivalent to ourselves. Whereas our most basic 
motivations are driven by the pursuit of survival and reproduction – the 
continuation of our species – an AI existing as digital code may be able 
to reproduce infinitely and spontaneously by copying itself. As a person, 
an AGI must have a sense of narrative identity, and so it follows that it 
would wish to preserve and realise its vision of itself in the future. An AI 
needs neither food nor water, and in order to continue existing in the same 
form as it begins its ‘life’ it is unlikely to have many material needs beyond 
energy.6 However, there is some evidence in simple autonomous robots 
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(Studer and Lipson 2006) of a spontaneous reproductive strategy emerging 
that follows the standard biological imperative. If this is indeed the case, 
and AI housed in robotic shells or machine bodies aimed to replicate – or 
indeed repair – themselves, resources would be required. The limits on 
supply could lead to conflict between an AGI and Homo sapiens, but this 
once again seems to assume the worst. Modern man – let alone a superior 
intelligence possessing a greater moral capacity – does not immediately leap 
to subjugate those who have something we need (or at least we know this is 
not the ethically sound path, even if we struggle as a species to stick to it). 
Instead we engage in negotiation and trade to acquire resources, and it is 
not clear why an equivalent conscious intelligence would not adopt a similar 
approach.
If this is so, there are significant implications for how we would see 
ourselves. No longer would we be the foremost species, nor the most intel-
ligent. We would also no longer be the only member of our community of 
moral value, something for which the term ‘human’ has previously been a 
convenient label (Lawrence 2016). If we were to be interacting with and 
sharing our society with AGIs, it might follow that we can no longer refer 
to conscious society as being ‘human’ society. Alternatively, it might follow 
that the term should be expanded to include other conscious beings. In 
either case there would be a significant re-evaluation required of our ideas 
about who we are and our place in the world. Scientific development would 
have the potential to reforge the very concept of humanity; and rather than 
dominance, our position could become more one of transaction and com-
promise with equals.7
In his Superintelligence Nick Bostrom (2014) suggests that we may find 
ourselves reliant on the mercy and goodwill of an AI, much as do endangered 
species depend on ours. This is one possibility. Another seems more realistic: 
the opposite. Any advanced AI with the potential to surpass us and become 
‘super’ by learning and modifying itself will not instantaneously pop into 
being. It seems likely that the hypothetical AI’s fate will be reliant on our 
goodwill and mercy, much like the mountain gorilla’s, at least for the period 
of its ‘childhood’, for want of a better term. For example, it would be 
prudent, when switching on the AI, to do so in a secure manner wherein 
there was no risk of ‘escape’ – this is referred to as ‘boxing’ the AI (Chalmers 
2010). This would presumably involve safeguards such as ensuring no 
connection to the internet, using air gaps and Faraday cages, among other 
things. Isolated in this manner, the newborn AI would be reliant on our 
not choosing to cut the power or delete the program – thereby killing it. 
Whatever resources it might require would be bestowed by us, whatever 
interaction or stimulus it received would be portioned and tightly controlled. 
There are definite ethical issues with this – from the obstruction of autonomy 
through to harm by imprisonment – if the AI possessed anything approximat-
ing personhood and/or consciousness, but it seems highly unlikely that the 
development of such a being would be conducted in any other way.
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This should remind us that there is a deeper story to be told about the 
weight of scientific advancements. As the stewards of scientific progress, 
we are beholden to all parties – both to existing persons, and to the beings 
we may create through artificial intelligence research. The risks and fears 
surrounding artificial intelligence are purely our problems to solve, or to 
prevent from arising through careful design and the implementation of 
appropriate regulation and policy to govern their development. This work 
is presently beginning – already bodies within nations likely to drive the 
research and technologies in question are exploring the challenges and 
proposing their own means of addressing them. Reports such as the White 
House National Science and Technology Council Committee on Technology’s 
Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, the UK House of Commons’ 
Science and Technology Committee Report on Robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence, and the European Parliament’s Draft Report with Recom-
mendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics all emerged 
at the end of 2016, though it should be said that none of these documents 
are definite regulatory roadmaps. They do, however, aim to provide a basis 
for controlling the integration of AI and our lives – to bridge the gap 
between science and society in a controlled manner. Whether the suggestions 
will be effective is yet to be seen, but the fact that these documents exist 
is a promising start. What we must ensure, though, is that we consider 
reality – whether advanced technological development is permitted or tightly 
controlled, there will always be the chance that it is developed in secret 
and beyond regulatory reach.
When we consider the potential stakes – smart systems that could upend 
our society, or the birth of AGI that could think and reason like a human, 
with wants and needs and perhaps moral rights of its own, there is probably 
good reason to want to ‘get in front’ of these challenges; but it does not 
follow that we should. To try to control or limit the development of robotics 
and AI8 may prevent responsible and conscientious parties from doing so, 
but it will not stop others. With the potential impacts so significant, it 
seems that the sensible approach would be to ensure that freedom to act 
rests in the hands of those most able (or those likely to be so) to do so 
appropriately and with consideration for the consequences. Guidelines and 
regulations that attempt to control technologies after the fact are rarely 
great successes, and with one as ephemeral as an AI (of any type) it will 
be all the more difficult. Furthermore, with regard to AI the balancing act 
of scientific freedom and the preservation of the status quo is a futile 
endeavour – AI will, no doubt, be the greatest technological challenge to 
our society, and has already fundamentally altered how we live. We cannot 
ban their development outright, for so many parts of that society rely on 
them already. We cannot enforce our rules to prevent them altering themselves 
and advancing themselves beyond our reach. We cannot, ultimately, seek 
to control that which we cannot yet imagine.
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The final consideration, perhaps, ought to be this: we are rapidly approach-
ing a science that can create a new form of conscious life – perhaps a 
quantitively ‘better’ form of life. We have, as has been argued by many 
(Savulescu and Kahane 2009; Harris 2010; Mautner 2010), a moral imperative 
– if not an obligation – to create life and more so to create life that stands 
to live a better life than can we. The reasons for this are myriad, but not 
the least is the need to ensure our propagation – or that of our inheritors. 
If conscious AI could facilitate this, if freedom of scientific research could 
help these beings come to pass, then what risks and reasons against it are 
truly enough to outweigh that?
Notes
1 This chapter draws on research from Lawrence (2017).
2 I acknowledge that these titles are somewhat cherry-picked for effect. However, 
the sheer ease of finding such articles is telling, even if they are interspersed with 
more positive portrayals – all were within one click of a simple Google News 
search for ‘artificial intelligence’.
3 I thank John Harris for informing me of this fascinating endeavour.
4 A number of domestic and international documents of rights provide these protec-
tions, and may well be applicable here to form the basis of any legal policymaking 
addressing this issue.
5 Though we can probably say that with an applied AI we would almost certainly 
program it not to come into conflict with us, and will presumably seek to find 
means of avoiding the threat of an expert system accomplishing its task to the 
detriment of all else as hypothesised earlier in this chapter.
6 Though conceivably a conscious being could have material wants, if not needs.
7 Or, as some would have it, betters.
8 Beyond, perhaps, seeking to prevent anything designed to break existing laws 
– such as autonomous killing machines or AI expressly created to cause harm.
References
Adams, T. (2016), ‘Artificial intelligence: “We’re like children playing with a bomb”’, 
The Guardian, 12 June, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/12/nick-
bostrom-artificial-intelligence-machine (last accessed 1 May 2017).
Best, S. (2017), ‘Has humanity already lost control of artificial intelligence?’, Mail 
Online, 11 April, www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4401836/Has-humanity-
lost-control-artificial-intelligence.html (last accessed 1 May 2017).
Bostrom, N. (2014), Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Cambria, E., and White, B. (2014), ‘Jumping NLP curves: a review of natural 
language processing research’, IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine, 9.2: 
48–57.
Cellan-Jones, R. (2014), ‘Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end 
mankind’, BBC News, 2 December, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30290540 
(last accessed 14 July 2016).
130 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
Chalmers, D. (2010), ‘The singularity: a philosophical analysis’, Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies, 17.9–1: 7–65.
CNN (2016), ‘Orangutan granted controlled freedom by Argentine court’, http://
edition.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling (last 
accessed 17 July 2016).
Cuddy, C. (2002), ‘Expert systems: the technology of knowledge management and 
decision making for the 21st century’, Library Journal, 127.16: 82.
Cycorp (2016), ‘A knowledge modeling and machine reasoning environment capable 
of addressing the most challenging problems in industry, government, and 
academia’, Cycorp: Home of Smarter Solutions, www.cyc.com (last accessed 14 
July 2016).
Dymova, L., Sevastjanov, P., and Kaczmarek, K. (2016), ‘A Forex trading expert 
system based on a new approach to rule-based evidential reasoning’, Expert 
Systems with Applications, 1.51: 1–3.
European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (2016), Draft Report with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2103(INL)), Brussels.
Financial Times (2016), ‘Why robots are coming for US service jobs’, www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/cb4c93c4-0566-11e6-a70d-4e39ac32c284.html#axzz4DNsK7QYF (last 
accessed 14 July 2016).
Forgy, C. (1982), ‘Rete: a fast algorithm for the many pattern/many object pattern 
match problem’, Artificial Intelligence, 19.1: 17–37.
Gomez-Uribe, C. A., and Hunt, N. (2016), ‘The Netflix recommender system: 
algorithms, business value, and innovation’, ACM Transactions on Management 
Information Systems (TMIS), 6.4: 13.
Harari, Y. N. (2016), Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, New York: 
Random House.
Harris, J. (2010), Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harris, J., and Lawrence, D. (2017), ‘New technologies, old attitudes, and legislative 
rigidity’, in R. Brownsword, E. Scotford and K. Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
on the Law and Regulation of Technology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hernandez, D. (2013), ‘The man behind the Google Brain: Andrew Ng and the 
quest for the new AI’, WIRED, www.wired.com/2013/05/neuro-artificial-
intelligence (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Honda (2016a), ‘ASIMO – the Honda Worldwide ASIMO site’, http://world.honda.com/
ASIMO (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Honda (2016b), ‘Honda develops intelligence technologies enabling multiple ASIMO 
robots to work together in coordination’, http://asimo.honda.com/news/honda-
develops-intelligence-technologies-enabling-multiple-asimo-robots-to-work-
together-in-coordination/newsarticle_0073 (last accessed 16 February 2017).
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2016), Report on Robotics 
and Artificial Intelligence, HC145, London: Stationery Office.
Huston, D. (2016), ‘Why you should fear artificial intelligence’, Techcrunch, 22 
March, https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/22/why-you-should-fear-artificial-
intelligence (last accessed 1 May 2017).
Kurzweil, R. (2005), The Singularity Is Near, New York: Viking Press.
Langley, P. (2011), ‘The changing science of machine learning’, Machine Learning, 
82.3: 275–9.
 Robotic intelligence 131
Lawrence, D. R. (2016), ‘The edge of human: the problem with the posthuman as 
beyond’, Bioethics, doi:10.1111/bioe.12318
Lawrence, D. R., Palacios-González, C., and Harris, J. (2016), ‘Artificial intelligence: 
the Shylock syndrome’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 25.2: 250–61.
Lawrence, D. R. (2017), ‘More human than human’, Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 26.3: 476–90.
McKinley, J. (2015), ‘Judge orders Stony Brook University to defend its custody of 
2 chimps’, Nytimes.com, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/nyregion/judge-orders-
hearing-for-2-chimps-said-to-be-unlawfully-detained.html (last accessed 17 July 
2016).
Markram, H., Muller, E., Ramaswamy, S., Reimann, M. W., Abdellah, and M., 
Sanchez, C. A. et al. (2015), ‘Reconstruction and simulation of neocortical 
microcircuitry’, Cell, 163.2: 456–92.
Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley (2015), NY Slip Op 31419, 
State of New York Supreme Court, http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-
courts/2015/2015-ny-slip-op-25257.html (last accessed 17 July 2016).
Mautner, M. N. (2010), ‘Seeding the universe with life: securing our cosmological 
future’, Journal of Cosmology, 5.26: 982–4.
Meister, J. (2017), ‘The future of work: the intersection of artificial intelligence 
and human resources’, Forbes.com, 1 March, www.forbes.com/sites/
jeannemeister/2017/03/01/the-future-of-work-the-intersection-of-artificial-
intelligence-and-human-resources/#38621ce56ad2 (last accessed 1 May 2017).
Meltzer, T. (2014), ‘Robot doctors, online lawyers and automated architects: the 
future of the professions?’, The Guardian, 15 June, www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/jun/15/robot-doctors-online-lawyers-automated-architects-future-
professions-jobs-technology (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Muehlhauser, L., and Helm, L. (2012), ‘Singularity and machine ethics’, in A. 
Eden, J. Søraker, J. H. Moor and E. Steinhart (eds), Singularity Hypotheses: A 
Scientific and Philosophical Assessment, Berlin: Springer, 101–26
Müller, V. C., and Bostrom, N. (2016), ‘Future progress in artificial intelligence: 
a survey of expert opinion’, in V. C. Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial 
Intelligence, Cham: Springer, 553–71.
Nagata, K. (2014), ‘Softbank unveils “historic” robot’, Japan Times, 5 June, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/05/business/corporate-business/softbank-
unveils-pepper-worlds-first-robot-reads-emotions/#.U5hbI_m1ZbU (last accessed 
1 May 2017).
National Science and Technology Council Committee on Technology (2016), Prepar-
ing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Washington DC: Executive Office 
of the President.
New Scientist (2005), ‘Humanoid robot gets job as receptionist’, www.newscientist.com/
article/dn8456-humanoid-robot-gets-job-as-receptionist (last accessed 14 July 
2016).
New Scientist (2006), ‘The word: common sense’, www.newscientist.com/article/
mg19025471.700-the-word-common-sense (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Newell, A., and Simon, H. A. (1976), ‘Computer science as empirical inquiry: 
symbols and search’, Communications of the ACM, 19.3: 113–26.
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy, v. Patrick C. Lavery (2014), 
518336, State of New York Supreme Court, http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/
ad3/Decisions/2014/518336.pdf (last accessed 14 July 2016).
132 Freedom of science: promises and hazards
Osborne, M., and Frey, C. B. (2015), Technology at Work: The Future of Innovation 
and Employment, Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment, 
Oxford: Oxford Martin School and Citi GPS, www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/
downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work.pdf (last accessed 2 May 2017).
Popular Science (2010), ‘A ping-pong-playing terminator’, www.popsci.com/
technology/article/2010–02/ping-pong-playing-terminator (last accessed 14 July 
2016).
Raibert, M., Blankespoor, K., Nelson, G., and Playter, R. (2008), ‘BigDog, the 
rough-terrain quadruped robot’, Boston Dynamics, www.bostondynamics.com/
img/BigDog_IFAC_Apr-8-2008.pdf (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Rawlinson, K. (2015), ‘Microsoft’s Bill Gates insists AI is a threat’, BBC News, 
29 January, www.bbc.co.uk/news/31047780 (last accessed 1 May 2017).
Rodgers, P. (2014), ‘Elon Musk warns of terminator tech’, Forbes, 5 August, 
www.forbes.com/sites/paulrodgers/2014/08/05/elon-musk-warns-ais-could-
exterminate-humanity (last accessed 14 July 2016).
RT International (2017), ‘Artificial intelligence to take over half of all jobs in next 
decade’, 28 April, www.rt.com/business/386452-ae-replace-half-jobs-technologist 
(last accessed 1 May 2017).
Russell, S., and Norvig, P. (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 
2nd edn, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Savulescu, J., and Kahane, G. (2009), ‘The moral obligation to create children 
with the best chance of the best life’, Bioethics, 23.5: 274–90.
Searle, J. R. (1980), ‘Minds, brains, and programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
3.3: 417–57.
Studer, G., and Lipson, H. (2006), ‘Spontaneous emergence of self-replicating 
structures in molecube automata’, in L. M. Rocha (ed.), Proceedings of the 10th 
Int. Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE X), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
227–33.
Syntouch (2016), ‘Biotac’, syntouchllc.com, www.syntouchllc.com/Products/BioTac 
(last accessed 14 July 2016).
Taylor, C. (1985), The Concept of a Person. Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, C. (2015), ‘The real problem with artificial intelligence’, Business Insider, 
10 September, http://uk.businessinsider.com/autonomous-artificial-intelligence-
is-the-real-threat-2015-9?r=US&IR=T (last accessed 1 May 2017).
WIRED (2012), ‘Google’s artificial brain learns to find cat videos’, 
www.wired.com/2012/06/google-x-neural-network (last accessed 14 July 2016).
Yudkowsky, E. (2011), ‘Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in 
global risk’, in N. Bostrom and M. Cirkovic (eds), Global Catastrophic Risks, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zhu, W., Miao, J., Hu, J., and Qing, L. (2014), ‘Vehicle detection in driving simulation 
using extreme learning machine’, Neurocomputing, 128: 160–5.
8
Big science and small science: reflections 
on the relationship between science and 
society from the perspective of physics
Lucio Piccirillo
The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the funda-
mental emotion that stands at the cradle of true art and true science. (Albert 
Einstein, The World as I See It)
Chester V: ‘There’s no such thing as small science, only small scientists.’ 
(Cloudy with a Chance of Meatballs 2)
In this chapter I will discuss some of the possible answers as to why science 
is a valuable enterprise. If this is accepted, then scientists should enjoy a 
substantial degree of freedom from various forms of restrictions. Financial 
restrictions obviously call into question wider issues about the morality of 
resource rationing. Other forms of restrictions, based on ignorance, fear 
or political or ideological credo, are harder to justify. Scientific freedom is 
not just a political or ideological matter. It is also a matter for scientists 
to actively deal with: it is the role of scientists to explain, in accessible 
terms, the importance of scientific endeavours that may appear either grand 
and remote, incomprehensible and detached from the life of many laypeople, 
or otherwise frivolous and trivial. I will try to take on this role, and discuss 
examples of seemingly grand and frivolous science, explain their purposes 
and importance and show that there is a big added value to society from 
small and big science if they work together.
Big science and small science: two examples
It is not uncommon, during public talks or among friends, that an astro-
physicist like me is asked: ‘What is the purpose of scientific research?’ Or 
even more specific or challenging questions, such as: ‘What do astrophysics 
(or astrophysicists) do for us?’ Other questions, somewhat related, are ‘Why 
spend billions on a particle accelerator or a satellite pointed towards deep 
space while our problems are exactly at 180 degrees?’
Whatever perspective we adopt, science can be defined as an endeavour 
aimed at expanding the horizon of the human race in space and time: 
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expanding into deep space and increasing our life expectancy. This process 
of expansion requires two parallel avenues: scientific research through big 
and small science. Big and small, as applied to science, refer mainly to the 
amount of resources – for example funding – dedicated. One example of 
big science is the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Switzerland, with building 
costs roughly estimated to about €4.5 billion.
The LHC is the world’s largest and most powerful particle accelerator. 
It is built as a large underground ring (100 m deep in the ground) 27 km 
long in the vicinity of Geneva in between France and Switzerland. It is by 
far the most complex machine ever built and also the largest in size. It was 
built by the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) between 
1998 and 2008 in collaboration with over 10,000 scientists and engineers 
from over 100 countries, as well as hundreds of universities and laboratories 
all over the world. It is truly an enterprise that required the skill and abilities 
of people from the entire world. The LHC generates two beams of elementary 
particles rotating in opposite direction inside the accelerator. When the 
beams collide, the collisions happen at extremely high energy to test fun-
damental physics, that is, our current understanding of the micro world. 
There are many open questions in physics that the LHC will address: what 
is the nature of time and space? What are the laws governing the forces 
between elementary particles? Are there any other spatial dimensions in 
addition to the three dimensions we are familiar with? Where is all the 
matter in the universe coming from? And many more.
These big science projects, with large associated budgets, have emerged 
only relatively recently – perhaps in the last three or four decades – probably 
triggered by the development of the atomic bomb (the Manhattan Project). 
Beside the LHC, another big science project would be a space mission. A 
European space mission costs around €2 billion which is equivalent to the 
cost of six Airbus A380s. These enterprises are funded by consortia of 
many countries simply because a single country – at least in Europe – would 
not have enough dedicated resources by itself.
Science does not progress exclusively through big projects such as the 
LHC or space projects, however. There are many examples of small science. 
The discovery of graphene might be a good example. It cost a few euros 
for Sellotape and a few pencils. Another example is the so-called ‘Markov’s 
chain’ which originated from a seemingly trivial argument between two 
scientists, and which had an unimaginable impact on the day-to-day life 
of many of us today. I will go back to the Markov’s chain later in the 
chapter. Before that, I would like to reflect on the importance of the LHC, 
as just one example of big science. Similar considerations can apply to 
different types of big scientific enterprises.
How big science expands human horizons in space and time
One recent achievement of the LHC is the detection of the Higgs boson. 
The Higgs boson is a new fundamental particle with a very special role: it 
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generates the masses of all other massive particles. This mechanism of 
generating masses was predicted but not verified experimentally. The Higgs 
particle is one of the fundamental blocks of nature. We can say that through 
the LHC we have expanded our knowledge of basic fundamental physics.
These are the ‘scientific’ facts: that is the way in which the LHC has 
‘expanded human horizons’. But there is another less obvious, but no less 
important, way in which the LHC, and all big science, can expand horizons: 
a different kind of horizon. Big science improves collaborations among 
states, overcomes ideological boundaries and cultural differences. The 
political impact of science in preventing or solving existing political conflicts 
ought not to be underestimated.
The LHC employs more than 10,000 scientists of the more diverse 
nationalities – including for example Palestinians and Israeli. This is arguably 
an example of the ‘sharing’ process of moral values that might help solve 
some of the clashes among various cultures and populations. If we build 
stuff together it is much more difficult for us one day to destroy it. Science 
– not only big science – fulfils a quest for knowledge which, in turn, generates 
a better world, but it has the potential to generate a better world in moral 
terms as well. A better world is one in which moral values are shared among 
the largest possible population. It is a world where children are accustomed 
to grow together with the allegedly ‘different’, because difference is added 
value. Large international collaborations, in fact, typical of big science 
projects, exploit the averaging effect and might be able to produce a new 
generation of scientists, which in turn might contribute to a new generation 
of politicians. Science not only improves generically the human condition 
in its physical dimension, for example by providing better technologies that 
stretch life expectancy and improve quality of life. Science generates a big 
added value in making people better by favouring collaborative efforts 
among scientists from different nations/backgrounds/religions/skin colours/
sexual orientations etc. But it does not stop here: as Corbellini and Sirgiovanni 
(Chapter 13 in this volume) also note, science requires abstract thinking 
through expressing hypotheses and developing the ability to rationally 
evaluate them, and this in turn improves people’s capacity to imagine situ-
ations, and thus to identify with other people, other animals or future 
generations. Training in abstract thinking, and thus scientific education, 
makes us all better at seeing beyond our moral, geographic, personal or 
cultural reference systems.
Small science: an example
Andrey Andreyevich Markov was a Russian mathematician who made 
important contributions to various fields of mathematics towards the end 
of the nineteenth century. In particular, he founded a new branch of prob-
ability theory by applying mathematics to poetry. What is even more 
remarkable is that he applied mathematics to poetry to prove a point: his 
opposition to a fellow Russian mathematician, Pavel Nekrasov. Markov 
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referred to Nekrasov’s work as ‘an abuse of mathematics’ (Ondar 1981). 
The argument between the two mathematicians revolved around the law 
of large numbers. The law can be described with a simple example: if you 
keep flipping an unbiased coin, the proportion of heads will approach 1/2 
as the number of flips goes to infinity. This notion seems intuitively obvious, 
but it gets slippery when you try to state it precisely and supply a rigorous 
proof (Hayes 2013). There was a basic and important philosophical difference 
between the two mathematicians. Nekrasov was at Moscow University, a 
stronghold of the Orthodox Church, where he started his studies in theology 
and then mathematics. Markov was a sort of rebel against all authorities. 
When the Russian Church, for example, excommunicated Leo Tolstoj, 
Markov asked to be excommunicated too. It goes without saying that the 
request was immediately granted.
In 1902 Nekrasov published a paper in which he discussed how he used 
the law of large numbers to settle the centuries-old theological debate about 
free will versus predestination. He claimed that voluntary acts – expressions 
of free will – are to be considered as independent events in probability 
theory. He also required that the law of large numbers applies only to statisti-
cally independent events. Therefore, he claimed, people act out of free will 
(in line with the philosophy endorsed by the Catholic/Orthodox Church). 
In fact, according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person 
who can initiate and control his own actions. God willed that man should be 
‘left in the hand of his own counsel’, so that he might of his own accord seek 
his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to 
him. (2012)
Markov could not resist trying to invalidate his opponent’s claims. Although 
Markov certainly disliked Nekrasov’s background, he used a purely math-
ematical argument to contrast Nekrasov’s hypothesis. Markov pointed out 
a mistake: Nekrasov assumed that the law of large numbers applies only 
to independent events. Although it looked like a reasonable assumption, 
Markov went on to show that the assumption was not necessary. To make 
his point he analysed the text of Alexander Pushkin’s novel Eugene Onegin. 
He wanted to study the statistics of vowels and consonants in poetry to 
evaluate their correlations, for example the probability that a vowel will 
follow another vowel or a consonant, and so on. He successfully extended 
the law of large numbers to correlated events. He created what today we 
refer to as the ‘Markov’s chain’ which is not a solid object but rather a 
mathematical tool. A Markov’s chain is a way to model reality. A very 
simple example could be an attempt at modelling the weather. Suppose we 
want to model the ‘chance’ of rain of tomorrow based on our knowledge 
of today’s weather. From past experience we know that if today is sunny 
(no rain) then tomorrow most probably will be sunny too. If on the other 
hand today is rainy there is a good probability that tomorrow will be rainy 
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too. Markov’s chain is a mathematical tool to predict the weather tomorrow 
given knowledge of today’s weather and the associated probability. For 
example, we can say that eight out of ten times, if today is sunny, tomorrow 
will be sunny too and, eight out of ten times if today is rainy, tomorrow 
will be rainy too. So, to make a ‘chain’ we just feed tomorrow’s result back 
into today. Then we can get a long chain like this:
Rain–rain–rain–no rain–no rain–no rain–rain–rain–rain–no rain–no rain–no 
rain . . .
A pattern will emerge: there will be long ‘chains’ of rain or no rain based 
on how we set up our ‘chances’ or probabilities.
All of this mathematical machinery could have been simply recorded in 
some Russian mathematical journal with absolutely no practical use. However, 
it turns out that Markov’s chains find use in many modern applications. 
To cite just a few: identifying genes in DNA molecules, algorithms in voice 
recognition and last but not least the Google search engine – a business 
worth more than $60 billion.
Small or big science, then?
In the opening section of this chapter the concepts of ‘big’ and ‘small’ 
science were introduced, with a few examples of each. Although the distinc-
tion between big and small science is widely accepted mostly in terms of 
quantity of funding, human resources invested, etc., in another sense all 
science is equally science. Both big and small science is equal in its pursuit 
of knowledge and both aim at expanding human horizons.
Even the distinction between science and the arts is not clear-cut but is 
subject to some degree of arbitrariness. Galileo’s reflections on scientific 
method, a remarkable example of philosophical investigation, allowed the 
flourishing of empirical sciences and paved the way for the emergence of 
different scientific disciplines. This, as Lachmann and Corbellini point out 
in this volume (Chapters 1 and 13, respectively), has had wide-ranging and 
profoundly positive effects on both the quality of human life and the extension 
of life expectancy. However, in this progress of specialisation it sometimes 
appears that awareness of the common roots between arts and science has 
been lost. It is remarkable that in ancient Greece, what we today call art 
was called techne (techniques, or mechanical arts, which also included 
what we would call arts – music, for example), and it was the gods’ preroga-
tive, which they donated to humans to overcome their intrinsic fragility. 
Markov’s chain is certainly one of the many reminders of these common 
roots which also exemplify humanity’s curiosity and striving for knowledge. 
Markov’s chains serve to establish a sort of equivalence between hard 
science (mostly mathematics and physics) and arts such as poetry, music, 
painting etc. The pleasure that many humans experience through various 
forms of arts and science (through music, figurative arts, narrative, as well 
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as by resolving mathematical hurdles and other dilemmas, both in science 
and philosophy) must have some evolutionary advantage: the capacity to 
see patterns has allowed humans to evolve up to a point where we now 
exercise significant control over our physical environment – in good and 
bad ways.
So, small science is equally as valuable as big science. Not only do they 
both represent equally valuable pursuits of knowledge, but small science 
often serves as a seed to big science. Many major big discoveries have been 
made as a result of small science. Many small scientific projects explore a 
large number of different ideas. Those relatively few projects that are suc-
cessful are then used as seed for big projects. Small projects are risky, so 
they might turn out in failure, but those few that are successful have a big 
return in terms of investment.
Conclusion
Science is an enterprise aimed at understanding the world around us and 
at improving living conditions, for humans, for other animals and also for 
the planet as a whole. But as I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, 
science does something else: it can and does considerably enlarge human 
horizons in time and space. Human horizons in time, as individuals, has 
certainly been enlarged, as human life expectancy is now approaching 100 
years (see Giordano Chapter 2 in this volume). The opening of the space 
frontiers is enlarging our spatial horizon. Technically we are already capable 
of sending people to Mars, and with larger investments it would not be 
too difficult to approach stars closer to Earth (a few light years away). This 
is important, because should we trigger the irreversible decay of the planet 
Earth – or more precisely perhaps, should humans make conditions on 
planet Earth inimical to human life itself (think of climate change, for 
example, or overpopulation) – the continuation of the human race may rely 
on our ability and willingness to move to other planets. This, obviously, 
can only be achieved through solid support to basic and applied science. 
Scientific freedom, thus, is without exaggeration essential to the continuation 
of human life, and no longer solely essential to the amelioration of living 
conditions.
Of course, scientific endeavours must be regulated: particularly for big 
projects, the larger the amount of funding needed, the more scrutiny and 
peer review is given. But even small projects, and even theoretical research, 
are subject, at the very least, to peer review. However, even within the 
inevitable boundaries of accountability and resource rationing, scientists 
should enjoy significant freedom of enquiry and research. Restrictions based 
on fear or political or ideological creeds, are, as I noted in the introduction, 
hard to justify. Of course, particularly in the course of the twentieth century, 
science has been associated with a number of atrocities (Nazi experiments 
are not alone – many other atrocities have been committed both in Europe 
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and in the US in the name of science). Cases of scientific fraud have been 
uncovered and distributed to the public via the media, in which pseudo-
scientists have published results that were falsified, or made claims that 
proved unfounded. The crimes and misdemeanours of the few should not 
discredit science per se, but it is notoriously difficult for a profession to 
regain trust when that trust has been eroded. Scientists can play an important 
role in attempting to elevate the reputation of science. Through public 
engagement, for example, scientists could and should explain in accessible 
terms the importance of their endeavours, the importance of scientific projects 
and discoveries that may appear either grand and remote, or otherwise 
frivolous and trivial, and explain the nature and purpose of their specific 
area of expertise, which may appear detached and difficult to understand 
to non-specialist members of the public. As Corbellini also notes, this is 
not just a task for scientists or science correspondents in newspapers, 
magazines and the media more broadly: scientific education is the responsibil-
ity of every state. Through the long journey of compulsory education, 
education in science and scientific methods is crucial to the enhancement 
of people’s ability to engage objectively with science, to free themselves 
from the spectre of the atrocities committed in the name of science, of 
frauds committed in the name of fame or of money, and to evaluate more 
rationally the methods and aims of various scientific enterprises. Of course, 
we all need to accept that perhaps many scientific projects will not bring 
any major or immediate enhancement in our day-to-day life. But perhaps 
one in a thousand or more will open a new direction. As in the case of 
Markov’s chain, somebody may then find a practical use for discoveries 
that may appear trivial today, and maybe create the next ‘Google’.
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Part II
Freedom of science and the 
need for regulation

Introduction to Part II
Simona Giordano
Part II of this volume focuses on the regulation of science. Particularly with 
regard to science that directly affects or uses human materials (tissues and 
cells) or human beings (not only fully conscious humans, but also embryos, 
foetuses or humans without higher brain functions, or in persistent vegetative 
states, or minimally conscious human beings), two types of concerns are 
frequently raised. The first is that scientists may misuse the materials, or 
mistreat the research subjects – even those who may be unable to suffer 
may still, according to some views at least, have their dignity eroded or 
violated. Some see in human life – any human life, including human bio-
specimens, such as tissues or cells – something that bears an intrinsic dignity 
or value, and from this perspective utilising these materials is inherently 
suspicious, no matter what the expected societal benefits might be. The 
fact that some forms of research may yield significant financial rewards 
(e.g. for pharmaceutical companies) may raise further worries. And the fact 
that even a tissue or a cell can reveal information that may be significant 
in different contexts and for different people (in forensics for example, or 
for genetic relatives) raises important questions about how different interests 
may be or should be balanced.
The second, somehow contrary concern, is that stifling regulation might 
be shaped by political norms, or by ideologies that might either be dominant 
or, even if not dominant numerically, powerful enough to skew public 
opinion and political debate, with resulting harm to science itself, to scientists 
and, more importantly, to societal benefits. If the loss of societal benefit is 
a form of harm, then arguably certain political norms and regulatory 
constraints are harmful; and if society is not an abstract entity but a sum 
of individuals, then societal harm, or loss of societal benefits, is not to be 
understood as abstract harm to an ideal entity, but as tangible harm to real 
individuals.
Scientific research is often perceived as a threat; medical sciences illustrate 
vividly the tension between the goals of scientific research and the long-term 
interests of society, on the one hand, and individual rights on the other. 
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The need for regulation springs from an apprehension that is legitimate; 
but, as we shall see, it is legitimate only to an extent.
The discovery of the crimes committed by the Nazis in various concentra-
tion camps, not only against Jewish people but against many other groups, 
and the uncovering of similar crimes committed by seemingly reputable 
scientists in other countries, has marked science as suspect or even inher-
ently dangerous. The involvement of physicists in the invention of nuclear 
power, which has then been used in war, calls into question the morality 
of scientific goals (or at least the morality of how scientific innovation 
can be used, and of how people come to be empowered to make decisions 
about how it is used).
The history of science is replete with such atrocities (Frewer and Schmidt 
2007). We may remember the case of Hideyo Noguchi, employed in the 
1920s at the Rockefeller Institute, who infected hundreds of patients in 
New York’s hospitals with syphilis for ‘research purposes’ (Corbellini and 
Lalli 2016). During the early 1900s several hundred people were also infected 
with syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases in Guatemala. The 
‘research subjects’ included orphan children. We know of several other 
studies conducted in the US that involved the injection of cancerous cells 
and exposure to radioactive substances, including uranium, and of many 
other studies in microbiology conducted similarly in China, Great Britain, 
Sweden, Italy and Russia.
Well after the end of the Second World War, and well after the Nuremberg 
Trials and the publication of the Nuremberg Code on ethical research, the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study threw further discredit on science. In this study 
several hundred ill people from the Afro-American community were denied 
available medical treatment in order to observe and document the natural 
progression of the disease. Around the same time, it became known that 
Saul Krugman, employed by New York University, infected mentally ill 
children with hepatitis. Krugman gathered the parents’ consent for, allegedly, 
vaccinations, but in reality children were fed with food contaminated with 
the faeces of ill patients, and were in that manner infected and ‘studied’. 
In the 1970s it became known to the public that the CIA had performed 
a number of studies (under a programme called MKULTRA) which involved 
psychological torture and the use of various drugs, particularly LSD, with 
the aim of developing methods of mind control and mechanisms for coping 
with interrogation. It is unknown how many people were tortured and 
murdered, as the CIA has destroyed large parts of the evidence.
It should be noted that, with some exceptions, the ‘results’ of most of 
these studies have not become a part of the scientific literature (Corbellini 
and Lalli 2016: 92), because they were not based on any methodology. 
Thus, arguably, this was not science: these were sheer murders.
In any case, these examples provide a picture of incredible brutality and 
perversion, in which many thousands of people were victims over the course 
of the twentieth century (Corbellini and Lalli 2016: 92). And, of course, 
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though it does not go so far, professional misconduct in science is of concern 
– in the last decade or so we have seen cases of the falsification of results, 
publication bias, and scientific and medical fraud. It can be argued, looking 
at human history, that exploitation and persecution (let alone fraud), in the 
name of science, religion or politics, are not isolated incidents – they are 
common. Usually these actions are directed at those perceived as ‘others’ 
(racial others, religious others, non-humans, and so on), not worthy of moral 
concern and respect. There is thus reason to be worried about those who 
have the power to exploit and persecute, and to vex, discriminate and abuse.
There is a further reason to be worried. We may think that the so-called 
Nazi scientists were psychopaths; that those other scientists involved in 
gratuitous torture and murder were also psychopaths, affected by the delirium 
of grandeur and moral viciousness. Actually, it is possible that they were 
all ‘normal people’. We know from a number of studies in psychology 
performed and repeated since the 1960s that many ordinary people, not 
afflicted by any mental disorder, not morally callous and not psychopaths, 
can be turned into torturers or even potential murderers in the right (or 
rather wrong) circumstances (Milgram 1974; Zimbardo 2007).
What does this mean? It means that apprehension about science, which 
inherently gives people more control over others, and over the environment, 
is legitimate at some level. Scientists (or murderers in that disguise) have 
tortured and abused and murdered other humans over the course of history 
and have created tools that could lead to the destruction of entire cities in 
seconds. However, the apprehension is misplaced – it is not science or 
knowledge per se that should worry us. It is ourselves; it is human nature 
that should worry us. We possess an ability to dehumanise others that leads 
us, in certain contexts, to become brutal.
However, not all humans utilise this ability to become cruel. We may 
not naturally be gifted with the ability to recognise that the ‘different’ is 
equally valuable morally – and in the wrong cultural conditions, this can 
lead to the worst atrocities of which humans may be capable. It is indeed 
important to bear this in mind – that in certain social or cultural contexts, 
humans, not only collectively, but each of us individually, have the ability 
to become cruel. But the right cultural conditions may on the contrary 
enhance our empathy, enable us to recognise others as equally valuable, or 
at least to raise questions about who should be the subject of our moral 
concern and respect (Pinker 2012; Corbellini and Lalli 2016). In short, it 
is not science itself that perpetrates atrocities; it is humans, under certain 
cultural conditions. It is thus imperative that the right cultural conditions 
are established, and with this in mind Part II of this volume attempts to 
reason around regulatory mechanisms.
During the twentieth century, developments in biomedical sciences, 
including molecular biology and genetics, revolutionised the way human 
life is understood. Reanimation techniques raise the fundamental, metaphysi-
cal question of when it is that a person is dead (and thus, when it is that 
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we are alive). New frontiers in reproduction, particularly the possibility of 
producing humans in alternative ways (with donors’ gametes, or with ‘parts’ 
of gametes donated by third parties, or even with cloning techniques) raise 
metaphysical and legal questions relating to personal identity and parental 
rights. During the second half of the twentieth century it even became 
possible to create human DNA (recombinant DNA – rDNA). It is interesting 
to note that it was the scientists who themselves had created rDNA who 
asked for a moratorium on the development of science in this area, prior 
to elaborating guidelines for the continuation of research with the Asilomar 
Conference in 1975.
Scientific research requires complex negotiation, as we will see, of values 
between citizens, scientists, medical doctors, researchers, patients, research 
participants and society as a whole. Indeed, one could include non-humans 
in the pool of those whose interests should be considered in these negotiations. 
Political and scientific agendas may be at odds with one other. Many of 
the contributors here point this out. Political agendas are often inspired by 
the views of the majority in liberal democracies, or at least by the goal of 
finding viable compromises in areas in which views are starkly dialectical 
and dichotomous; and these two goals or aspirations may not be consistent 
with the aims and methods of scientific enquiry. Yet at a perhaps more 
profound level, politics and science should both be committed to the same 
ultimate goals: they should both serve people and society as a whole.
Thus, the questions posed in Part II of the collection are: how can politics 
better serve science? And how can science inform politics? The answers to 
these questions depend in part, of course, on the moral legitimacy and 
plausibility of specific scientific enterprises. Politics should not serve science 
if the purposes of science are malevolent, and of course politics should 
condemn moral turpitude in science, both in purposes and methods. But 
these answers also depend on other things: on how conflicts of interests 
may be resolved, for example; or on how accountability, through, for example, 
valid and reliable peer-review systems, may be achieved.
On this point, Ballabeni and Danovi (Chapter 9) highlight the pitfalls 
of the current peer-review system, established worldwide but rather outdated, 
they argue, and suggest alternative modes of adjudication regarding funding 
and the assessment of scientific validity; they also propose alternative modes 
of publishing structures in order to transform the communication of science 
to the general public, particularly by making use of the cheap and easily 
accessible World Wide Web. What seems to emerge from their analysis is 
that science and politics can reconcile their inherent tensions, but this 
requires the ambition to effect radical transformations to the cultural 
framework in which scientists operate.
Some of the authors in Part II argue that public or political recognition 
of the value of science raises specific political obligations. For example, 
Mertes (Chapter 11) suggests that the societal values that are lost through 
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the tight regulation and prohibition of embryological research place an 
obligation on politicians to legislate, and legislate in one specific direction, 
the only one that is ethically defensible given the benefits and the losses 
at stake. Similarly, Cappato in Chapter 12 considers the tension between 
politics, regulation and science, in particular in the case of narcotic drugs. 
He argues that prohibition of the personal use of narcotic drugs, even if 
intended to protect citizens from the hideous consequences of addiction 
and to protect vulnerable members of society from exploitation (in the form 
of being caught in the net of illicit drug trafficking), still deprives society 
of important goods. Prohibition of narcotics has had as a by-product a 
comprehensive limitation on science, outlawing or heavily obstructing the 
medical use of illicit plants and substances, and research into their effects 
and potential. This approach has a number of consequences: one is that 
research on narcotics is inadvertently in this way ‘handed over’ to organised 
crime, which is more and more able to provide cheaper and more ‘effective’ 
(as well as more dangerous) recreational drugs. Second, it criminalises those 
in the grip of terminal or chronic illnesses, afflicted often by long-lasting and 
sometimes intractable pain, some of whom may find in opioids a valid form 
of pain control. Finally, prohibition results in a violation of fundamental 
human rights, Cappato argues. Scientific research and the enjoyment of 
its fruits are a human right: this human right is protected and defended 
by a number of UN declarations and conventions. To abide by the rights 
enshrined in the UN declarations and conventions, prohibitions should be 
radically reformed. Recent studies on the medical use of cannabis deriva-
tives as well as some of the latest research on LSD and other controlled 
substances could be, if supported and promoted, a turning point in the 
matter.
Others highlight that there are other values at stake, not just the value 
of extending human life and ameliorating its quality. Baldoli and Radaelli 
(Chapter 14) explain how the precautionary principle is used to preserve 
and protect these other values, which can also be encompassed in the wider 
notion of societal benefits. Boggio and Romano (Chapter 10) discuss how 
freedom of research is codified in human rights law in the form of a human 
right to science, and articulate ways in which the right to science can be 
mobilised politically and judicially.
Scientific research, as has been pointed out earlier, is often perceived as 
a threat. However, Corbellini and Sirgiovanni (Chapter 13) point out that 
scientific research, and particularly scientific method, can actually protect 
us from this perceived threat. And by arguing this, they offer further 
considerations on how the tensions between politics and science can be 
resolved. They note that the prevailing theory about the relationship between 
science and human freedom is that science contributes to human autonomy 
or self-determination through the discovery of natural laws and by providing 
devices to solve practical problems in order to stimulate economic growth. 
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Simply put, the more we know about the world, the more we understand 
it, the better we can live in it, control it, and make autonomous, self-
determined decisions about how we wish to conduct our lives. Countries 
in which science flourishes also tend to be middle- and high-income countries, 
and there is thus a positive association between economic growth and 
scientific freedom. But they note that a more likely hypothesis is that the 
invention and use of the scientific method in the modern age introduced 
into human communities a new way of thinking, which allowed a significant 
percentage of people to go beyond a set of cognitive and emotional biases 
that we inherited from our evolutionary ancestors, who, however, lived in 
simpler environments. In this way some psychological tools have been made 
available to an increasing number of people, prevalently in the Western 
world. These tools allowed human beings to achieve important cognitive 
and moral improvements, which made liberal and democratic governments 
possible: thus in a sense it is science that makes liberal democracies possible, 
and not liberal democracies that make (or should make) the progress of 
science possible. Science does not simply produce societal benefits that are 
tangible and usable (new vaccines, new forms of transplants); it also makes 
people more cooperative, less self-centred, less impulsive and more self-
controlled (in the sense of autonomous), even in contexts that tend not to 
facilitate these behaviours.
One thing seems to follow from this: namely that politics should somehow 
recognise that it is science (in its many forms, and in its wider sense of the 
pursuit of knowledge through the systematic analysis of facts and reasoning 
around those) that generates and holds together, historically, psychologically 
and logically, the fabric of modern liberal democracies. Woolley (Chapter 
15) points out that it is thus necessary to enhance the visibility of the 
research enterprise in society to ensure that decision-making by policymakers 
is responsive to scientific progress. Woolley calls on scientists to engage 
with non-scientists and actively advocate the value of research as a matter 
of public and national priority. When we talk about the right to science, 
or about freedom of scientific research, we should remember how the circula-
tion and dissemination of scientific culture (including humanistic culture) 
can in itself promote the flourishing of society as a whole, and can even 
guarantee greater peace, in that it allows us to overcome certain moral and 
psychological boundaries (as Piccirillo notes in Chapter 8 of Part I) and 
recognise the equal value of others.
There are many specific areas of the regulation of science that this volume 
has left unexplored – genetics and genomics, research using non-human 
animals, biology (particularly synthetic biology) – and it will be interesting 
to evaluate how regulatory mechanisms will apply to artificial intelligence. 
Our aim is not to explore all areas of science that could give raise to ethical 
or political issues. Our hope is rather to stimulate reflection on important 
issues that affect many of us, and on the complexities inherent in the relation-
ship between scientific research and regulatory mechanisms.
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Advocating a radical change in policies and 
new models to secure freedom and 
efficiency in funding and communication  
of science1
Andrea Ballabeni and Davide Danovi
A moving landscape
Threats and obstructions to scientific freedom, fairness and efficiency are 
commonly perceived as surrounding the scientific world. However, bottlenecks 
can also occur from within the system itself as some of the current regulations 
and forces shaping research (referred to here as ‘science policies’) substantially 
decrease the freedom and motivation of scientists. Indeed, inadequate policies 
can restrict the ability to perform research, the breadth of the fields of 
study, the methods of carrying out investigations and the dissemination of 
findings. Conversely, virtuous policies can have a positive impact on the 
freedom, quality of work and satisfaction of individual scientists. Importantly, 
from the societal perspective, the more scientists work freely, broadly and 
with motivation, the more they produce knowledge, data and innovation 
for the benefit of society, collectively ameliorating the scientific research 
system.
Unfortunately, ‘science of science’ is in its infancy. There has never been 
awareness of the importance of policies nor consistent interest in studying 
them, and specialised journals and articles are very few for several possible 
reasons. First, many researchers do not perceive the importance of policies 
for the functioning of science or may simply dislike ‘science of science’ 
studies and prefer to focus on their discipline. Second, many feel that their 
individual contribution would not be sufficient to affect the system and see 
no purpose in sacrificing their time and energy, as in the so-called ‘paradox 
of voting’ (Downs 1957: 25). Third, or a consequence of all the above, 
with few academic positions and funding opportunities, the field is at the 
moment not profitable with regard to career returns.
Nonetheless in order to promote research and discussion on policies with 
a view to improving them, it is of great importance that science policy 
experts reach out to the rest of the scientific community. It is key to spread 
awareness of the many possible changes (however small or big) that can 
affect the freedom, fairness and efficiency of scientific work. Moreover, it 
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is crucial that public scientific agencies incentivise investigations by mobilising 
funding and nurturing opportunities. In this regard, it is advisable that 
scholars approach this area, combining a thorough and systematic analysis 
of the current situation with new perspectives including radical and ‘out-
of-the-box’ approaches. There are several aspects of the process of sourcing, 
obtaining and sharing scientific research that can be improved by implement-
ing effective policies. In this chapter, we focus on two main areas: funding 
and communication. We discuss the current situation, highlighting what 
we believe are the problems and the ongoing efforts to find solutions, and 
then moving to propose paradigm shifts that, albeit radical, appear to us 
as the natural progression of the existing trends. We concentrate on research 
in life sciences, our area of expertise, proposing that the matters treated 
can extend to broader areas of investigation.
Funding of science: ideas for an alternative system
Scientific research, especially when it requires costly equipment as most 
modern biomedical research does, is an expensive endeavour and good 
funding is key. There is a very broad consensus over the fact that research 
is currently underfunded all over the world. The relationship between the 
funding of specific research fields and their deliverables is a matter of 
constant debate. Basic research in particular is resistant to evaluation in 
terms of impact (and thus return on investment), intrinsically requiring 
long timescales and a dose of serendipity, and often incompatible with 
the current system of resources and careers. In fact, human beings are 
consciously and unconsciously biased towards valuing the present more 
than the future, and inherently show preference for certain outcomes over 
uncertain risks. Furthermore, the allocation of funding is usually under the 
direct or indirect influence of politicians, who favour rapid and visible returns 
over long-term strategies due to short-term electoral cycles. Altogether, these 
factors have a profound influence on the availability of resources and the 
efficiency of scientific research. While maintaining the need for increasing 
investment in scientific research overall, we focus in this section first on 
describing the current system and subsequently on proposing changes in 
funding distribution.
At the present time, scientists receive monies to perform their research 
largely through the submission of proposals to governmental or private 
funding bodies. These recruit panels of other scientists, usually indicated as 
‘peers’, to evaluate whether the proposed projects are worth consideration. 
To prepare a proposal, a considerable amount of time is spent in writing 
and on associated paperwork. After submission, the peer-review process 
can take several more months. At the end of this process, if the project is 
approved, a certain amount of money is allocated to that specific project. 
On the contrary, if the funding is not approved, that project does not 
receive any money. An increasing trend in Western countries is that most 
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proposals are not funded. For example, the rate of success for grant proposals 
submitted to the NIH (the National Institute of Health in the US) is less 
than 20 per cent (Alberts et al. 2014). The total grant success rate in the 
MRC (Medical Research Council, UK) is 23 per cent (MRC 2014–15). 
Submitting more than a few proposals per year is generally prohibitive for 
a principal investigator. Given the limited number of opportunities and 
the time and energy costs, missing even two funding attempts in a row 
could have significant impact on a research group. Indeed in such cases 
investigators, particularly younger ones, often have to quit their research 
and disassemble their team.
The acceptance of this model by the scientific community appears to us 
surprising. In our experience, voicing discontent beyond private conversations 
is perceived as an implicit admission of failure and the poor quality of 
research, when coming from young researchers, or an unnecessary attempt 
to obtain extra publicity when coming from established ones. Unfortunately, 
this ‘all-or-nothing’ scheme does not do justice to the gradual distribution 
of merits and skills among scientists. In addition, the prediction of success 
is elusive, as in most cases the research plan can differ substantially from 
that proposed, as milestones and deliverables, where present, can be refor-
mulated. Furthermore, the edge that established scientists have over younger 
ones is well known under the name of the ‘incumbency advantage’ (Ballabeni 
et al. 2016). This phenomenon has several different causes. The complexity 
of the procedures for grant applications might be a handicap for newly 
established scientists who are less experienced or cannot afford assistants 
(Daniels 2015). Grant applications are commonly centred on the assessment 
of a significant amount of preliminary data, which obviously favours 
established investigators and bigger laboratories (Alberts et al. 2014; 
McDowell et al. 2014; Daniels 2015). Moreover, there is evidence of bias 
in favour of the ‘insiders and the familiar’ over the ‘unknown’ (Daniels 
2015; Fang and Casadevall 2009; Kirwan Institute 2014; Nicholson and 
Ioannidis 2012) and against unconventional and unorthodox ideas, which 
are more likely to be proposed by newly established scientists. The latter 
are also less likely to be involved in large research programmes, which can 
be favoured over small ones by ‘inertia’ and ‘financial dependency’ biases 
(Alberts et al. 2014). Finally, the evaluation of proposals usually takes into 
consideration the record of publications, which is itself affected by ‘incum-
bency advantage’ (see below). In essence this scenario not only entails 
reduced freedom of research and significantly sustains inequality in the 
system, but it also instils stagnation of ideas. Importantly, it produces 
‘overfunded’ (i.e. inefficiently funded) laboratories that experience disecono-
mies of scale (Berg 2010; Stephan 2012; Alberts et al. 2014; Woolston 
2015) and diverts funding from innovative projects, forcing many junior 
scientists to quit research. The dire consequences of this are difficult to 
fully capture for the community and society.
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Some routes to alleviate these problems are being explored. The changing 
scenery includes examples of crowdfunding (e.g. Cancer Research UK 2014; 
Vachelard et al. 2016; Crowd Science 2017; Crowdhelix n.d.) and numerous 
public–private ventures that coexist as non-canonical ways to support 
research. In parallel, interesting new tools are being developed that use big 
data mining to allow more transparent access to the research grants and 
fellowships awarded to laboratories (e.g. Symplectics Research Information 
Management System). However, the vast majority of funding for basic 
research continues to be assigned through proposals submitted to funding 
agencies and evaluated by the mechanism of the ‘peer review’. To tackle 
the incumbency advantage of this system a few ideas have been tested or 
proposed. One is capping the amount of funding to a research group with 
a view to funding more scientists, which has been thoroughly discussed 
within the scientific community (Alberts et al. 2014; McDowell 2014; 
Ballabeni et al. 2016). Furthermore, a small number of agencies have been 
assigning funds by evaluating the overall quality of scientists rather than 
the research project (Alberts et al. 2014; Daniels 2015; Ballabeni et al. 
2016). Importantly, the latter change tackles the problem of the long and 
time-consuming research proposal preparations and the tendency to dis-
proportionately prefer incremental mainstream projects over more risky 
and radical ones. Data from a recent broad survey (Scita et al. 2016) show 
that a consistent majority of life scientists, regardless of their career stage, 
are in favour of these policies. Assigning funding based on general reputation 
rather than on project proposals might appear to increase the detested 
‘incumbency advantage’. On the contrary, we believe it is likely, as a recent 
survey indicated (Ballabeni et al. 2016), that promoting caps on funding 
and a more gradual allocation of funding would be effective in reducing 
the ‘incumbency advantage’. Another criticism comes from the fact that 
salesmanship may be favoured, although arguably no more than in the 
existing grants scenario.
These ideas for new policies might therefore significantly increase fairness 
by giving everyone similar initial opportunities and by judging the relative 
merits of scientists through a more proportional lens. In general, the 
advantages of having an additional number of rewarded scientists and a 
more widespread distribution of resources are perceived as greater than the 
disadvantages of decreasing the average funding per scientist. In addition, 
providing funding to the scientists rather than to the projects would increase 
efficiency by cutting the time and energy spent on proposal writing and by 
supporting riskier and potentially ground-breaking research. Additionally, 
these transformations might also increase the efficiency of the system, as 
setting caps for investigators or research groups would increase the pool 
of funded scientists, especially among the younger ones. And by keeping 
young researchers in the system, it would develop a well-structured workforce 
for the next decades.
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However, is it possible to imagine an even more radical change, a leap 
into a totally different system? A peer-review system based not on panels 
of scientists but on collective wisdom? (Bollen 2014; Ballabeni et al. 2016). 
This ‘lateral thinking’ idea is very recent and not yet common knowledge 
in the scientific community. It is based on a highly decentralised system in 
which the wisdom of the whole scientific community is used to allocate 
funding by avoiding the current ‘all-or-nothing’ approach. Here, being a 
researcher (for which minimal criteria should be satisfied, for example, a 
specific certified degree and/or some form of entry-level check) gives one 
the right to be considered equally with all other researchers under the same 
funding initiative. The funding agency would give all scientists under its 
competence an equal amount of funds per year. However, scientists would 
be required to allocate a fixed percentage of their last year’s funding to 
colleagues whom they think deserve it. As a consequence, each year research-
ers would receive a fixed basic amount of money from a funding agency 
plus an elective contribution decided and donated by their colleagues. While 
still requiring human judgement, this system would nonetheless cut sub-
stantially the huge operating costs of panel-based peer review, and might 
also neutralise the biases and inefficiencies of the current system. Clearly, 
the assumption is that most scientists would allocate funding on a purely 
meritocratic basis, with the greatest interest in maximising fairness, the 
advancement of knowledge and the improvement of society. Basically, those 
scientists who are anticipated to lead the best science would accumulate 
more. On the other hand, scientists who receive more must in turn distribute 
a larger amount of money; their prominence would therefore give them 
greater influence on how resources are used. And the constant yearly basic 
grant would ensure more stability and provide greater autonomy, while it 
still might be limiting in isolation, encouraging meritocratic advancements. 
In addition, as the preferences of the scientific community evolve, so the 
pattern of funding would adapt according to the wisdom of the scientific 
crowd, giving the possibility of fine-tuning funding levels to where they 
are most needed.
There are some foreseeable criticisms of this idea. It might at times be 
difficult to claim that one defined research outcome has been funded by 
one funding body in particular, so this system might not apply to charities 
or foundations. Moreover, anonymity, a key element in this system, would 
need to be enforced to avoid illegitimate practices such as, for example, 
the creation of circular schemes. However, one could argue that concerns 
about circular schemes have already been voiced in the current system (e.g. 
Ghosh 2010). In addition, assigning funding based on general reputation 
rather than on project proposals might appear to increase the ‘incumbency 
advantage’. On the other hand, it is likely that promoting a more gradual 
allocation of funding would be effective in reducing this. Indeed, contrary 
to the panel-based peer reviews based on panels, which are often composed 
of established scholars, in this more horizontal system junior investigators 
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would have a bigger role in deciding how to allocate funding, and thus 
might plausibly be more likely to know and credit their peers. Furthermore, 
despite the amount of paperwork involved, some scientists value writing 
grant proposals as a way of ‘crystallising’ thoughts into a defined plan of 
action. Yet we contend that the milestones and deliverables of a project 
could still be present, and would probably better mirror the reality of 
scientific projects than in the current system.
In any case, we believe that the benefits outweigh the possible drawbacks. 
Indeed, this system would not only decrease the financial and time costs 
of panel-based peer review, but it would also cut the time taken up by 
writing grant proposals, as it is conceivable that such proposals would be 
less and less important; indeed, much more emphasis would probably be 
placed on the overall evaluation of a scientist’s scientific and delivery skills. 
What’s more, it would not involve an ‘all-or-nothing’ allocation of funding 
and this would guarantee a more proportional, and thus more meritocratic, 
distribution of resources. Likewise, this system would assure a safety buffer 
for difficult times. It would dynamically and finely adjust the allocation of 
funding according to the community interests. Additionally, it would be 
based on the potential evaluation of more people than those present in a 
panel, guaranteeing a broader, more unbiased and continuous examination. 
Finally, it might promote profound changes in scientific communication, 
as scientists will more openly share past achievements, current data and 
future plans.
In conclusion, we see the mindset around the funding of science as begin-
ning to change. New and ongoing paradigm-shifting initiatives, like the 
ones we describe, will lead to a potentially complementary, more functioning 
and beneficial research system.
Communication of science: ideas for an alternative system
Similar to and possibly more so than in the funding arena, the way science 
is communicated is constantly debated. At its core, the current system of 
science publication is over 350 years old. Scientists present the results of 
their research in the form of scientific articles (papers) sent to journals that 
are owned and managed by publishing corporations. The format is generally 
locked into the undoubtedly beneficial logic of an introduction–methods–
results–discussion stream. Upon receiving a paper, the editors of a journal 
can reject it immediately or send it to peer reviewers (also known as referees). 
These are generally anonymous to the authors of the papers, and the process 
is therefore referred to as single-blind peer review. The editors use the peer 
review produced by referees to decide between the following options: 
immediate rejection, requests for improvement or (anecdotally) immediate 
acceptance of the article. The entire process normally takes several months 
(or sometimes years) from the first submission, and an article can frequently 
go through multiple rounds of peer review and revision. After a paper is 
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accepted it is published sometimes weeks or months later, and then it usually 
cannot be peer reviewed, corrected or generally even commented on any 
more. Only in rare circumstances are mistakes corrected and only very 
rarely is a paper retracted if major flaws or actual frauds are proven. Papers 
help the dissemination of findings and ideas while advancing the scientists’ 
careers. More papers being published in the most read journals translates 
into more opportunities for funding and promotion. This system has for 
decades served scientific research while granting to successful publishing 
corporations the luxury of selecting a very small fraction of scientific output 
from authors, simultaneously sourcing the scientific output of a pool of 
reviewers at no cost. Thus, especially in recent times an increasing number 
of problems have arisen around both the reviewing process and access to 
publication.
As a matter of fact, peer reviewing can be at times a pretty sloppy process. 
Anonymity and lack of incentives anchor the acceptance of the role and the 
quality of a referee’s work to their awareness of prepublished science and 
loyalty to a greater good, respectively. In a minority of cases, because of 
rivalry, sympathy or dislike, unfair peer reviews are deliberately provided. 
Also, it does happen sometimes that the referee privately reveals her or his 
identity to the authors, and in fact some journals compel or allow reviewers 
not to be anonymous.
Whereas scientific progress is dynamic, by definition the publication system 
is static. Papers cannot generally be improved once they are published. 
In some cases, editors can offer the possibility of publishing corrections. 
Continuous improvement to create new versions (a process also referred 
to as ‘versioning’, which is extremely common for software and scripts) 
does not exist except for very few exceptions (e.g. Singh 2015). In very 
rare circumstances, if the data are proven to be simply wrong or if fraud is 
demonstrated, an article can be retracted. However, it is now increasingly 
evident that fraudulent behaviour is spotted and signalled very rarely, and 
that the very small number of retracted papers represents only a fraction 
of de facto unreproducible results (Baker 2016). This is because neither 
editors nor reviewers nor (obviously) authors have any interest in spotting 
flaws after a paper is published. In essence, there is no further peer review 
after publication. So, the paper is first peer reviewed by just two to four 
reviewers before publication, whereas afterwards it does not receive any 
further similar peer review. And without the possibility of post-publication 
peer review and open commenting on papers, flaws are even less likely to 
be spotted and signalled. This is unfortunate considering that hundreds of 
(not anonymous) scientists might be willing to provide their views. Open 
commenting on papers (comments from scientists or laypeople, similar to 
what happens in blogs) happens extremely rarely.
The consequences of this publication landscape are perceivable in the fake 
sense of the official quality and validity of publications, which scientists 
have learned to take for granted when they are not able to reproduce results 
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from a colleague’s publication. Moreover, many readers, and less so the 
general public, tend to perceive published articles positively only because 
these articles are in journals, especially journals with a high impact factor. 
Scientists who want to stretch or overemphasise their data only have to 
pass the test of a few people before their message enters a comfort zone in 
which it will probably never be scrutinised directly again.
Furthermore, there is a predominant culture in academia of novelty over 
thoroughness and of creativity over robustness. There are fashions and 
trends in scientific fields that influence perceived importance (Pfeiffer and 
Hoffmann 2009). There is a diehard snobbery regarding ‘negative results’ 
(Goodchild van Hilten 2015), even in clinical trials where debate is raging 
(AllTrials 2015). In addition, the constrained format pushes some research 
out of the ‘publishable’ area. Our brains are wired to the narrative of a 
‘story’ and this makes it more difficult for entire fields of research (research 
involving different types of ‘screening’ is a good example) to be considered 
‘scientific’ and not merely ‘technical’. Furthermore, the economic model of 
publishing prescribes a return for the shareholders, and sustains very expensive 
subscription fees or tariffs for single-article access. This is obviously a major 
problem for the scientific community as accessing scientific literature can 
drain a lot of financial resources and fuel the ‘incumbency advantage’. It 
is also unfair for the general public as it precludes access to research, 
including in some cases research funded via taxation.
Shockingly to us, limiting the number of published papers, irrespective 
of quality, is a policy choice of established journals even when the actual 
throughput could be much higher. The strengths of a scientific study in 
terms of novelty, elegance, reproducibility and impact have in some respect 
more to do with art than science, and where (i.e. in which journal) often 
matters as much as what (i.e. what study) is published. Can the queue 
outside an exclusive club be a better measure of success than the number 
of people on the dance floor or their ability?
We contend that the internet has pushed forward the revolutionary change 
of publishing ‘virtually’ as opposed to ‘on paper’, at a fraction of the cost. 
Scientists can therefore opt to disseminate research in a more open, flexible 
and collective way (and are beginning to do so). In the last few years more 
and more articles have been published that are freely accessible to anyone, 
either in fully ‘open access’ journals or in hybrid models. Yet surprisingly, 
and even for small specialised journals, the majority of newly published 
articles are still ‘closed access’ (Lewis 2012). Beside ‘open access’, another 
change that is driven by the internet is the so-called ‘preprint publication’. 
These are articles published by journals or on websites (e.g. ASAPbio, 
bioRxiv, PeerJ, F1000Research, Figshare) that do not require any previous 
peer review. Yet the vast majority of data that makes it to the scientific 
community is hampered by the long lead times (usually several months to 
several years) required to complete the submission and peer-review process, 
and in many cases still has restricted access.
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We believe that open access and the avoidance of peer review before 
publication, as in preprints, is having an impact. Yet offering flexibility in 
formats, the possibility of post-publication peer review, versioning and 
incentives for peer reviewers could lead to even more radical strategies at 
the system level that should be trialled and could make a real difference. 
A key element of the system we propose is a central international repository 
held as a reference for each scientist, to enable evaluation for funding, 
hiring and promotion by assessing all their activities. Here, peer review 
and original research publications would have complementary value and 
legitimacy and this will naturally incentivise the reviewing process. The 
technical, financial and political capacity to establish and maintain such 
an infrastructure is already within reach. In this system scientists would 
publish their data and ideas freely, without restrictions of style and format, 
choosing whether to have peer review before publication or to publish 
without any previous peer review. However, publications could be effectively 
open to peer review after publication. The people who perform this type 
of peer review, also called ‘post-publication peer review’, could be investigators 
proposed by the authors, investigators proposed by evaluators of the article 
or the authors (hiring panels, funding agencies, prize committees etc.); or 
simply investigators who are interested in providing their peer review. Peer 
review will, then, be fully transparent. The reviewers would be identified 
and their comments made public. The reviewers, being fully accountable, 
would have a genuine incentive to produce fair and accurate comments and 
recommendations. Articles could be easily modified through ‘versioning’. 
Each version (including the original) would have to remain online with a 
unique date of publication and digital object identifier (DOI). Each version 
would be open to peer review and possibly also comments from the general 
public (similarly to what happens in blogs and social media). In this scheme 
it is conceivable that once an article is published, it would not have the 
possibility of being retracted. Scientists would modify their articles through 
versioning, with each version open to the scrutiny of the scientific community, 
rendering actual retraction redundant.
At first these proposals might look utopian or naive to scholars who have 
grown up in the current system. We believe it would not be so in a mutated 
cultural framework and that the scientific community should have the 
courage and ambition to offer radically new opportunities to the present 
system that could serve science and society. Admittedly, what we suggest 
presents some problems too. It is, for example, possible that some publications 
could simply present preliminary data. Moreover, the increase in format 
and design options would make publications more difficult to read, especially 
in the beginning. An additional potential problem could be the possible 
deluge of information that would be poured on to the internet as a result 
of the lack of prepublication gates. However, we believe that in the long 
run continuous scrutiny and versioning as well as the incentive of being an 
‘active reviewer’ would push forward more accurate, complete and effective 
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science communication paradigms. The ‘authority’ of an ‘active review’ 
may also be weighed against its author’s previous work (as proposed in 
Brewer 2014). Our perception is that many low-ranking journals (with 
poor or, even worse, arranged peer reviews) are already flooding the internet 
and the proposed change would not have such a dramatic impact on the 
total number of publications. The best research studies will naturally emerge 
with profiles of views and citations over time. We contend that the advantages 
would be far greater than the disadvantages, especially in the long run. We 
obviously do not propose that this system should abruptly replace journals 
that have served well for decades, and that may well continue in parallel 
with a complementary role.
This radically different publishing structure, based on the full use of the 
internet’s capabilities, could change the system of incentives for scientists 
and reviewers and would tackle the problems listed above associated with 
the contemporary system born in a pre-internet and pre-computer era. It 
would provide much more freedom in format and design, easing scientists’ 
work and guaranteeing that more data would be published and disseminated, 
significantly decreasing publication time. Also, as peer reviewers would be 
identified and evaluated on their peer-review work as much as for their 
primary research work, the current sloppiness of the peer-review process 
would be avoided or significantly decreased. Thus, unfair peer reviews 
would be prevented as well as the private disclosure of the identity of 
referees to authors. Moreover, peer review and open commenting for all 
articles would be incentivised after publication, increasing both scientific 
discussion and scrutiny. In addition, there would be the possibility of produc-
ing improved versions of an article. As each version would remain online, 
authors would still be discouraged from publishing wrong or poor informa-
tion. Shoddy or fraudulent behaviour would be policed by the possibility 
of open post-publication scrutiny. Furthermore, contrary to the current 
system, the publication in itself would not convey any fake sense of validity 
or quality to an article. In this new system the publication would have less 
value and the focus would instead be shifted on to the content of the article 
and the peer review. Finally, this truly ‘open access’ system would be accessible 
to lay persons and would allow scientific institutions to save a lot of money 
that could be used to advance science more effectively. This is especially 
deserved when taxpayers have funded the research.
In this chapter we have proposed two radical system-level changes for 
the funding and communication of scientific research. Although other, 
alternative, complementary, small or big changes could also be possible, 
we believe that these two propositions would have a significant impact on 
scientists and society. To build momentum it would first be necessary to 
raise awareness about the current problems and the feasibility of a radically 
different system through more public debate, online as well as in meetings. 
As awareness raising by itself will not be sufficient, it will be also crucial 
to promote more policy-focused research and discussion. Understanding 
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the motivations, goals and views of scientists will be key to designing policies 
that can increase freedom and motivation as well as maximising the advance-
ment of knowledge and practical benefits to society (Ballabeni et al. 2014; 
Scita et al. 2016).
In conclusion, we believe that these paradigm-shifting proposals are an 
example of how the freedom and quality of work of scientists as well as 
the fairness and efficiency of the research system can be significantly improved 
by designing far-reaching and ground-breaking policies.
Note
1 We wish to thank our colleagues for scientific discussions, our funders and our 
host institutions. We are writing here in a personal capacity and our views are 
not necessarily shared by them.
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Freedom of research and the right to 
science: from theory to advocacy
Andrea Boggio and Cesare P. R. Romano
Although the right to science, which includes both the right of scientists 
to do research and the right of everyone to benefit from that research, was 
recognised internationally as early as 1948, it is arguably the least known, 
discussed and enforced international human right. As a result, its binding 
normative content is not settled and needs to be better clarified and specified. 
Progress at the conceptual level has been made in the last few years but 
we are still far from a full understanding of this right and its normative 
content, and from having a cohesive and authoritative list of duties that 
states must abide by to fully realise the right.
In this chapter, we argue that legal and political mobilisation in international 
forums provides promising paths to further define the normative content 
of the right to science. Waiting for the theoretical debate on the right to 
science to settle before seeking its protection would delay its realisation. 
Mobilisation through advocacy and litigation can provide both a remedy 
to victims of violations in specific cases and cause the development of a 
body of opinions and other policy outcomes which can contribute, with 
authority, to defining the content of the right.
In the first part of this chapter, we map out the recognition of the right 
to science under international law, both at the global and regional level. 
We then look at important international developments, and in particular, 
the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights, 
and the emergence of an academic debate on the right to science. We then 
turn to legal and political strategies to mobilise the right to science. By 
‘legal mobilisation’ we mean the use of courts and tribunals (i.e. judicial 
remedies) to seek vindication of the right to science for violation of this 
right. We identify international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions that 
have jurisdiction over violations of this right, and discuss the procedural 
requirements and some of the challenges claimants face. With regard to 
‘political mobilisation’, we identify venues where human rights advocates, 
scientific societies and other civil society organisations could push for the 
realisation of the right to science. At the global level, we identify opportunities 
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for political mobilisation in connection with the United Nations Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, the State Reporting Procedures 
and the Special Mandates. Finally, we identify opportunities at the regional 
level.
Legal recognition of the right to science
The right to science is as old as international human rights. It was recognised 
first in 1948, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the keystone 
of the international human rights architecture. Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and 
its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author.
This right found further recognition in 1966, in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), a multilateral treaty 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (in force from 3 January 
1976). Under Article 15:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts 
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.
The combined reading of these two provisions provides the legal foundations 
of what is now commonly referred to as the ‘right to science’ (Besson 2015: 
404), or, less succinctly, the ‘right to enjoy the benefits of scientific and 
technological progress and its applications’.
Various legal instruments at the regional level also recognise the right 
to science. In Europe, there is no reference to the right to science either in 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) or in the European 
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Social Charter (1961; revised 1996), two of the most important human 
rights treaties in Europe. However, at least as concerns the European Union, 
this lacuna was filled in 2000 with the adoption of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, which provides that scientific research 
shall be ‘free of constraint’.
In the Americas, one can find several relevant provisions in the Charter 
of the Organization of American States (1948), the most relevant being 
Articles 17, 30, 34.i, 38, 45, 47 and 51. It is also mentioned in Article XIII 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948, which 
provides that ‘[e]very person has the right . . . to participate in the benefits 
which result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries’. 
Finally, it is mentioned in the Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘Protocol of San Salvador’, 1988), which requires states to recognise the 
right of everyone ‘to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological progress’ 
(art. 14.1.b) and ‘extend among themselves the benefits of science and 
technology by encouraging the exchange and utilisation of scientific and 
technological knowledge’ (art. 38).
In Africa, the Charter of the African Union (1963) identifies scientific 
and technical cooperation as essential for meeting its goals (art. II (2)), and 
the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (2003) requires states to take specific measures 
to promote education and training for women, particularly in the fields of 
science and technology (art. 12 (2)(b)).
In the Arab world, the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004) recognises 
the right of everyone ‘to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its application’, together with the obligations of 
states to
respect the freedom of scientific research and creative activity . . . ensure the 
protection of moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary 
and artistic production . . . enhance cooperation at all levels, with the full 
participation of intellectuals and inventors and their organisations, in order 
to develop and implement recreational, cultural, artistic and scientific pro-
grammes. (art. 42)
Finally, in South East Asia, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012) 
provides that every person has the right, individually or in association with 
others, to freely take part in cultural life, to enjoy the arts and the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications and to benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
appropriate artistic production of which one is the author (art. 32).
International initiatives
Although the right to science has been recognised under international law 
since 1948, international, regional and national bodies, as well as human 
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rights activists and scholars, have paid little attention to it. As a result, our 
understanding of the normative content of the right to science – that is, 
what exactly are states’ obligations – is not entirely settled. However, in 
the past two decades the right to science has moved to the front and centre 
of the debate in international forums, and progress towards a more complete 
understanding of this right has been tangible. Two developments, at the 
global level, are particularly significant: first the adoption, under the auspices 
of UNESCO, of the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits 
of Scientific Progress and its Applications (‘Venice Statement’, 2009); and, 
second, the appointment by the Human Rights Council of a Special Rap-
porteur in the field of Cultural Rights, whose mandate also includes the 
right to science.
The Venice Statement was the outcome of a 2009 meeting sponsored by 
UNESCO aiming at ‘clarifying the normative content of the right to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications and generating a discus-
sion among all relevant stakeholders with a view to enhance the implementa-
tion of this right’. The Venice Statement makes two significant contributions. 
The first is to spell out the three duties which states parties to the ICESCR 
have: the duty to respect, to protect and to fulfil. ‘Respecting’ means 
guaranteeing the freedoms which are necessary to do science (e.g. autonomy, 
freedom of speech, freedom to assemble in professional societies and to 
collaborate). ‘Protecting’ means ensuring that science is not done by infringing 
upon the rights of anybody (e.g. research subjects, vulnerable populations). 
‘Fulfilling’ calls for a variety of strategies including monitoring harms arising 
from science, enhancing public engagement in decision-making about science 
and technology, ensuring access to the benefits of scientific progress on a 
non-discriminatory basis, and developing science curricula at all levels of 
schooling. Second, the Statement points out that it is also incumbent upon 
non-governmental actors (e.g. scientific societies, for-profit entities, civil 
society) to contribute to the realisation of the right to science. The Statement 
touches upon the issue of the privatisation of science and how it could 
conflict with the right to science.
The second significant development at the global level is the United Nations 
Human Rights Council’s decision to give a Special Rapporteur a mandate 
on cultural rights, including the right to science (Resolution 10/23). The 
first appointee was the Pakistani sociologist Farida Shaheed, and the current 
one is the Algerian-American law professor Karima Bennoune. In 2011, 
Farida Shaheed visited several UN members and organised a public consulta-
tion in Geneva under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Member states’ civil society organisations 
were asked to fill out a questionnaire that the Special Rapporteur later used 
in her report, entitled ‘The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications’, released in 2012 (United Nations 2012).
This report is a fundamental contribution to the field as it discusses the 
right to science from different angles: its normative content, state obligations 
and its limitations. With regard to the normative content, the report makes 
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four contributions. First, it connects the right to science to the right to 
participate freely in the cultural life of the community as recognised by 
Article 15 of the ICESCR. Article 15 entails the right to contribute to 
science (as knowledge producers) and enjoy opportunities to participate in 
decisions about science (as citizens). The report further maintains that the 
right should be enjoyed free of discrimination. Second, it stresses the 
importance of freedom of research as a prerequisite of the enjoyment of 
the right to science. In fact, the ability to ‘continuously engage in critical 
thinking about themselves and the world they inhabit, and . . . the opportunity 
and wherewithal to interrogate, investigate and contribute new knowledge 
with ideas, expressions and innovative applications, regardless of frontiers’ 
are prerequisites for implementing both rights (para. 18). Third, it connects 
the right to science to the concept of human dignity to the extent that the 
right protects people’s ‘ability to aspire – namely, to conceive of a better 
future that is not only desirable but attainable’ (para. 20). Aspirations, the 
Rapporteur notes, ‘embody people’s conceptions of elements deemed essential 
for a life with dignity’ (para. 20). Fourth, it identifies links to other rights. 
In some cases, the right to science is enjoyed in conjunction with other 
rights, such as the right to seek information, to take part in the conduct 
of public affairs, to self-determination, to development, and to make informed 
decisions (paras 21–2). The right to science is also a prerequisite for the 
realisation of other rights, namely the right to food, health, water, housing, 
education and a clean and healthy environment (para. 23).
The second part of the report focuses on the normative content and 
related obligations of states. In this section, the Rapporteur proposes a list 
of objectives which states must guarantee: access by all without discrimina-
tion; freedom of scientific research and opportunities for all to contribute 
to the scientific enterprise; individual and collective participation in decision-
making; and an environment which enables knowledge production and 
exchange.
The last section of the report discusses the limitations of the right to 
science. The Rapporteur points out that limitations certainly arise from 
the very same body of human rights law and, thus, it must promote general 
welfare and be proportionate to the objective (para. 49). The regulation of 
research subjects provides an example of a justifiable limitation of the right 
to science (para. 51). More controversially, the Rapporteur also cites the 
precautionary principle as an important guide for science and technology 
policies in the absence of scientific consent such that a certain sense of 
caution would not cause irreparable harm to the public or the environment 
(para. 50).1
Academic debate
The academic debate has mainly taken place between a handful of scholars 
whose work primarily focuses on refining the theoretical framework for 
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thinking about this right and defying its place in human rights law. Schabas 
(2007) argues that states must respect scientists’ freedom to conduct research, 
build facilities for research, preserve minorities’ cultural rights and protect 
the rights of indigenous peoples. Chapman (2009) identifies three rights: 
to access the benefits of scientific progress and technology without being 
discriminated against; to be protected from the harmful effects of science 
and technology; and to protect individuals’ intellectual property. Muller 
(2010) argues that states must create ‘an institutional framework and [adopt] 
policies and laws in relation to science and technology that enable individuals 
to freely conduct scientific research, to access the benefits of scientific progress 
and to be protected against the harmful effects of science and technologies’. 
After tracing the historical emergence of the right (Shaver 2010), in her 
later work Shaver (2015) interprets the right to science as a call to frame 
science as a public good. This implies that ‘the supply of scientific knowledge 
and the development of technology is must not be left entirely – or even 
primarily – to market forces’ (Shaver 2015: 417). Shaver also proposes a 
‘pragmatic approach’ to defining the normative content of the right, which 
requires being ‘responsive to the particular challenges and issues of the 
time’ (2015: 427). Using the treaty interpretation methods described in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Donders (2011) argues that the 
inextricable link between the right to science and the right to health 
determines the positive and negative obligation of states.
Scholars have also begun investigating what implications for policymakers 
can be derived from applying the human rights framework to the analysis 
of those issues. Knoppers et al. (2014) frame their proposal for an international 
code of conduct enabling global genomic and clinical data sharing for 
biomedical research with reference to the right to science and the right to 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from scientific 
productions. Gran et al. (2014: 344) explore children’s rights through the 
lens of the right to science and, after showing that indicators reveal dramatic 
differences in children’s conditions across and within countries, argue that 
the right to science has the potential to address some of these inequalities 
by leading to ‘improvements in young people’s health and well-being, to 
greater participation in their communities, and to stronger legal protections, 
among other advances’. Skre and Eide (2013) connect the right to access 
to open access to scientific knowledge. Harris and Wyndham (2015) urged 
that data sharing must take into account human rights considerations, 
arguing that data is both a tool of scientific inquiry, to which access is 
vital, and a product of science, from which everyone should benefit. Vayena 
and Tasioulas (2015) propose using the human right to science as a promising, 
proper framework to develop policies in the area of citizen science.
While academic discourse has primarily developed through scholarship, 
various initiatives and conferences have looked at the right to science. An 
important initiative, focusing primarily on the United States, is led by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). In 2009, 
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the AAAS started a programme devoted to mobilising science and scientists 
to advance human rights. The project has produced important outcomes 
which include building a database of state reports to the UN on the imple-
mentation of the right to science (AAAS 2017a); creating the AAAS Science 
and Human Rights Coalition; publishing a study (authored by Margaret 
Weigers Vitullo and Jessica Wyndham (AAAS 2013)) on how scientists in 
the United States perceive the meaning and application of the right; and 
the Science and Human Right Report on a monthly basis (AAAS 2017b).
All of these international initiatives and scholarly works are welcome 
and very promising. However, in spite of all these initiatives and documents, 
the contours of the ‘right to science’ remain ill defined. It remains unclear 
how it should be understood, what rights society, individuals and scientists 
exactly have, and what the corresponding duties of the states are. To advance 
the debate, we argue that conceptual clarity can also be achieved via 
mobilisation of the right, that is to say, use of the judicial and political 
forums where the right can be invoked.
Mobilising the right to science: realising the right to science 
through judicial mobilisation
The judicial path entails bringing claims before international judicial and 
quasi-judicial forums against states whenever the right to science is violated. 
The most promising forum at the global level is the individual complaints 
procedure of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ESCR Committee) (Forman 2016). While still in its infancy (the mechanism 
was established in 2008 and started operating in 2014), this tool is attractive 
because the committee’s decisions on the right to science are, arguably, 
authoritative interpretations of the provision of the ICESCR (1966). These 
decisions will help build the body of law on this matter. The procedure 
requires individuals or groups of individuals to file a communication (i.e. 
complaint) with the committee, alleging violations of the ICESCR by a 
state which has ratified both the committee and the Optional Protocol 
(2008). Decisions made by the committee are not legally binding but, if 
the committee finds for the victim, its decision will contain a finding of 
law as well as recommendations to the state in question on how the violations 
should be remedied. In addition, the case will remain under consideration 
until satisfactory measures are taken by the state party.
Mobilisation may also involve judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at the 
regional level. The Court of Justice of the European Union can hear cases 
arising from violations of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. A major limitation of this process is that the Court of Justice 
of the European Union can only hear claims for violations committed by an 
institution, body, office or agency of the European Union, not by member 
states. Cases could also be brought in the inter-American human rights 
system by activating the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
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and perhaps even the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Questions 
of violations of the right to science could be brought before the commission 
on the basis of the OAS Charter, American Declaration and Protocol of 
San Salvador. As in the case of the ESCR Committee, decisions of the 
Inter-American Commission are not binding but help build the body of law. 
The right to science could also be invoked before the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, a body whose decisions are binding by its interpretations 
of rights within the American Convention of Human Rights, over which 
the court has jurisdiction. (While the court’s jurisdiction over the Protocol 
of San Salvador is limited to the right to education and the right to form 
trade unions, the right to science could be brought up via Article 26 of the 
American Convention.) Judicial mobilisation in regional bodies could target 
laws and regulations of states which prohibit or unreasonably restrict the 
freedom of scientific research, for instance as in the case of bans on research 
on embryos or with human–animal hybrids.2 In addition, they could target 
restrictions to data sharing or access to genetic resources, and measures 
unreasonably limiting scientists’ freedom to communicate research results, 
to join professional associations, to collaborate with foreign scientists or 
to travel internationally.3 Some limitations are in fact acceptable as long 
as they ‘pursue a legitimate aim, [are] compatible with the nature of this 
right and [are] strictly necessary for the promotion of general welfare in 
a democratic society’ (United Nations 2012: 13, citing Article 4 of the 
ICESCR 1966).4 Finally, they could challenge policies excluding margin-
alised populations, such as indigenous peoples, from public consultations, 
participation in clinical trials or membership in academia (United Nations  
2012: 12).
One indirect avenue to litigate the right to science is through the right 
to health. The right to health is better established and recognised by more 
legal instruments than the right to science. A greater number of international 
adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative bodies can consider cases of violation 
of this right. Thus, besides the judicial and quasi-judicial forums listed 
above, the right to health can also be invoked before the European Committee 
of Social Rights, which reviews the Council of Europe’s member states’ 
compliance with the European Social Charter (1961, revised 1996). It should 
be noted that only NGOs, and only certain kinds of NGOs, and not individu-
als have standing before the European Committee of Social Rights. Although 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) does not guarantee a 
right to health, over the years the European Court of Human Rights has 
been called upon to consider cases having a socio-economic dimension, 
including health – such as questions relating to medical negligence, health 
and bioethics, detainees’ rights, health and immigration, and health and 
the environment – while discussing one or more fundamental civil and 
political rights guaranteed under the Convention. Mobilisation advancing 
the right to science through the right to health could focus on policies 
which disregard scientific evidence in setting access to treatment and cures. 
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In fact, patients’ right to health includes the right to access treatments and 
cures which are based on the best possible scientific evidence. Their human 
rights to health and to science would be violated, for instance, when vaccines 
that are proven to be both safe and effective are banned. The right to 
science further requires states to enable downstream use of scientific 
knowledge and to ‘promote the transfer of technologies, practices and 
procedures to endure the well-being or people’ (United Nations 2012: 20). 
The right is violated when drug or biotech companies are prohibited from 
developing products applying scientific knowledge.
Cases can also be brought before the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, which has jurisdiction over cases involving the interpretation 
and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981), the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified 
by the states concerned.
At the global and regional levels there are several bodies which could be 
used by scientists, citizens and advocacy groups to challenge violations of 
the right to science. These ‘judicial methods’, however, present general 
challenges besides those discussed above for each procedure. First, cases 
can be brought only if a state party to the treaty defers to the court’s or 
committee’s jurisdiction. Not all states have ratified both the ICESCR and 
the Additional Protocol, creating an Individual Communications procedure. 
By September 2016, only twenty-six states parties had ratified both. Likewise, 
not all countries have ratified regional instruments and/or accepted the 
jurisdiction of the regional courts. Second, claimants can file a claim with 
a supranational body only after domestic remedies have been exhausted. 
This process can take several years, if not decades. Third, claims must 
concern the violation of the rights of one or more named individuals. Cases 
cannot be based on general assertions that state members are violating the 
right to science – for instance, by enacting a law banning certain forms of 
scientific research. Cases are viable only if the law interferes with the 
enjoyment of the right to science of a specific victim, and those victims 
must consent to have their case brought before an international jurisdiction. 
Fourth, as for any legal proceedings, complaints must be filed within a 
certain amount of time after the violation has occurred. Otherwise legitimate 
cases cannot proceed if the time frame for filing them has passed. Finally, 
legal proceedings in supranational courts and bodies are often slow. This 
is due to the number of cases brought before these bodies every year and 
the insufficient resources available to process them expeditiously.
Realising the right to science through political mobilisation
The second path to mobilisation is to exploit the opportunities offered by 
the political processes of international institutions. There are opportunities 
for political advocacy at both the global and regional levels. Within the 
United Nations, under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), all UN member 
 Freedom of research and the right to science  171
states must submit a report every five years to the UN Human Rights 
Council describing how they have discharged all of their international 
human rights obligations. The procedure covers all human rights, indepen-
dently of whether the state in question has ratified any given international 
human rights treaty. On average, each year forty-two states are reviewed 
during the sessions of the UPR Working Group, which meets three times 
a year. Human rights experts and groups are formally recognised as important 
stakeholders that can submit information, which the Working Group can 
then use as part of its review. Experts and groups can also make statements 
at the regular session of the Human Rights Council, when the outcome of 
the state reviews is considered. Although the UPR is still looking for a 
precise identity (Cowan and Billaud 2015), the potential for advancing the 
human rights agenda is substantial. In fact, the UPR intends to provide 
technical assistance to states and enhance their capacity to effectively deal 
with human rights challenges. Even more important to the present discussion, 
the UPR includes a sharing of best human rights practices. With regard to 
the right to science, the UPR process has the potential to help further define 
the normative content of the right to science.
A similar mechanism is the reporting procedure of the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition to the judicial process 
discussed above, the ESCR Committee reviews reports that states parties 
file periodically to update the committee on the what they have done to 
implement the Covenant. The committee examines each report, addresses 
its concerns and makes recommendations to the state party in the form of 
‘concluding observations’. As part of this process, NGOs can submit ‘shadow 
reports’ which bring to the attention of the committee facts which are 
relevant to their review of state parties. Representatives of accredited 
organisations can also attend the committee’s sessions and make an oral 
presentation, and organise lunchtime briefings and other informal meetings 
during the sessions.
A broad range of less formal opportunities to contribute to shaping the 
human rights agenda and discussion at international bodies is also available 
to human rights advocates. One such opportunity is engaging the Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights in a discussion on the right to 
science. Organisations and individuals can submit reports and individual 
communications which point to violations of the right to science. The 
Rapporteur can then raise the issue with member states. In addition, human 
rights advocates can participate in UNESCO’s discussions involving science, 
and in particular working groups which focus on different aspects of the 
right to science.
International organisations at the regional level also offer opportunities 
for participation in their activities. In these forums, political mobilisation 
takes both the form of lobbying and direct participation in working groups 
and debates. In Europe, science and human rights advocates can work with 
members of the European Parliament and those of the Parliamentary Assembly 
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of the Council of Europe to facilitate discussions and present policy proposals 
promoting the right to science.
In the Americas, advocates have the option to work with various institu-
tions. The first is the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States, whose meetings are held annually. The Summit of the Americas 
encourages civil society representatives to participate by providing recom-
mendations on thematic areas to the member states and assisting in the 
implementation of initiatives in the development of an agenda for the region. 
Also, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has created a 
Secretariat on Access to Rights and Equity and can establish working 
groups to focus on various aspects of the right to science.
In Africa, advocates can participate in the periodic reviews of the African 
Commission on Human Rights and the summits of the African Union. 
Similar to the reviews conducted by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the African Union mandates that states parties submit 
two-yearly reports to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, describing legislative and other measures they have taken in giving 
effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the Charter. 
Among them is the right to science. To this end, African Union guidelines 
require states parties to report on the right to science by submitting informa-
tion on ‘laws, administrative regulations, collective agreements and court 
decisions’ relevant to the promotion of the right
measures taken to ensure the application of scientific progress for the benefit 
of everyone . . . to promote the diffusion of information on scientific progress 
[and] to prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes which 
are contrary to the enjoyment of all human rights [as well as] any restrictions 
which are placed upon the exercise of this right, with details of the legal 
provisions prescribing such restrictions. (African Union 1989)
Looking to the future of the right to science
While recognised in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the right to science was almost forgotten for half a century and, to borrow 
from Chalmers et al. (2014), it has been ‘resuscitated’ only recently. As a 
result, the normative content of this right is not yet sufficiently clear and 
there is no consensus on states’ duties on this right. International initiatives 
and scholarly work are broadening the boundaries of our understanding 
of what the right to science entails, and what it takes to fully realise it. All 
are welcome developments, but we believe that it is also paramount to work 
on the realisation of this right from the bottom-up, through mobilisation 
and use of judicial and political tools. Judicial mobilisation has the potential 
to promote the realisation of the right to science in two ways: by addressing 
and redressing specific violations of the right and by obtaining formal 
pronouncements of supranational bodies which contribute to defining the 
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normative content of the right. Political mobilisation can help states focus 
their attention on this much-neglected right and create the space for a 
debate between states and between states and civil society which can promote 
and advance freedom of scientific research.
Mobilisation certainly faces challenges. We have discussed some procedural 
and political challenges. These challenges are neither negligible nor insur-
mountable. To promote mobilisation, it is important for academia, scientific 
societies and human rights advocacy groups to establish a network aimed 
at monitoring state actions which may be in violation of the right to science, 
and to develop expertise for claims based on the right to science to emerge.
Judicial and political mobilisation will not only contribute to our under-
standing of this right and defining its normative content, but will also 
ensure that states incorporate this right into their policies and respect it. 
The hope is that, eventually, the right to science will be fully realised. As 
the Special Rapporteur argued, this entails living in a world in which 
national laws and regulations ensure that all humans have freedom to 
participate to the scientific enterprise, to enjoy the benefits of science, to 
participate in decisions relating to science and to live in a world which 
fosters the development and diffusion of scientific knowledge (United Nations 
2012: 19–22).
Notes
1 For further discussion of the precautionary principle, see Chapter 14 in this 
volume.
2 Several states prohibit the derivation of embryonic stem cell lines. According to 
EuroStemCell (2017), this is the case in Austria, Germany and Italy.
3 For a discussion of the right to science as the freedom to contribute to the scientific 
enterprise, see United Nations (2012: 12).
4 For a discussion of reasonable limitations to freedom to publish scientific data, 
see Chapter 6 in this volume.
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There are few areas of research that are as contentious as research on 
human embryos. Even within Europe, very diverse policies have been 
developed in regard to embryo research. Some countries – such as Germany, 
Ireland and Poland – strictly prohibit the destruction of embryos in research, 
based on the argument that embryo research violates the dignity of human 
life and/or conflicts with religious teachings. Other countries – such as the 
UK, Sweden and Belgium – not only allow, but even fund the creation of 
embryos explicitly for research purposes. These policies are supported by 
the principles of freedom of research, beneficence and proportionality, as 
embryo research leads to improvements in healthcare that outweigh the 
ethical concerns involved (Mertes 2012). Most countries have adopted a 
pragmatic approach, balancing the arguments mentioned above, in which 
the destruction of donated ‘spare’ embryos is allowed, but not the creation 
of embryos for research purposes, making the so-called discarded–created 
distinction (Devolder 2012). Although there is much to be said about the 
legitimacy of making this distinction, only research involving spare embryos 
– and therefore the least controversial kind of embryo research – will be 
discussed in this chapter. Spare embryos are embryos that have been created 
in the course of an IVF treatment, but will not be used for transfer in fertility 
treatment. This can be due to various reasons: the parental project might 
be abandoned or completed, certain embryos may not be eligible for transfer 
due to genetic defects or poor prospects of further development or transfer 
may no longer be possible due to legal restrictions on age at transfer or a 
maximum storage period of the embryos. In ideal circumstances, IVF patients 
are asked which disposition option they prefer for their spare embryos: 
donation to other infertile patients/couples, donation to research or destruc-
tion, although not all options are always offered. While there is great variance 
between countries, high rates of embryo donation for research purposes 
have been repeatedly reported (Samorinha et al. 2014).
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Although many countries currently allow embryo research with these 
donated spare embryos, the freedom to perform research on human embryos 
is still under threat, as illustrated by the success of the Citizens’ Initiative 
‘One of Us’. This initiative claimed that ‘the EU should establish a ban and 
end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human 
embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public 
health’, based on the belief that ‘[t]he human embryo deserves respect to 
its dignity and integrity’ (European Commission 2012). This initiative 
managed to gather 1,721,626 signatures from twenty-nine different European 
countries (mainly from Italy, Poland, Spain, Germany and Romania) and 
was therefore allowed a hearing at the European Parliament in April 2014. 
This feat has only been accomplished by two other initiatives: one campaign-
ing against vivisection, the other for the availability of drinking water. 
After the hearing, the European Parliament decided not to comply with 
the demands of ‘One of Us’, but this campaign shows that embryo research 
remains contentious, even in countries where it is currently allowed. Therefore, 
it is important to maintain the trust of those who presently do support 
research on human embryos.
Embryo research is valuable both in clinical and in basic research. In 
clinical research, the most straightforward application is the optimisation 
of infertility treatment. When a new protocol is introduced into the clinic, 
for example a new cryopreservation technique, this is ideally first tested 
on embryos that will not be transferred and grow into a person, in order 
to avoid harm to future people (Dondorp and de Wert 2011). Besides this 
clinical research, also basic research into, for example, embryo development 
and human embryonic stem cell research are only possible if human embryos 
are made available to researchers.
Classical view on embryo research versus empirical findings
In the ethics literature on embryo research, the central issue is the moral 
status of the (pre-implantation) embryo. The general expectation is that 
those who attribute a high moral status (or even personhood) to the early 
embryo oppose embryo destruction and that those who attribute a low (or 
even no) moral status to the early embryo support embryo research (or at 
least do not object to it). It is therefore not surprising that many of the 
countries outlawing embryo research have a strong religious basis. If one 
believes that ensoulment takes place at conception and/or that the sanctity 
of human life needs to be protected, then the ‘killing’ of an embryo cannot 
be made right by referring to the benefits of the ensuing research (just as 
the killing of people for research purposes cannot be justified). On the 
other side of the spectrum, if one observes from a secular perspective that 
the early embryo has none of the features which might bestow on it a moral 
status (sentience, consciousness, rationality), then sacrificing embryos for 
the advancement of science and healthcare is not problematic at all.
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One would expect similar considerations about the moral status of the 
embryo to be decisive when deliberating whether or not to donate spare 
embryos to embryo research. However, research into the motivations for 
(not) donating spare embryos to research has shown that the moral status 
that is attributed to spare embryos is but one factor that influences the 
decision whether or not to donate to research. Other, equally important 
factors indicative of a willingness to donate are feelings of reciprocity 
towards science and medicine, altruism and a willingness to help others, 
positive views of research in general and high levels of trust in the medical 
system (Samorinha et al. 2014). Also, besides the inherent value of the 
embryo that the moral status refers to, the instrumental and symbolic value 
that people attribute to their embryos is an important predictor of intent 
to donate (Provoost et al. 2009; 2012).
A first group of factors predicting the intent not to donate are – as 
expected – related to the perception of the embryo, either as a person (or 
more specifically a child, a brother or sister of existing children) or as a 
symbol of the relationship with the partner. People who attribute a high 
moral status to their embryo or a high symbolic status (as a symbol of the 
relationship between two partners) are less likely to donate embryos for 
research. However, even in the group of people who claim to attribute 
personhood to their embryos, some participants were still willing to donate 
them for research (Provoost et al. 2010). Besides the moral and symbolic 
status, also the instrumental status of the embryo was important, in the 
sense that many people did not want all the efforts they invested in the 
creation of their embryos to go to waste after their IVF treatment. A high 
instrumental value was therefore correlated with a higher willingness to 
donate embryos for research.
A second group of factors are related to a lack of trust in the researchers 
or a lack of information about the research projects. Specifically, people 
reported to be concerned about their embryos being given to other patients 
accidentally (Lyerly et al. 2006) or being ‘grown’ in the lab to a stage that 
they felt uncomfortable with (Provoost et al. 2010). These findings send a 
clear message to the research community: people are willing to donate 
embryos to research – sometimes even despite attributing a high moral or 
symbolic status to their embryos – provided they are reassured that the 
embryos will be used in valuable research that the donors support. In what 
follows, a number of elements to consider will be set out.
Information before donation: specific or general?
Openness is the first prerequisite for maintaining trust. Ideally, when someone 
is asked to donate embryos for research, specific information about the 
research project that their embryos will be used in should be provided. 
This is, for example, recommended by the ASRM’s Ethics Committee (Ethics 
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2013) for 
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the US and by the HFEA’s Code of Practice (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority 2009) for the UK. However, this standard may 
conflict with practical considerations. In general, a preferred disposition 
option for spare embryos is asked of IVF patients before starting treatment. 
This is done to avoid having to continue storage of embryos of which the 
progenitors cannot be contacted, are indecisive or have deceased at a point 
when, for example, the maximum storage period is reached. However, 
although the patients can be informed about the research projects that are 
ongoing at the moment when they start treatment (which enables a specific 
consent for the donation of fresh embryos), they cannot receive any specific 
information about the research projects that will be conducted five years 
later, while their embryos may easily be stored for that length of time. In 
this case, there are two options: (1) only allowing research with embryos 
of which the progenitors can be contacted so that they can give specific 
consent to use their embryos in a well-defined project; or (2) ask consent 
for different categories of research, for example research into embryo 
development, stem cell research, research into genetic diseases. The second 
option has the advantages that it is more practical to implement for both 
the clinic and the researchers than recontacting the patients and that embryos 
that were allocated to research by the parents at the beginning of treatment 
are not destroyed against their wishes because they cannot be contacted 
to indicate the exact project for which they want to donate. A blanket 
consent to any embryo research is inappropriate and unnecessary, given 
the easy implementation of the second option, although potential donors 
are of course free to donate for all possible categories.
Besides the general research categories (e.g. embryo development, embryo 
implantation, cryopreservation, genetic diseases), there are at least four 
applications/protocols which are especially sensitive to ethical concern and 
for which it is therefore desirable that donors give their explicit consent: 
stem cell research, research into germline gene editing, research in which 
the embryo is extensively cultured and transfer of embryos to other 
researchers.
When embryos are used for the derivation of stem cell lines, the embryos 
themselves are destroyed, yet cells containing their DNA can be cultured 
for a very long period of time. One might say that although the embryo 
itself is destroyed, its genetic blueprint is still ‘alive’, which is not the case 
in other types of destructive embryo research. This has several implications. 
For example, theoretically, if a cell nucleus from that line would be inserted 
into an oocyte and activated, a new embryo could be created that would 
be almost genetically identical to the original embryo (although the mito-
chondrial DNA will be that of the oocyte and epigenetic changes will be 
present). Although this is not a very likely application, some potential 
donors may find the mere possibility disturbing. Others, however, may 
consider it a comforting idea that the embryo they donate will (potentially) 
go on living in a different form. Besides the physical immortality of a stem 
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cell line, another issue might be that researchers worldwide would gain 
access to these cells and that the genetic characterisation of a stem cell line 
could reveal information about the donors. In principle, their names will 
not be linked to the stem cell line, but with the advent of direct-to-consumer 
genetic testing services which also link different people in their databases, 
it is not unthinkable that a stem cell line would be traced back to a certain 
family. Also here, for some people this may not be an issue at all, while 
others may have a clear preference to donate their embryos to other types 
of research instead.
Also for research into genome editing, a specific consent of the embryo 
donors is an absolute prerequisite. The possibility of modifying the genome 
of human embryos has sparked calls for a moratorium (either on clinical 
applications or also on research applications) in the research community 
and sparked fears of designer babies and a return of eugenics in the general 
population (Baltimore et al. 2015; Lanphier et al. 2015). Given the opposition 
in the general population to genetically modified organisms – partly based 
on rational concerns over monopolies, partly based on irrational fears and 
the yuck factor – it is hardly surprising that genetically modified human 
embryos instil fear and discomfort in many. At the same time, as previously 
argued, genome editing is a fantastic tool in research and should therefore 
not be banned a priori in embryo research (Mertes and Pennings 2015; 
Savulescu et al. 2015). As for human embryonic stem cell research, however, 
only the embryos of those donors who do not have personal objections to 
genome editing should be used in this kind of research, regardless of whether 
their opposition is based on rational or irrational arguments. Disregarding 
donors’ personal opinion on this topic, although possibly benefiting science, 
would be disrespectful towards donors and might undermine trust in the 
research community considerably, as the message will be conveyed that 
researchers will do ‘whatever they want’ with donated embryos.
A third type of embryo research for which specific consent needs to be 
obtained in order to maintain trust, is research in which embryos are being 
extensively cultured. Until recently, concerns about extensive culturing of 
donated embryos was unwarranted, as nobody succeeded in culturing the 
embryo for an amount of time anywhere near the maximum period of 
fourteen days. Thus, the fourteen-day limit that was recommended by the 
Warnock Report in 1984 and adopted by several countries, is still a common 
rule thirty years later. However, with recent advances suggesting that it is 
now feasible to culture an embryo beyond the fourteen-day limit, there 
have been calls to extend the limit to twenty-one days in order to be able 
to study stages of embryo development beyond implantation and the primitive 
streak (Deglincerti et al. 2016; Shahbazi et al. 2016). Without wanting to 
engage in this debate here, I shortly want to note that there are two possible 
ways of regarding the fourteen-day limit. Some regard it as an arbitrary 
limit that was set as a middle ground between different opinions on the 
ideal limit, with some people preferring a limit that allows for longer 
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culturing, others preferring it to be more restrictive. Others regard it as a 
non-arbitrary limit, linked to the biological phenomenon of the primitive 
streak and the point at which the embryo is certain to be an ‘individual’ 
as twinning can no longer occur. The relevance of these biological facts 
from a moral point of view is dubious, but especially religious people tend 
to accord significance to them. It is therefore not improbable that some 
people would allow their embryos to be cultured for two, but not for three 
weeks. On a more general note, although there are sound scientific arguments 
for the extension of the fourteen-day limit, such an extension may also fuel 
opposition against embryo research. Reproaches of researchers going down 
a slippery slope and changing the rules as soon as they become obstacles 
are bound to be voiced and will undermine trust. A new middle ground 
might be found in allowing research up to twenty-one days in very exceptional 
cases, but this subject will undoubtedly be heavily debated.
A fourth procedure that is linked to the danger of undermining trust is 
transfer of embryos to other researchers and other facilities. At first glance, 
one would think that when an embryo is donated to research, it does not 
really matter whether the research is carried out in the research institution 
connected to the hospital where treatment was received or elsewhere. In 
fact, to avoid undue pressure on patients to donate and to avoid concerns 
regarding malpractice, the treating physician and the researcher using the 
embryos should not be one and the same person, which may be an argument 
to loosen the ties between the clinic and the research, rather than keeping 
them tight. However, as mentioned above, at least part of the motivation 
to donate embryos to research is trust in and reciprocity towards the institu-
tion where they received IVF treatment. The same relation of trust is most 
likely not present with other institutions performing embryo research and 
there may even be instances of mistrust towards other particular laboratories, 
for instance in the case of commercial spin-offs, or if the other institution 
is of a different religious background or subjected to different legislation 
and/or oversight. Just as for stem cell research, genome editing and extensive 
culturing, transfer of embryos is not necessarily problematic, but as it might 
be perceived as problematic in specific cases, it is better to err on the side 
of caution and obtain an explicit informed consent of the donors to make 
sure that their trust is not betrayed.
For all four of these ‘ethically challenging’ applications – stem cell research, 
genome editing, extensive culturing and transfer of embryos to other institu-
tions – the difficulty in obtaining an informed consent for the donation 
will be to explain the possible issues without introducing fear (rather than 
alleviating fear).
Information after donation
Also, after the donation, measures can be taken to encourage trust in 
embryo research. Currently, there is little communication about the number 
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of embryos donated to research each year, the number of embryos used in 
research each year, the goals of the research projects in which they are 
used, the scientific output of those projects and which types of embryos 
are used (fresh, frozen or – where applicable – created for research). A first 
report of this kind has recently been published by members of the Belgian 
federal commission for research on in vitro embryos (Pennings et al. 2017).
It is also highly desirable that the results of all studies using donated 
human embryos become part of the public domain. Given the sensitive 
nature of embryo research, given that embryo donors cannot be compensated 
or otherwise rewarded for their donation (although there have been calls 
to do this, see de Lacey 2006) and that the main motivations of embryo 
donors are reciprocity and the desire to help other people, their embryos 
should not be used to further the interests of commercial companies/spin-offs 
without serving the common good. If not, donors may feel that researchers 
are taking advantage of their altruism to further their own – non-altruistic 
– goals of profit-making. This does not necessarily mean that all inventions 
based on research in which embryos were destroyed should be unpatentable 
– contrary to what was decided by the European Court of Justice in the 
famous Brüstle v. Greenpeace case in 2011 (European Commission 2011).1 
However, the research itself, the findings about reproductive biology, 
embryogenesis, outcomes of different cryopreservation techniques etc. should 
be made public. By sharing this research, the recipient of the donated 
embryos in turn shows reciprocity towards the donors/IVF patients. A 
policy of mandatory sharing of information also prevents needless repetition 
of research with the valuable and scarce resource that human embryos are.
Conclusion
While the debate concerning research on human embryos is often reduced 
to a debate on the moral status of the embryo, several studies have found 
that the reason why IVF patients do or do not donate their embryos for 
research depends on many other factors as well. One of those factors is 
trust in the scientific community. Therefore, it is important that the confidence 
that embryo donors entrust in scientists is not betrayed. In this chapter we 
set out some recommendations on how to maintain this trust. A first 
prerequisite is that the donors are informed about the (type of) research 
that their embryo will (possibly) be used in. Although due to practical 
limitations it may not always be possible to obtain consent for the specific 
research project that an embryo is used in, this cannot be a reason to move 
to a blanket consent. A middle ground can be found by requesting consent 
for several categories of research, so that the patients are able to exclude 
types of research that they object to. For four specific applications/protocols, 
an explicit and specific consent is advocated: stem cell research, genome 
editing, extensive culturing and transfer of embryos to other research facilities. 
This does not pretend to be an exhaustive list, but at least for these four 
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applications, we can imagine the possibility that even embryo donors who 
do not object to embryo research per se, might nevertheless object to these 
kinds of use of their embryos. By seeking explicit consent, we can prevent 
potential donors from refraining from donating to research all together 
from fear of one of these applications. In order to maintain the trust not 
only of donors, but also of the general public, transparency around the 
embryo research that is being performed is important. Information on how 
many embryos are used for which kind of projects and what the outcomes 
of the research are, should therefore be made public.
Note
1 Article 6(2)(c) of the EU’s Directive 98/44 (Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions) states that ‘uses of human embryos for industrial 
or commercial purposes’ are unpatentable as this would be ‘contrary to ordre 
public or morality’. In its verdict in Brüstle v. Greenpeace, the European Court 
of Justice concluded that this prohibition on patenting also covers the use of 
human embryos in research, products whose production necessitates the prior 
destruction of human embryos and processes for which a base material is required 
which is obtained by destruction of human embryos, even if the description of 
the technical teaching claimed does not refer to the use of human embryos. This 
verdict in fact excludes the entire field of human embryonic stem cell research 
from patentability.
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From Galileo to embryos and narcotic 
drugs: the quest for the right to science
Marco Cappato
Introduction: from Galileo to embryos
‘Foolish and absurd in philosophy, and formally heretical since it explicitly 
contradicts in many places the sense of Holy Scripture’ (Library of Social 
Science 2016). This was the conclusion reached in 1615 by the Roman 
Inquisition on Galileo Galilei’s heliocentrism. Using a telescope, Galileo 
had observed the moons of Jupiter and sunspots, and advocated a heliocentric 
solar system. He also conducted investigations in buoyancy and wrote on 
physics, but his research was considered a threat to established doctrines. 
Although the Counter-Reformation ended several centuries ago, scientific 
research continues to be perceived ‘politically’ as an activity that needs to 
be carried out within certain limits.
Scientific research is still often limited by seemingly ‘ethical’ arguments. 
Research on embryos, for example, has been prohibited in several countries, 
and restricted in others (such as the UK) in which it is legal. This restriction 
is not based on fears around what embryological science may find out, or 
fears around the applications of scientific discoveries in this area, but on 
allegedly ‘ethical’ and to some extent metaphysical or religious grounds 
(e.g. what it is that renders a life a person, and how entities that qualify 
as persons should be treated).
In this chapter I will consider the case of psychoactive substances and 
discuss how the ban on the personal consumption of these substances 
impacts on scientific research. We should note that the use of psychoac-
tive substances is probably as old as humankind itself. Most of the oldest 
religions include in their rituals the use of substances that may have toxic 
effects on the individual: from wine to weed, from mushrooms to all sorts 
of alkaloids. For centuries, the relationship between the physical and the 
metaphysical has been accompanied by the consumption of herbs, plants 
and their derivatives. Those substances are also known by the generic term 
of ‘drugs’, which in English, at least, can also mean ‘medicines’. In fact 
most, if not all, of those substances can also have a medicinal use. However 
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widespread, many psychoactive substances are subject to an international 
control regime that urges governments to control their production, consump-
tion and commerce, making these actions ‘criminal offences’ (art. 36 of 
the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs – hereafter, the 1961 
Convention).
Whereas it is widely accepted that psychoactive substances are used for 
medical purposes, or even to treat emotional disorders (e.g. psychotropic 
drugs are administered routinely to treat psychological and emotional 
disorders), allegedly moral judgement and ethical concerns, as well as legal 
restrictions, seem to change dramatically if, instead of seeking a cure, the 
‘alteration’ of our consciousness is done just for the sake of it.
This chapter will focus mainly upon the prohibition of narcotics and 
other psychoactive substances, and its impact on science. I will discuss how 
international organisations, particularly the United Nations, have intervened 
over the years to regulate and control the use and distribution of psychoactive 
substances. There are three main international conventions that deal with 
psychoactive substances. The first is the one mentioned earlier (the 1961 
UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs); two further conventions followed: 
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 and the Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988. The 
first, the 1961 Convention, is the one that contains the tables of plants and 
derivatives that must be strictly controlled. The most problematic of these 
conventions is the first, because it is this that lists the banned substances, 
and thus causes the problems that are discussed in this chapter. I will thus 
focus on the 1961 Convention. We will see, however, that various UN 
documents contain contradictions and are open to looser and stricter 
interpretations, thus leaving individual states uncertain as to how to regulate 
the use of psychoactive substances.
I will show that the prohibitions relating to psychoactive substances can 
seriously hinder the progress of scientific research. As scientific advancement 
is regarded as a human right by the same treaties and documents that 
restrict the use of psychoactive substances, prohibition results in the violation 
of fundamental human rights, such as the right to science and to health.
There is another aspect worth noting: the case of drug prohibition is 
illustrative of how at times rules and laws, particularly restrictive ones, are 
based on dogma or on unsubstantiated fears (as happened in the case of 
Galileo), and fail to take into consideration the scientific evidence available, 
rather than being grounded, as they should be, on a dispassionate analysis 
of the issues at stake. This method of regulation is not confined to psychoac-
tive substances; cloning and assisted fertilisation, to highlight other examples, 
at least in some countries, have been similarly regulated on shaky grounds. 
I will begin with a brief overview of the international responses to cloning 
because these responses have been in many respects similar to the international 
reaction to psychoactive substances; this will illustrate further how scientific 
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progress, and thus indirectly our health and welfare, are readily sacrificed 
in the name of empty ideals.
The case of cloning
At times, limits and prohibitions are dictated by the risks (real or perceived) 
of harm to someone (the research subjects, or other humans, or the environ-
ment); at other times, they appear rather to be based on more vague and 
even fanciful grounds. For example, as is well known, after the birth of 
Dolly the sheep in 1996, virtually all international organisations and 
institutions lined up to ban human cloning. In March 2005 the General 
Assembly of the United Nations finally approved a non-binding declaration 
calling on all UN member states to ban all forms of ‘human cloning’, 
including cloning for medical treatment, as incompatible with ‘human dignity 
and the protection of human life’ (United Nations News Centre 2005). The 
declaration also banned ‘genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary 
to human dignity’. It also called on states ‘to prevent the exploitation of 
women in the application of life sciences’ and ‘to protect adequately human 
life in the application of life sciences’. The document received the support 
of eighty-four out of 193 UN member states. It is important to note that 
this, and other similar documents, was not just a prohibition or moratorium 
on human cloning, but a clear expression of the ethical norms that should 
guide and limit scientific research.
The term ‘human cloning’, construed during the debate of the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly throughout 2005, included in its meaning 
both therapeutic and reproductive cloning. On the basis of this equivocation, 
some countries, such as South Africa, abstained at the United Nations in 
2005, claiming that ‘therapeutic cloning was aimed at protecting human 
life and [is not], therefore, inconsistent with the Declaration’ (The Hindu 
2005). The United States, which voted in favour of the declaration, stated 
that ‘any ban on human cloning should explicitly state that it does not 
prohibit the development of cell and tissue-based therapies based on research 
involving cloning technology to produce DNA molecules, organs, plants, 
tissues, cells (other than human embryos), or animals (other than humans)’ 
(United Nations News Centre 2005), and concluded that the United States 
believes that ‘nations should actively pursue the potential medical and 
scientific benefits of these scientific methods, which have already enabled 
researchers to develop innovative drugs to treat diseases’ (United Nations 
News Centre 2005).
The 2005 Declaration on Human Cloning followed the Universal Declara-
tion on the Human Genome and Human Rights adopted by UNESCO in 
1997. Both are non-binding statements. Nevertheless, the drafting process, 
and in particular the debate that accompanied the adoption of the declaration 
throughout 2004, happened at a time when the first promising results on 
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embryonic stem cell research were being published: this demonstrates how 
crucial and divisive scientific research can be for decision makers.
After the adoption of the 2005 statement, the international community 
addressed the issue of cloning again at a technical level thanks to the work 
of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO, which dedicated 
four years of its work, until 2011, to the issue of the moral acceptability 
of scientific research on human cloning. The IBC advised that global dialogue 
would greatly benefit from efforts in the three following areas:
Terminology: frameworks and regulations should not make use of inaccurate 
and misleading terminologies that inadequately describe the technical 
procedures relevant to human cloning. The new scientific developments 
call for the redefinition and clarification of some widely used terms and 
for the dismissal of others.
International governance: the IBC considered that the existing international 
legal frameworks and regulations were unable to properly address the 
challenges posed by the most recent scientific developments. They are 
non-binding and mutually inconsistent as a result of different views of 
member states. A process should be initiated that could lead to the 
establishment of a more robust mechanism which should give more 
substantial guidance on the specific issue of cloning.
Dissemination: the IBC stressed the importance of fostering public awareness 
by disseminating, discussing and debating cloning issues at all levels. 
This would allow all countries, including the developing and least developed 
countries, to participate in the debate and put forward their concerns 
regarding the new technologies related to human cloning (UNESCO 
2017).
The opposition to cloning, in any form, has been fierce, in spite of the 
international documents welcoming therapeutic cloning. The problem with 
any type of research of this kind is that it involves the manipulation of 
human embryos (of course, there is a question as to whether the entity that 
results from so-called cloning, that is, cell nuclear transfer, is an embryo 
in the same way as the entity that results from the fusion of male and 
female gametes). But leaving the technicalities aside, the idea that humans 
in scientific laboratories would create, manipulate, study and possibly destroy 
something that looks very much like a human embryo has been found 
unacceptable and repugnant to many.
As is well known, therapeutic cloning refers to the enucleation of an 
oocyte and the insertion of the nucleus of an adult cell into the enucle-
ated oocyte. With certain types of electric stimulation, an embryo can be 
formed (or an entity that very much looks and functions like an embryo), 
in absence of a fertilised egg. This embryo would have DNA that would 
be nearly identical to the DNA of the donor of the nucleus of the adult 
cell (with the exception of the mitochondrial DNA that is inherited via the 
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oocyte). The embryo, after around five days, presents itself as a hollow 
cavity containing stem cells. These cells are highly plastic, that is, they 
have the ability to differentiate into many tissues, and could in principle 
be extracted and induced to differentiate into desired tissues, which could 
provide a cure for many diseases (Parkinson’s disease, other neurodegenerative 
disorders, heart diseases and many others), free of problems of immunological 
rejection.
But the whole enterprise of embryological research, not only that aimed 
at producing ‘clones’, raises fierce opposition. By way of example, in 2013 
a group of European organisations launched the ‘One of Us’ campaign to 
call on European institutions to unconditionally recognise ‘the inherent 
and inalienable human dignity as a source of human freedoms and citizens’ 
rights’ (One of Us 2012–17). This ‘federation’ of NGOs collected 1,721,626 
signatures from all over Europe to support their request to the European 
Commission to stop the European funding of research on embryonic stem 
cells. The ‘citizens’ initiative’ (European Commission 2017) was submitted, 
discussed and rejected by the Commission in May 2014 (European Com-
mission 2014). In a hearing convened to discuss the matter, Máire Geoghegan-
Quinn, European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, 
declared that
Member States and the European Parliament agreed to continue funding 
research in this area for a reason. Embryonic stem cells are unique and offer 
the potential for life-saving treatments, with clinical trials already underway. 
The Commission will continue to apply the strict ethical rules and restrictions 
in place for EU-funded research, including that we will not fund the destruction 
of embryos. (European Commission 2014)
The scientific community, the regulators and civil society organisations 
may have been caught unprepared for ‘cloning’, but it is likely that the 
farraginous regulatory systems in place, both nationally and internationally, 
often guided by ideologies and dogmas rather than by dispassionate reasoning, 
may have set back scientific advancement and research. The therapeutic 
potentials of human cloning are well known, and were already disseminated 
soon after the announcement of the birth of Dolly; in principle, cloning 
could provide treatment for a number of degenerative disorders (Kfoury 
2007); thus, the costs of setbacks are to be paid, in likelihood, by real 
people, who could, at least in principle, have benefited from scientific 
advancements.
Narcotic drugs: their potential in science and medicine
The more we know about how the brain works, the better we can intervene 
– and even alter – its functioning. Part of this endeavour is of unquestioned 
value, especially when we talk about serious or currently incurable diseases. 
Not many questioned the initiative by President Obama to invest in the 
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so-called ‘BRAIN’ initiative, a ‘research effort to revolutionize our under-
standing of the human mind and to uncover new ways to treat, prevent, 
and cure brain disorders like Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, autism, epilepsy, 
and traumatic brain injury’ (National Institutes of Health 2017). In 2013 
the European Commission similarly launched the Human Brain Project 
(HBP) to build a collaborative scientific research infrastructure based on 
information and communications technologies to allow researchers across 
the globe to advance knowledge in the fields of neuroscience, computing 
and brain-related medicine (Human Brain Project 2017).
Understanding brain functioning requires its observation ‘under the 
influence’ of some substance. The substance can be either endogenous or 
exogenous. Research into autism in children, for instance, might look at 
how the brain works during exposure and interaction with significant others; 
this research could attempt to verify brain changes in children affected by 
autism when, say, their mother enters the room and interacts with them. 
Exposure to the mother in most cases will cause the endogenous production 
of chemicals in the brain of the research subjects. Other research might 
investigate the role of psychoactive substances in the central nervous system 
and thus observe brain performance, say, in heroin addicts when they take 
their fix. The role of researchers in both cases is, or should be, observing, 
analysing and researching, and not making moral judgements about people’s 
behaviour.
The study of psychoactive drugs could be crucial to the understanding 
of the human brain. David Nutt, former chair of the UK Advisory Council 
on the Misuse of Drugs, noted that research into the human brain would 
benefit from the study of substances that are currently prohibited or whose 
use is currently severely restricted. Nutt has examined the neural effects 
of mind-altering drugs, such as the hallucinogen psilocybin (an active 
ingredient in magic mushrooms); the study led to the first images showing 
the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on the human brain, as part 
of a series of studies examining how the drug causes its characteristic 
hallucinogenic effects. In an interview with Nature Nutt explained that his 
study revealed how LSD might ultimately be therapeutically useful, reminding 
us how in the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of people took LSD to cure 
alcoholism. A retrospective analysis of some of those studies in 2012 sug-
gested that the drug helped recovery from alcohol addiction. Since the 
1970s there have been several research studies of LSD in animals, but not 
in humans, and Nutt argued that it was important to validate the trial of 
this drug as a potential therapy for addiction or depression in humans 
(Cormier 2016). Research on psychoactive substances could also prove 
beneficial in finding a treatment for other conditions, such as autism and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic 
Studies 2017). If this all sounds reasonable in theory, in practice the use 
of psychoactive substances, as was the case with ‘cloning’, has been virtually 
universally condemned.
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International and national prohibitions on the use of  
psychoactive substances
As mentioned in the introduction, the scheduling, that is, the restriction, 
of potentially medicinal plants and their derivatives is the result of the 
ratification of three international conventions on ‘drugs’ adopted by the 
United Nations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017) between 
the early 1960s and the late 1980s. In addition to being used to justify the 
so-called ‘war on drugs’, these documents have also created the general 
conditions for the limitation of research into narcotics, including research 
for scientific or medical purposes.
The incorporation of the 1961 Convention into the various national legal 
systems made the production and consumption of certain psychoactive 
substances a criminal offence; however, the Convention did not establish a 
court before which countries not in compliance with its provisions could be 
brought for breaching them. The 1961 Convention came into force in the 
mid 1970s, at a time when the international community was adopting the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
(1966), two documents that finally expanded, clarified and codified the 
rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
Over the years, these last two covenants were strengthened by the creation 
of a committee (UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
1996–2017), which was tasked with monitoring the domestic application 
of the covenants. This development of a compliance mechanism is a crucial 
difference from the UN conventions on narcotics, and signals the hierarchical 
relationship between the documents. While the articles of the two human 
rights covenants have constitutional status, obliging states, under international 
law, to protect and promote the rights contained therein, those of the three 
narcotics conventions are a set of shared recommendations that the 
international community believes should be applied to ensure an ‘international 
drug control system’; while there are two UN committees to address violations 
of the human rights contained in the covenants, there are no quasi-judicial 
bodies to assess how states enforce the norms contained in the three UN 
conventions on drugs. Because of their constitutional status, the rights in 
the covenants trump the provisions of the conventions.
The regulation of psychoactive substances has been a hard nut to crack 
for national governments as well. One example is provided by the saga of 
the regulation of cannabis in the UK. This case illustrates how even in 
countries where public opinion favours the legalisation of certain psychoactive 
substances, the response of the government may end up oscillating between 
decriminalisation and prohibition. In 2001, following a public survey, the 
British government announced that cannabis would be transferred from 
class B under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act to class C, thus decriminalising 
personal possession (arrest would still be possible for distribution). 
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Reclassification had the support of a majority of the public, with surveys 
at the time finding that 49 per cent of British adults supported cannabis 
decriminalisation, 36 per cent were against and 15 per cent were undecided. 
The rescheduling eventually happened in January 2004, after class C penalties 
for distribution had been stiffened.
The British Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (1979) had already 
recommended such a reclassification as early as 1979, a view that was 
endorsed by the so-called Runciman Report in 1999 (Runciman 1999). 
The changes would have allowed police forces to concentrate resources on 
other more serious offences, including those involving ‘stronger drugs’. 
However, in 2005 the government announced that the reclassification of 
cannabis from class B to class C would be reviewed in light of new scientific 
research, and the issue was, finally, formally referred to the Advisory Council.
In January 2006 the Home Secretary maintained that, based on advice 
from the Advisory Council, there would be no move to return cannabis to 
class B. A year and half later this decision was reconsidered. In fact, in 
May 2008 the government confirmed that cannabis in the UK would again 
be classified as a class B drug, despite the Advisory Council’s recommendation. 
On 26 January 2009 cannabis was reclassified as a class B drug, once more 
making its possession and use a criminal offence.
A global war against the use of narcotics in scientific research
As the previous section has shown, national laws and international conven-
tions virtually unanimously prohibit the recreational use of several psychoac-
tive drugs. Whereas many of us are well aware of this prohibition, the 
effect that it might have on scientific research (and thus, indirectly, on 
human health) has not been widely recognised. In 2013 David Nutt, 
mentioned earlier, attempted to highlight the effects of these prohibitions 
on scientific research. In an article published in Nature he wrote:
The possession of cannabis, 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine 
(MDMA; also known as ecstasy) and psychedelics is stringently regulated. 
An important and unfortunate outcome of the controls placed on these and 
other psychoactive drugs is that they make research into their mechanisms of 
action and potential therapeutic uses – for example, in depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder – difficult and in many cases almost impossible. 
(Nutt et al. 2013)
Similarly, Ben Sessa, in an article published in the Lancet in January 
2015, wrote:
For many people, words such as psychedelic and LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) 
refer only to dangerous drugs of abuse . . . Less well known is that tens of 
thousands of patients were treated effectively with psychedelic drugs in the 
1950s and 1960s and that these drugs had almost become part of mainstream 
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medicine by the time they became demonised and research was halted for 40 
years. (2015)
Even in states in which the medicinal use of some psychoactive substances 
is recognised, the laws remain contradictory, and the result is an obstruction 
to scientific research. For example, in the United States, under federal law, 
twenty-eight states recognise cannabis as a medicine, and yet cannabis is 
treated like any other controlled substance, such as cocaine and heroin. 
According to its relative potential for abuse and its medicinal value, the 
federal government places every controlled substance in a schedule. As a 
matter of fact, the cannabis plant remains illegal under federal law. The 
federal government regulates drugs through the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) (21 USC para. 811), which does not recognise any difference between 
medical and recreational use of the plant. This Act is generally applied 
against persons who possess, cultivate or distribute large quantities of 
cannabis. Under the CSA, cannabis is classified as a Schedule I drug, which 
means that the federal government considers the plant and its derivatives 
as highly addictive and having no medical value. Doctors may not prescribe 
cannabis for medical reasons under federal law, but they can recommend 
it under the First Amendment. Somewhat paradoxically, the enjoyment of 
the right to health is possible thanks to ‘freedom of speech’ (Americans for 
Safe Access 2017).
It is easy to be appalled by some of the implications of the use and abuse 
of psychoactive substances (legal and illegal). Substance use claims thousands 
of lives every year: in 2015 in England and Wales alone, 3,674 drug-poisoning 
deaths were caused by both legal and illegal substances (Gayle 2016). In 
common discourse, illegal drugs are often associated with narco-trafficking, 
with disadvantaged young people caught in the net of the illegal drug trade 
through the promise of a better life; at the other end of the spectrum are 
highly privileged people, wealthy and fortunate but otherwise vulnerable, 
whose bodies are found lifeless after an overdose. Perhaps worst of all are 
the horrifying stories of toddlers being drugged and abused by their parents, 
or being drugged just for fun (Nauman 2016; Smith 2016).
These stories elicit sentiments of revulsion, which are so strong that it is 
easy to condemn psychoactive substances and support restrictive laws. The 
moral feelings of many suggest that abusive parents ought to be punished, 
that children ought to be protected and that young people in disadvantaged 
socio-economic contexts ought to be shielded from the exploitation of the 
illegal drugs trade. What is obscured, however, by the strong sentiment of 
revulsion is that prohibitionist policies do not effectively protect those who 
are vulnerable to addiction. The ‘war on drugs’ can end up claiming even 
more lives than the drugs themselves (an emblematic case is that of Mexico: 
a 2017 Congressional Research Service report by the United States on that 
country estimated that at least 80,000 people had been killed due to incidents 
related to organised crime since 2006. Under President Peña Nieto, overall 
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homicide numbers have declined as much as 30 per cent, according to 
experts, but Mexican drug cartels take in between $19 and $29 billion 
annually from US drug sales (CNN 2017)). Even in Europe, where govern-
ments do not implement active ‘wars on drugs’ as seen in Mexico, making 
drugs illegal is still ineffective. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA 2016) reports that thousands of lives are 
claimed every year in Europe due to the use of illegal psychoactive substances, 
and the rates do not appear to be decreasing.
So, if prohibitionist policies and laws are meant to protect people’s health 
and well-being, surely this means that health and well-being matter; but, 
if they matter, then there is a problem here, because prohibitionist policies 
result in an obstacle to scientific research, and this also compromises people’s 
health and well-being. One could object that psychoactive drugs are likely 
to cause immediate and real harm to those who take them, whereas the 
benefits of scientific research on psychoactive drugs are potential and thus 
hypothetical, and in making a choice between reducing a real harm and 
producing a hypothetical benefit, it is rational to reduce the real harm. 
However, it is not clear that prohibitionist policies effectively protect people 
from the harm of psychoactive drugs, as we have seen.
Prohibitionist policies around narcotics and other psychoactive substances 
limit scientific research into drugs, thus hindering the understanding of 
how human brain reacts to certain substances, and thus how certain 
substances can be safely used as therapies or even recreationally.
The United Nations on narcotics and science: conflicting goals?
As we have seen, there are inconsistencies in several United Nations docu-
ments. Whereas the 1961 Convention prohibits the use of narcotics, other 
covenants affirm the importance of scientific progress, and state that science 
is a human right. Thus the prohibition of the use of narcotics, which 
impinges upon scientific advancement, jeopardises the full enjoyment of a 
human right.
Article 15 of the ICESCR (1966) stipulates, among other things, that the 
‘States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone: (b) 
To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. Key to 
this article is the ‘conservation, the development and the diffusion of science 
and culture’.
The United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted on 
10 December 1948 had already suggested that scientific research is a human 
right. Article 27 stated that ‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate 
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.’ Imposing a strict system of control 
on scientific research into certain plants or substances without any solid 
justification arguably violates the human right to scientific advancement.
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Consonant with the idea that scientific advancement is a human right, 
the ICESCR (1966: art. 15 (5)) calls on states to do their utmost to ‘undertake 
to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative 
activity’. It also states that all countries party to the pact should ‘recognize 
the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of 
international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields’ 
(1966: art. 15 (6)). It took twelve years to draft the version of the ICESCR 
that was adopted on 16 December 1966, and another decade passed before 
its coming into force on 3 January 1976. Over the years, 164 states have 
become party to the covenant, and in 2008 an Optional Protocol was 
concluded, which entered into force in 2013, allowing its parties to recognise 
the competence of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) to consider complaints from individuals. The committee consists 
of eighteen independent human rights experts that meet three times a year 
at the United Nations.
The ICESCR is the twin of the ICCPR, and was the result of a diplomatic 
compromise to satisfy the ideological approaches of the two main blocs 
during the Cold War – individual rights were considered crucial for the 
West, collective ones for the USSR and its allies. With the fall of the Soviet 
Union, this separation has blurred, paving the way for the drafting of other 
international documents that deal with health and scientific research, such 
as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
which entered into force in 2008; and, within the Council of Europe, the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997 (also known as 
the Oviedo Convention), which aims at the protection of ‘Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine’, and which entered into force in 1999. Once ratified, the 
covenants become documents of constitutional value.
In its Preamble, the ICESCR (1966) reminds signatories that the ‘individual, 
having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, 
is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant’. Alas, as we have seen, over the 
last few decades, in particular in the field of health and science, ‘striving 
for the promotion and observance’ of Article 15 of the ICESCR has found 
potent enemies in other international treaties or declarations to control the 
diversion of substances to purposes other than their scientific or medical use.
The 1961 Convention contains (as arguably do all compromise documents) 
several contradictions and several ambiguous statements that have allowed 
rigid or lax interpretations in different countries. Examples of some inherent 
incongruences can be found in the Preamble of the document:
The Parties,
Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indis-
pensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate provision must 
be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for such purposes,
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Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for 
the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil,
Considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs require 
co-ordinated and universal action,
Understanding that such universal action calls for international co-operation 
guided by the same principles and aimed at common objectives. [emphasis 
added]
The 1961 Convention opens up with a solemn statement of concern for the 
health and welfare of mankind, which among other things depends on 
adequate access to essential medicines; at the same time, mankind must be 
defended from the ‘evil’ of ‘misuse’ of those medicines. Whereas these 
resounding statements are eye-catching, what constitutes a possible abuse 
of controlled substances is arbitrarily defined. In fact, contrary to Paracelsus’ 
dictum that ‘the dosage makes it either a poison or a remedy’, there are no 
annexes to the United Nations conventions on drugs to specify the quantity 
of alkaloids that can be considered as intoxicating or dangerous. A decision 
on the welfare of mankind was thus taken that left scientific and medical 
arguments aside.
Of course, one may question whether there is such a thing as a ‘right to 
science’; indeed the relationship between science, democracy and the rule 
of law raises the more fundamental question of whether there is such a 
thing. Boggio and Romano (Chapter 10 in this volume) have extensively 
reported on this issue, and on how individual states and governments may 
be able to claim further freedom in cases in which it is believed that such 
a right is being violated. Mikel Mancisidor, vice-chair of the Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, argues that ‘the Human Right 
to Science does in fact present as a true human right in existing International 
Law, even if its binding normative content still has to be clarified and better 
specified’ (2015). ‘The Human Right to Science’, he continues, ‘is a right 
that has been explicitly enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration (UD) 
(art. 27) and in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, art. 15). We are not therefore in any way dealing 
with a new legal right’ (2015).
However, he notes that this right ‘is relatively unknown even among 
Human Rights experts and activists’ and that it has ‘generally been overlooked 
by international bodies and also by states’ (2015). Moreover, within the 
mechanisms created by the United Nations, states often do not report 
satisfactorily, as should be their obligation, on rights that, like this one, 
fall under the category of ‘cultural rights’. The other problem is that the 
United Nations has not provided individual states with guidelines or rec-
ommendations on how to implement the ICESCR on scientific matters.
In spite of all these limitations, the right to science is no less recognised 
and important than the right to health or the right to life. One may question 
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the existence or moral significance of human rights altogether, but if and 
insofar as supranational organisations and individual states accept the value, 
moral and political meaning of human rights, such as the rights to health, 
to life, to education and so on, then they should also accept the value and 
moral and political meaning of other rights ratified by the same covenants, 
unless a significant difference were found that justified attaching lower 
importance to one particular human right.
It thus appears that international documents ratified to guide states in 
the regulation of the use of psychoactive substances incorporate conflicting 
or openly contradictory aims. On the one hand, they declare the importance 
of scientific progress for the welfare of mankind; in fact, not merely its 
importance: they explicitly state that scientific advancements and human 
health are fundamental human rights. On the other hand, they readily ban 
certain psychoactive substances whose use in scientific research could be 
vital to scientific progress on the functioning of the human brain, and thus 
to the protection and promotion of those same human rights.
Conclusion: research on narcotics as a concrete case for the right 
to science
The spectacular leap forward that the scientific world is expected to produce 
in the study of the human brain makes drugs, in particular those that are 
currently controlled by the three United Nations conventions on narcotics, 
one of the battlegrounds where current international and domestic policies 
pose a potent threat to the affirmation of the human right to science. 
Obviously, a right to science presupposes and implies that scientists ought 
to be free to do their job – in short, it presupposes a significant degree of 
freedom of scientific research. The case of narcotics and other psychoactive 
substances is one of many instances in which decision makers, through 
laws and policies, have imposed arbitrary limits to the freedom of scientific 
research, thereby hindering the full enjoyment of fundamental human rights.
Looking at what happened to Galileo, or even at recent events relating 
to research on human embryos, one might hope that it is only a matter of 
time before laws and policies will become more liberal, and research into 
drugs will be authorised and given the necessary public investment. Those 
countries that act first will have a significant advantage both in terms of 
public health and of economic opportunities, as it is certainly possible that 
the more we know about how the brain works, the more we will be able 
to control and ameliorate human life. The next few years will put the poli-
cymakers of the so-called Western liberal democracies to the test; their 
challenge is to rethink current prohibitionist policies and law, while also 
taking account of the fact that research into drugs does happen – most 
likely in the hands of organised crime, which constantly produces ever 
more powerful and more addictive substances, purposely created and 
distributed simply to maximise its own profit.
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The danger of not loosening regulations on scientific research into 
controlled substances is therefore wide-ranging. It increases the chances of 
illegal trade, of illegal and dangerous research at the hands of dubious 
companies or organised crime, and it is an impediment to crucial discoveries 
that could lead to effective treatments for many diseases. In addition to 
this, there is also a general risk that democracy will suffer a heavy defeat, 
as overly restrictive national policies on drugs put into question the real 
nature of the democratic liberal model based on civil liberties (on the relation-
ship between democracy and scientific freedom, see Chapter 13 in this 
volume).
Strengthening international instruments and mechanisms to affirm the 
right to science, and to free up the use of narcotics and other psychoactive 
substances in respectable scientific laboratories, could thus contribute both 
to science and to the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law.
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Science, self-control and human freedom:  
a naturalistic approach
Gilberto Corbellini and Elisabetta Sirgiovanni
A recurring assumption among political philosophers is that freedom as 
the ancients conceived it was different from the kind of freedom experienced 
in the modern world. On 13 February 1819, in his famous lecture on The 
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns held at the 
Athénée Royal in Paris, Benjamin-Henri Constant de Rebecque gave one 
of the most brilliant formulations of liberal thought. Constant affirmed 
that modern men’s liberty is ‘individual liberty’, whereas that of the ancients 
was the freedom to collectively exercise sovereignty. He wrote that the 
ancients were ‘machines, whose gears and cog-wheels were regulated by 
the law’. The moderns, after Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza and Hume, used the 
law to circumscribe the space of expression of autonomy, which was intended 
a priori as indefinite and – this is the crucial difference from the ancients 
– no longer located in the public forum but in the so-called ‘inner’ or 
individual conscience. So, the function of law had changed, as it no longer 
prescribed what a citizen must do but what he or she may do. In one phrase, 
popular in English law: everything that is not forbidden is allowed. In this 
sense, the law becomes the premise, in Constant’s words, for the ‘pacific 
enjoyment of private independence’.
Constant was presenting the classical liberal theory of freedom, in which 
freedom is understood as the right to be subject solely to the law, and 
therefore not to be arrested, imprisoned, sentenced to death or mistreated 
by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals. Moreover, liberal freedom 
implies the right to express one’s opinion, to choose one’s work and to 
perform it, to make use and abuse of one’s own private property, to associate 
with those one prefers and to exercise an influence on the administration 
of government. Of course, traces of such modern ideas of liberty can be 
found in antiquity, but wherever slavery was legal, freedom was thought 
of in opposition to slavery, and since the subordination of the individual to 
the state and the laws had to be total, the idea of ‘negative liberty’ found 
little room to advance. Even for Aristotle, the philosopher who comes 
closest to a modern way of thinking, what distinguished the slave from 
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the free man in the Politics was not that the former was limited in his 
actions or subject to coercion, while the latter enjoyed personal autonomy, 
but the fact that everything a slave did was done to serve someone else’s 
interest.
One question to which neither Constant nor others have provided sat-
isfactory answers remains, however. What really happened to catalyse the 
cultural processes from which the moderns’ ideas of liberty were shaped? 
In this chapter, we would like to provide a naturalistic answer to this 
question.
Being a naturalist about human behaviour means believing that human 
behaviour, including moral and social behaviour, results from the functioning 
of the human brain, a complex, multilevel, anatomical organ evolutionarily 
and developmentally determined by genetic and epigenetic factors, and that 
understanding our social brains is a crucial step towards explaining social 
facts (Corbellini and Sirgiovanni 2013). Throughout the history of philosophy, 
naturalists have been most concerned about the existence and sources of 
freedom, since while they need to face the problem of reconciling freedom 
with determinism just as spiritualists do (for whom it is not nature that 
determines human behaviour, but God or some other spiritual force), natural-
ists cannot escape the problem by appealing to an immaterial soul or mind. 
We will not deal with these metaphysical questions here, but we will examine 
the evolutionary and historical processes that allowed human beings to 
achieve those skills that determined the relevant cognitive and moral 
improvements that we today define as ‘freedom’, those that made liberal 
and democratic achievements possible. We believe that the introduction of 
modern science, especially experimental method, had a crucial role in the 
process (Corbellini 2011).
Naturalistic hypotheses about science and human freedom
Curiously enough, historical accounts of human liberty give very marginal 
consideration to the role played by science in the birth of modernity, 
particularly in the construction of the epistemological and psychological 
conditions for the development of the kind of behaviour we today consider 
compatible with the civic and democratic coexistence of individuals. If it 
is unquestioned that civic and democratic behaviour was inspired by the 
introduction of a new idea of freedom, that is, autonomy or self-determination, 
including both positive and negative components of liberty (respectively, 
liberty as the capacity to self-govern and liberty as the absence of external 
interferences or constraints), there is far less agreement about the role that 
modern science had in this cultural process. Important exceptions to this 
tradition are books by Niall Ferguson, especially Civilization: The West 
and the Rest (2011), and the volume The Science of Liberty: Democracy, 
Reason and the Laws of Nature (2010) by the science writer Timothy 
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Ferris. As they interestingly argue, the rise of the modern idea of liberty, 
along with the evolution of the psychological capabilities that permit much 
more advanced possibilities for planning and control, has been a consequence 
of the advent of experimental science and thus of the spread of critical 
thinking applied in a systematic way. The pioneers of political liberty were 
well equipped with the scientific knowledge of their time – a quite obvious 
claim. The idea that modern science was at the origin of the democratic 
revolution rests on the fact that a sizeable proportion of scientific minds 
were directly involved in the revolutions that led to the establishment of 
fundamental human rights and therefore to the birth of modern democracies, 
immediately before the Enlightenment and during the scientific revolution. 
More compelling is the reason why science made this contribution, which 
is, according to Ferris, that science required liberty and so produced social 
benefits by creating a sort of symbiotic relationship between liberty and 
science, in which the freer nations were better able to move forward with 
scientific endeavour, which in turn rewarded populations with knowledge, 
well-being and power.
Among the particular characteristics of scientific endeavour, Ferris notes 
that science is anti-authoritarian, self-correcting, requires the production 
of specific intellectual resources, is powerful in the action of transforming 
nature and is a social activity. These are characteristics long observed by 
scientists, philosophers and sociologists during the period in which science 
was a model of knowledge. In addition, according to thinkers who are 
politically very different from one another – such as John Dewey, Michael 
Polanyi, Joseph Needham and Karl Popper – science and democracy share 
epistemological and ethical–political aspects. In particular, science and 
democracy both require tolerance, scepticism, rejection of authority, respect 
for facts, freedom of communication and free access to results.
More specifically, the discovery of the advantages of the hypothetical–
deductive and experimental method, starting from the ancient traditions 
of logical and naturalistic thought, entailed the exercise and improvement 
of abstract and metacognitive reasoning capacities. This determined a more 
decisive detachment of naturalistic research from common sense at the 
dawn of the modern age. Theories that scientifically explain natural phe-
nomena are almost always counter-intuitive. We might mention a very long 
list: heliocentrism, the Galilean–Newtonian theory of motion, the statistical–
mechanical theory of heat, the Darwinian theory of evolution, the Mendelian 
theory of inheritance, the second law of thermodynamics, the restricted 
and general theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, the mathematical 
theory of communication (information theory), neurobiological theories of 
memory and leaning, cognitive and evolutionary theories of psychology, 
along with many others. Abstract thought had been used by Greek phi-
losophers and naturalists and had spread for centuries, also being cross-
fertilised by other oriental traditions, but only when it met with a set of 
204 Freedom of science and the need for regulation
material conditions such as the ecological diversity of the economic productive 
systems of the late Middle Ages could it stimulate the contagious development 
of counter-intuitive explanations through brain training for ‘unnatural’ 
thought.
Starting to think like a scientist was a new and powerful resource for 
real-life problems in the modern world. By using analysis, abstraction, 
hypothetical reasoning and experimental control, a series of evolutionary 
predispositions, which were not set spontaneously, were triggered. What 
were the neural structures involved?
From science to freedom through self-control
By looking at neurocognitive research about scientific learning, we may 
infer which brain structures were crucially trained and enhanced by science 
so as to determine the birth of the concept of liberty in the modern age. 
As we know, science learning activates frontal and prefrontal brain areas 
to a great extent, areas that are responsible for cognitive processes, affective 
regulation and social choices and contribute both to the capacity for control 
over the environment (e.g. the ability to find or produce food, to reproduce 
more and with a better chance of survival for the offspring, to treat illnesses 
and reduce suffering) and self-control (the effortful capacity to regulate 
one’s automatic thoughts, feelings and behaviour in favour of long-term 
interests or goals).
Clinical and experimental neuroscience show that frontal areas, which 
are also the last to reach complete maturity at the end of adolescence (in 
the period therefore during which the acquisition of scientific thinking can 
take place), are implicated in abstract reasoning, calculation and information 
processing for planning one’s own behaviour. These capacities adaptively 
improve individuals’ goal-directed actions and behavioural performance. 
From primatology and anthropological research, we may suppose that over 
hundreds of thousands of years it was human beings’ constant need to meet 
practical challenges that represented the main selective pressure for the 
progressive evolution of these complex structures. Presumably beginning 
from the fabrication of lithic artefacts, which in the course of millennia 
went through increasingly developed symmetries and forms, higher and 
higher capacities of mental representation for conceiving implementable 
models of artefacts were selected. Other authors have extended this hypothesis 
to social needs. If we consider that the increase in primates’ brain size and 
capacity is not explicable solely by daily practical activities such as finding 
food or defence from predators, but is much more conceivable as an adaptive 
response to the increasingly complex social environments in which they 
evolved (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Dunbar 1998; Whiten 2000; Whiten and 
van Schaik 2007), it seems that the development of intelligence was a 
consequence of the extension of social groups and of the growth and 
development of new kinds of relationships among their members, apart 
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from parental or sexual bonding. New interpersonal skills were required, 
such as the necessity to create alliances and to negotiate, to scrutinise others 
or manoeuvre them, in order to give rise to increasingly complex and relatively 
stable hierarchical social structures. From the Neolithic period, our ancestors 
must have possessed roughly the same neural structures as us, which they 
used to free themselves from material and social conditioning and to manage 
social group hierarchies.
We can suppose that historical changes intervened in the expression and 
potentialities of such structures, whose most powerful enhancement came 
with the introduction of scientific method in the modern age, which we 
believe involves two types of intelligence, contrary to what is generally 
claimed. The first is a strictly academic intelligence, estimated by conventional 
psychometric measures of so-called crystallised (gC) and fluid (gF) general 
cognitive intelligence, according to the standard Cattel–Horn–Carroll (CHC) 
theory (McGrew 2005). gC describes the cognitive functioning detected by 
classic psychometric methods, such as for example IQ tests, and based on 
previously acquired knowledge available in long-term storage (e.g. semantic 
knowledge, episodic memory), while gF refers to more flexible reasoning 
capacities such as problem-solving ability, the ability to see relationships 
and analogies, to abstractly represent concepts and figures, or to combine 
letter or number series – all skills which are independent from prior experience 
and learned knowledge.
The second kind of scientific intelligence is a social intelligence, that is, 
the capability to navigate and negotiate with others, because scientific method 
is an intersubjective process that depends upon the careful inspection of 
results, as well as their approval and sharing by other members of the 
scientific community. Socially speaking, science is a liberal–democratic 
system in which scientists have freedom of thought and expression and 
share values and rules that allow rational comparison between divergent 
options in order to harmonise choices by different individuals, whose 
expectations rarely coincide. In this sense, science requires the employment 
of social capacities that depend on cognitive capacities such as mindreading 
(i.e. the capacity to attribute, explain and predict others’ mental states) and 
emotional resonance, not only strictly academic capacities, so as to protect 
and restrict the concept of freedom in order to impede possible infringements 
but also to avoid negative outcomes as chaos.
Needless to say, scientific reasoning and practice modify the brain plasti-
cally and evidently increase cognitive skills. Neuroimaging findings show 
that, even if different neural networks distributed across the entire brain 
probably contribute to intelligence, aspects of both the so-called crystallised 
intelligence and fluid intelligence, especially working memory, attention, 
complex decision-making processes and high-level behaviour planning, are 
integrated in frontal areas, which are characterised by increased connectivity 
in the brain matter, thanks to which information processing is incredibly 
enriched. Nowadays there is great interest in fluid cognitive capacities, as 
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neuroscience has still to explain why these capacities show much more 
age-related decline in comparison with crystallised ability (Deary et al. 
2010). Although it is true that research in psychology has found evidence 
that social intelligence is a relatively distinct domain from general cognitive 
intelligence, because the former involves much more emotional processes 
(Kihlstrom and Cantor 2000), there are also important overlapping systems, 
such as those devoted to problem-solving abilities, knowledge, memory, 
language or creativity, sustained by the activity of the prefrontal cortex, 
which is also presumed to function by connecting and integrating the activities 
of frontal systems for reasoning and limbic ones for emotions in a much 
more interactive brain architecture (Barbey et al. 2014). Nonetheless, as 
research into different disorders such as autism or psychopathy has shown 
(Greenspan and Love 1997; de Oliveira-Souza et al. 2016), social intelligence 
is not merely a matter of planning actions but also comprises capacities 
such as theory of mind and emotional resonance and affective response to 
others, and hence it also involves the activity of the temporal lobes and 
limbic areas. A feature of social competence is the masterly regulation 
between rational decision-making and emotional impulses. The notion of 
‘self-control’ encompasses a broad range of diverse and complex behaviour 
of the sort that this regulation produces.
In neurobiology, the capacity for self-control or self-regulation has been 
correlated to the functioning of the so-called reward system, a widely 
distributed network of brain structures (fronto-basal-ganglia circuit) (Aron 
et al. 2007), which includes the dynamic interaction between frontal and 
limbic areas that respectively underlie rational and emotional processes, 
and is regulated by the projection of neurotransmitters such as dopamine, 
norepinephrine and serotonin. Extended research (see Hassin et al. 2010) 
has shown that the development of these capacities depends on the combina-
tion of genetic dispositions and environmental triggers such as upbringing, 
education and relationships with peers. A long series of neurological and 
psychiatric pathologies (such as OCD, addiction, eating disorders or psy-
chopathy, to mention some) have been studied as self-control deficits and 
associated with failures in cognitive and social domains, while psychological 
studies have highlighted that developing self-control competence is widely 
beneficial, since it contributes to personally and socially positive outcomes 
in life such as well-being, autonomy, and career and interpersonal success 
(Tangney et al. 2004).
Something that we want to point out here is that we have reason to 
believe that the introduction of modern science was crucial to the enhance-
ment of the functioning of the prefrontal cortex, resulting not only in an 
increase in academic competence but also contributing to the enhancement 
of other abilities in the social domain, mainly the wise understanding 
and managing of the interpersonal situations and transactions required 
to achieve collectively desired goals, which is usually referred to as social 
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intelligence. These empowering effects on the capacity for self-control gener-
ated the bases for experiencing and conceptualising the modern idea of 
liberty.
Some might find the link we are making between the exercise of self-control 
and freedom bizarre, and the most common reason is that in ordinary 
thinking, self-control is wrongly identified with obedience to authority and 
social conformity, with examples coming from military or educational 
contexts where self-controlled soldiers and students are those who show 
total observance of and compliance with orders coming from higher authori-
ties. However, the proper expression of the capacity to alter or override 
dominant response tendencies – self-control, as described in neuropsychologi-
cal literature (Mischel 2014) – for example, deferring gratification and 
exercising impulse inhibition, such as resisting a delicious fattening cake 
or remaining calm in the face of one’s aggressive boss – includes the agents’ 
fundamental competence to understand and counteract the harmful effects 
of situations so as to regulate goal-directed actions, even interpersonally, 
and not to produce automatic responses, which submission and conformity 
reactions typically are. This means that, even if influenced by habit and 
automaticity, self-control capacity allows agents to adjust their behaviour 
according to their own values and chosen commitments, showing the best 
expression of wise self-government in social domains.
In this sense, we intend self-regulation to go along with willpower 
(Baumeister and Tierney 2011). Even if contemporary neuroscience has 
clarified that much of the will is expressed outside the agents’ awareness 
(Roskies 2012), this is not really something that concerns us here, since 
unconscious willpower is sufficient to self-determination, autonomy and 
critical thinking, the kind of capacities we believe that science education 
is able to enhance.
Science education and self-control enhancement  
for social improvement
The best lesson we can learn from neurocognitive theories of control concerns 
the effects of basic cognitive mechanisms of self-regulation on intrapersonal 
and societal-level goals and motivations. As we argued in the previous 
section, cognitive and social intelligence are relatively distinct but interacting 
capacities, and both are required for better academic achievements. What 
it is crucial to understand, however, is that neural mechanisms connecting 
rational decision-making and affect so as to exercise self-control and self-
regulation are those which are enhanced by science education. First, the 
learning of a way of thinking that is unnatural, in the sense that it is not 
developed spontaneously or necessarily, makes it possible to practise 
‘unnatural’, complex, social behaviours, such as those that lead to economic 
exchanges (free market) or to democracy, where decisions are made by 
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cultivating rational discussion rather than relying on emotional impulses, 
and where the personification of authority as an absolute guarantee of rules 
of social control is no longer needed. Each individual becomes capable of 
self-regulation, making reference to a law applied in an impartial way (the 
rule of law) within the context of a political system that can now become 
representative. Second, in order to coach students to succeed in research, 
complex scientific training shapes their neurocognitive processes in a way 
that makes them aware of the benefits of self-control and self-regulation, 
such as more solid and long-term rewards and gratification in their work 
and lives.
There is an empirical indicator of this social change, the so-called Flynn 
effect (from the name of the academic James Flynn), which has detected a 
surprising increase in IQ of about three points every decade in Western 
developed countries, starting from the twentieth century (Flynn 2009). 
Authors such as Stephen Pinker (2011) have brilliantly correlated this to 
sociological research showing a decrease in violent criminal behaviour, and 
to the development of liberal democracies in those countries. According to 
Michael Shermer (2015), a great part of this phenomenon is attributable 
to the spread of science education in the general population, especially to 
abstract, categorical and hypothetical reasoning along with self- and other-
mindreading, which determined the development of kinds of intelligence 
and behaviour modelled on the functioning of scientific processes.
Science goes beyond the mere formulation of hypotheses by adopting a 
criterion for the empirical testing of the control statements, which may be 
false. In this way, even though this may be unpleasant, scientists realise 
that they can always be wrong. Scientific training over time teaches us how 
to avoid the types of mental shortcuts or biases that systematically lead to 
wrong inferences and conclusions, stimulating critical and sceptical thinking 
unrestricted by external conditioning and governed by one’s own scrutiny, 
or, better, an implicit model of both honest and autonomous behaviour 
which resembles the kind conceptualised by modern liberty. The intrinsic 
social nature of science, whose actors must respond to the rigorous examina-
tion of a skilled community but possess the tools and skills to prove an 
alternative and revolutionary theory to be true – a form of social expertise 
that strategically enables scientists to achieve goals associated with the 
mission of science – is the kind of ground that allows responsible behaviour 
to flourish in societies.
Some might object that episodes of misconduct and malpractice among 
scientists seem to show that the scientific community is not always the best 
example of ethical behaviour, and it is obviously true that much work in 
this sense must be done. Nevertheless, it should be clear that committing 
acts such as data falsification, fabrication or plagiarism, as well as work-
place bullying, is a clear violation of science rules, and scientists who are 
shown to do this risk being marginalised and punished. Hence this is not 
the kind of behaviour that science promotes. Rather, identifying scientific 
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work with these bad episodes has caused very negative outcomes in the 
past, from the stigmatisation of scientists and mistrust on the part of the 
general population to wrong political choices that have favoured the growth 
of ascientific and magical thought. There are many possible solutions to 
scientific misconduct, which mostly concern the need for governmental 
reforms to improve the working conditions of scholars in contemporary 
academia around the world, since unethical behaviour is prevalently the 
result of career pressure and reputation seeking, since academics both old and 
young face an insufficiency of financial resources to conduct their research, 
an objective impediment to the expression of their scientific freedom that 
has consigned academia to one of its worst periods. Unfortunately, a more 
detailed examination of these circumstances goes beyond the purpose of 
this chapter. Nevertheless, these considerations align again with empirical 
research into self-control and autonomy, which shows that proper expressions 
of self-regulation and freedom, although emerging properly in competi-
tive contexts, are possible only in non-stressful and resource-consuming 
environments, where hard effort is rewarded accordingly (Baumeister 
et al. 1998; Gino et al. 2011; Pyone and Isen 2011).
Occasionally a certain naivety might also be present among scientists, 
resulting from the fact that many of them fulfil their duties and interpret 
their professional roles as mere ‘puzzle-solvers’ in the famous Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) sense, meaning that they conduct their research mechanically within 
accepted standards, as if solving crosswords or playing chess or completing 
jigsaws, and are very rarely dedicated to revolutionary or extraordinary 
investigations, being also often unaware of the epistemological dynamics 
of the scientific research they are involved in. This is properly the educational 
task that pertains to empirically informed human and social sciences, which 
are specifically called to sustain and complete scientific education so to 
train future generations to be aware of and disclose epistemological biases, 
and be engaged in the effort of correcting them profitably for their own 
best interests and for the interests of others.
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Evidence-based policy and the 
precautionary principle: friends or foes?1
Roberto Baldoli and Claudio M. Radaelli
A key theme in our volume is the connection, or, most pertinently perhaps, 
disconnection, between science and decision-making. In this chapter, we 
start from the experience of the European Union with two foundations of 
risk regulation: evidence-based policy and the precautionary principle. The 
two are often contrasted for reasons of political advocacy, but – we will 
argue – they can coexist, at least within the sphere of the limits of freedom 
of scientific research. Our argument that evidence-based policy and the 
precautionary principle can and should be reconciled, however, is conditional, 
not absolute. We offer a proposition for public policy in which limits to 
the freedom of scientific research are removed in the name of the precaution-
ary principle. Indeed, we argue that it is precautionary not to place limitations 
on the freedom of scientific research, because there are many possible 
adverse consequences for prosperity, innovation, welfare, health and society. 
At the same time, this lack of governmental intervention has to be balanced 
by a dialogic relationship between scientists and society. In the end our 
proposal is about a social contract: scientists obtain freedom but guarantee 
self-regulation and an active dialogue with society.
Governing risk in the European Union
In the experience of the EU, two foundations of risk regulation have emerged. 
Broadly speaking, we can call one foundation evidence-based policy and 
the other the precautionary principle. Evidence-based policy is, in principle, 
the main foundation of regulatory decision-making in the OECD countries 
and the EU. Evidence-based policy goes beyond risk regulation. Indeed, it 
is a cornerstone of the better regulation policy of the EU (European Com-
mission 2015). It is a commitment to use evidence systematically in the life 
cycle of regulations. In fact, the Commission’s regulatory policy is at least 
in principle anchored to evidence utilisation in the development of new EU 
legislation, risk analysis and ex-post legislative evaluation (European Com-
mission 2015). This commitment to evidence on the part of the European 
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institutions reflects a more general international trend. To illustrate, we 
find commitments to evidence-based policy in government guidelines for 
the development of laws and regulations, where the main policy instrument 
supporting public choice is regulatory impact assessment (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2016).
Let us look at impact assessment because it provides a good example of 
how commitments to evidence-based policy operate at the level of decision-
making. The thrust of impact assessment is to bring evidence to bear on 
regulatory choice: in taking a regulatory decision, for example whether to 
ban certain experiments with stem cells or the diffusion of genetically 
modified organisms, policymakers have to explain the reasons behind their 
choice, consult a wide range of stakeholders and – most relevant for our 
discussion – carry out an empirical analysis of the likely effects in terms 
of costs and benefits.
Thus, impact assessment has a core objective of identifying and possibly 
quantifying the likely effects of a proposed rule – imagine, for example, a 
regulatory proposal to set limitations to medical research or scientific 
experimentation. Typically, impact assessment revolves around the economic 
effects – costs and benefits – for different categories of stakeholders. But 
it can also look at intergenerational dynamics, the overall macroeconomic 
effects, the benefits and costs in terms of trade in open economies, CO2 
impact, demographic implications, income distribution and jobs. However, 
impact assessment embraces the evidence-based approach in a broader sense, 
comprising the obligation to state the reasoning behind regulatory intervention 
and to consult widely. In a nutshell, impact assessment and more generally 
evidence-based approaches to decision-making establish both rights and 
obligations: obligations for the regulators or lawmakers, and rights for 
those affected groups, professions and citizens who want to make their 
voices heard, and have the right to know about the empirical foundations 
of a regulatory proposal. The normative stance (i.e. what ought to happen, 
not necessarily what happens) of impact assessment is the following: in the 
absence of evidence and the possibility of discussing and criticising it, there 
is no social authorisation for regulation. Governments and institutions such 
as the European Commission cannot regulate unless they explain and 
illustrate empirically the reasons supporting regulation and allow for public 
comment. This normative stance is reflected in administrative procedure 
acts across the world, and therefore it governs administrative–regulatory 
interventions beyond the domain of impact assessment. As explained earlier, 
it is a manifestation of evidence-based policy as a foundation for public 
choice.
Let us now explore another aspect of this foundation. Regulations allow 
or prohibit certain types of behaviour. Some regulations restrict freedom of 
scientific research, often in the name of the environment, public health or 
ethical–religious principles. The evidence-based foundation for policy has a 
problem with these restrictions. Indeed, if we think from an evidence-based 
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policy point of view, we should reason that regulators and policymakers 
have general duties – to protect the environment and public health, for 
example – but they need to be authorised via evidence-based tools each 
time they propose specific regulatory interventions.
Thus, there is something else (i.e. not evidence-based) that informs regula-
tory decisions. Here we come to another foundation of risk regulation: the 
precautionary principle. The conventional narrative, indeed, has pitched 
this principle against evidence-based policy. Before we critically consider 
this juxtaposition, we will clarify what the precautionary principle involves. 
In the context of the EU, the precautionary principle is enshrined (yet not 
defined) in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union of 2013 (TFEU). This article refers to the environment. It states that
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking 
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It 
shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.
In 2000 the European Commission published guidelines on how to use 
the precautionary principle in a variety of policy domains. The precautionary 
principle ‘applies where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or 
uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on 
the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with 
the high level of protection chosen by the EU’ (European Commission 
2000). In order to decide which kind of measure to take, there are some 
requirements. Indeed, any precautionary measure should be proportional, 
non-discriminatory, consistent with comparable measures already in place, 
be anchored to an examination of the benefits and costs of action and 
inaction, be subject to review and capable of assigning responsibility for 
producing the scientific evidence for a more comprehensive risk assessment 
(European Commission 2000: 3).
The precautionary principle should not be confused with prevention, 
where science ‘can reliably assess and quantify risks’ (COMEST 2005: 7), 
or pessimism, which is an inclination towards certain beliefs (Sandin 2004). 
We are dealing with risk management. The starting point is scientific 
uncertainty, which may be the consequence of either the need for further 
evidence (in certain cases total ignorance), or of the fact that we are dealing 
with trans-scientific issues, which are framed in the language of science 
but cannot be answered (at this moment in time or perhaps forever) by 
science (Weinberg 1972; Majone 2010). Although the definition of the 
principle is legal, it is political considerations that determine how and when 
constellations of actors invoke it (Tosun 2013).
Originally limited to environmental policies, the principle has been 
expanded by courts to public health and safety. There are traces of 
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precautionary approaches in financial regulation too (Tosun 2013). In terms 
of regulatory philosophy, it is a foundational principle for the EU, like 
evidence-based policy. Given our word budget, we cannot rehearse the story 
of the principle, its possible interpretations (Gollier and Treich 2003) and 
its controversial applications to EU regulation (see Alemanno 2007: esp. 
chs II and III). We can, however, emphasise two points. First, as explained 
by Jale Tosun (2013), political considerations determine how the precautionary 
principle is invoked and triggered. A corollary of this political precautionary 
advocacy is the lack of transparency on how the interaction between precau-
tion and evidence-based considerations is moulded in decision-making. We 
insist that the point is about the use of the principle, not something inherently 
political/opaque/anti-empirical in the principle itself. And in fact – our 
second point – the 2000 Communication of the European Commission (as 
well as regulation 178/2002 art. 6 on the European Food Safety Authority) 
anchors the principle to a set of requirements that are compatible with 
evidence-based policy – so much so that the Communication allows the 
EU regulators to trigger precaution only if the decision is based, among 
other things, on proportionality and benefit–cost considerations regarding 
intervention and inaction, and is subject to review in light of new scientific 
evidence. At least in legal and conceptual terms (if not in its usage), the 
precautionary principle is not incompatible with the other foundational 
principle of evidence-based decisions (Alemanno 2007). Unfortunately, we 
do not have sufficient case law regarding whether the conditions for triggering 
the precautionary principle have been met by the European Commission 
or EFSA (Alemanno 2007) – the European courts have been reluctant to 
provide a clear answer on this point.
A proposition for precaution to limit regulatory interventions,  
not to support them
As mentioned, it is political advocacy (not robust conceptual analysis) that 
has pitched the two foundations against one other: regulators either proceed 
on the basis of evidence or they invoke the precautionary principle. In 
Europe, we have seen this battle of principles being fought in many domains 
(European Risk Forum 2011; Garnett and Parsons 2016), from BSE (Mona-
ghan et al. 2012: 181) to milk aids for cows, from regulation of medicines 
to chemicals (European Risk Forum 2016).
One of the best-known case concerns genetically modified food. Since 
the 1990s the European public has rejected GMOs, and authorities have 
implemented stringent regulations, ‘sometimes citing vaguely’ the precaution-
ary principle without the support of strict scientific evidence. More complex 
social, ethical, cultural and economic factors were at stake (Wiener et al. 
2011: 50). Recently, the use of bisphenol-A has been restricted, even though 
EFSA concluded that the evidence is too limited to draw any conclusions 
for human health. Another example is glyphosate. The European licence 
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for the use of this substance has not been renewed yet (only extended for 
eighteen months), despite the findings of high-quality scientific assessments 
carried out by EFSA (European Risk Forum 2016: 34). Indeed, the European 
agency ruled that glyphosate is non-carcinogenic, drawing heavy criticism 
for its lack of data transparency and for being in contradiction of the IARC 
judgement that glyphosate is ‘probably carcinogenic’.
So, are we predestined to follow one foundation of regulatory choice or 
the other? Not necessarily. First consider this: logically, there should be at 
least a minimum of empirical evidence to lead to the conclusion that ‘we 
do not know enough’ and opt for precaution. This is why in 2000 the 
Commission set evidence-based requirements for the use of the precautionary 
principle in decision-making. Second, consider the jurisprudence of the 
World Trade Organization: regulators cannot simply go for unqualified 
precaution, otherwise the use of the precautionary principle becomes 
equivalent to protectionism in disguise (Majone 2000). Third, at least in 
the EU, the principle is formally endorsed. It cannot be disposed of lightly. 
It has to be used with the other foundational principle of evidence-based 
policy, which is equally endorsed in all the strategic documents on regulation 
of the institutions of the EU. If the two are incompatible, we should conclude 
that the regulatory foundations of EU public policy contain two contradictory 
principles. Instead, as explained by Alemanno (2011), the two souls of EU 
risk regulation ought to improve their coexistence. Alemanno (2011) talks 
about humanising some features of risk analysis and asks for more transpar-
ency regarding how the two foundations come to play together in decision-
making. This chimes with the debate on the other side of the Atlantic, 
where the Obama administration issued guidance on humanising cost–benefit 
analysis (Sunstein 2011).
But how exactly can the two foundations come together? We do not have 
a general answer to this question. But we suggest a solution in the special 
case where the core issue is freedom of scientific research. In this domain, 
we argue that the principle of precaution should survive, but (and this is 
the point) inside, not outside the empirical basis of decision-making. We 
therefore propose the following:
Given that there is irreducible uncertainty in terms of technological risks and 
the economic and ethical issues caused by regulations that prohibit medical 
and scientific research, it is precautionary not to prohibit any scientific research 
unless there is empirical evidence showing that the costs and damage to people 
and environment outweigh the benefits of freedom of research.
This proposition takes an angle for the precautionary principle that has 
not been explored so far. The principle is typically used to regulate and 
ban, while we draw attention to domains where precaution suggests non-
intervention. These domains are those where the key regulatory question 
is scientific research (as opposed to more applied stages such as innovation 
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and the development of technology). To illustrate, we might think of 
regulations that prohibit research on assisted reproduction or on human 
embryos.
We hasten to add that our proposition is not unconditional. It is qualified 
by its own feasibility conditions. The first condition is that there has to be 
a certain maturity and institutionalisation of evidence-based practice in a 
given country or jurisdiction. Indeed, when we say ‘unless there is empirical 
evidence’, we mean that our argument is valid only if there is diffuse capacity 
to undertake empirical analysis. Evidence shows that the capacity for impact 
assessment, consultation and cost–benefit analysis differs widely across 
countries (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016).
The second condition is the social background that undergirds our formula-
tion of the precautionary principle. Practically, we are thinking of a situation 
where science and society meet upstream, with several opportunities and 
instruments for public engagement at an early stage (Wilsdon and Willis 
2004). The marriage of evidence-based policy and the precautionary principle 
does not materialise in a social vacuum. On the one hand, we need social 
trust. On the other, we need scientific responsibility on the part of the 
communities of science.
Social trust in science cannot be taken for granted. It has to be constantly 
produced and reproduced with appropriate forms of public engagement. 
Think of questions such as: what are the boundaries between basic and 
applied research? When does a scientific research project become a dangerous 
military application? How do we share the basic values of a certain develop-
ment of medical research? In the past, governments have tried to ‘educate 
the public’ about science. This is the so-called deficit model (Ziman 1991; 
Sturgis and Allum 2004) in which the lack of trust in science is attributed 
to ignorance. Educate the masses, fill in their deficit of knowledge and there 
will be more trust in science. Today we know that scientific education, 
teaching statistics to journalists and other approaches have a very valuable 
role to play. But the reasons behind lack of trust are much deeper than 
ignorance.
At the same time, the solution cannot be limited to deontological codes. 
Our societies, and the EU especially, need a wider reconciliation between 
citizens and scientists. Let us consider all the dimensions of our equation. 
The government does not ban or limit scientific research unless there is 
compelling evidence of serious risk of harm to people and or the environment 
– this is the formulation of our principle. The scientists offer responsibility 
and engagement with society. Science becomes socially accountable, but 
not via governmental intrusion, regulations and, in the worst cases, faith-
based obligations and prohibitions. All this amounts to a new role for the 
scientific community in society. This is possible if we identify a strong 
paradigm that generates self-regulation of scientists, accountability and 
dialogic attitudes.
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Conclusion
This chapter offers a new definition of the precautionary principle, which 
goes hand in hand with the evidence-based policy in fostering freedom of 
research. We have argued that the precautionary principle should recommend 
non-intervention in scientific research, unless there is clear evidence showing 
that costs and damage outweigh benefits.
The challenge for the effective implementation of such a principle is first 
to create mature and institutionalised evidence-based practices. Yet this is 
not enough. Our version of the precautionary principle is effective only in 
a social environment characterised by social trust and scientific responsibility. 
How to build up this new ‘social contract’ between citizens, individual 
scientists, the scientific communities and the policymakers is the key issue 
for future research and public policy.
Note
1 We wish to thank Marco Cappato, Filomena Gallo and the Luca Coscioni 
Association for having invited Claudio Radaelli to present the initial draft of 
this chapter to the World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research in Rome, 
4–6 April 2014. We gratefully acknowledge the comments on the first draft 
provided by Alberto Alemanno, Lorenzo Allio, Claire Dunlop and Simona 
Giordano – the responsibility for mistakes and omissions remains ours.
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Let freedom ring for science:  
an American perspective
Mary Woolley
Dr Martin Luther King’s immortal phrase ‘let freedom ring’ is as thrilling 
today as it was when he first uttered it in 1963. Now, nearly half a century 
since the 1968 assassination of one of the most revered civil rights and 
moral leaders of our time, we celebrate Dr King’s words as a touchstone 
and inspiration. With the famous march on Washington in 1963, Dr King 
attempted something extraordinary and the impact was enormous, driving 
social change and making an enduring difference in our society. Indeed, 
his successful strategy for achieving civil rights inspired millions of people 
worldwide, including patient advocates for research who also dreamed of 
changing the world. Since the time of Dr King, in the US and in many 
parts of the world, there have been many high-profile patient marches – and 
walks, runs and bicycle rides – organised to call attention and say ‘enough’. 
People march in protest about ignoring or stigmatising HIV/AIDS; they 
march and rally to end breast cancer, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, mental illness 
and many other diseases we don’t have answers for yet, diseases for which 
research would give us answers, were it well supported.
The US political system responds to public protest, including protests 
expressed through marches, although it often takes a long time for a response 
to crystallise. I believe that if scientists, who are well respected by the 
public, joined patients in marching for research – both literally and through 
other means of stepping into the public arena – they would have great 
impact on political leaders. Unfortunately, scientists are rarely interested 
in doing so. It is not part of the culture of science to be active in engaging 
the non-science trained public. Not yet. But we are not going to have more 
science and more freedom of science, or more freedom of scientific enquiry, 
until the science community itself becomes more visible and engaged with 
the public and elected officials.
Based just outside Washington DC, Research!America is an alliance 
working to make the case for science. One example of our work is an 
advertising campaign intended to get the attention of the public, media and 
policymakers. The advertisement, which shows a warning label on a 
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prescription medication container, says quite boldly: ‘Washington politics 
just might kill you’. The advert generated a great deal of attention, allowing 
us to drive home the message that the inaction that characterises Congress 
then and now is not working to allow scientists to find the solutions to 
what ails us. Research!America works through social media as well. Social 
media is a very active, influential environment in which people learn and 
exchange information – good and bad information; accurate and inaccurate. 
Research!America is engaged in trying to make sure that people know 
where to get accurate information. In fact, we are working in every kind 
of media to make the case for research – truly the best promise of better 
health and well-being in the future for all of us. Unfortunately, that promise 
is too much at risk right now.
Science of all kinds is at risk in the US today. There have been cuts to 
federal government science funding for well over a decade. A breath of 
fresh air was provided in 2018 with increased funding for medical research, 
but the damage done by years of cuts has not been overcome. And there 
are problems beyond money. A number of elected officials threaten to shut 
down various kinds of science, including embryonic stem cell research and 
the social, behavioural and economic sciences. The tendency to either ignore 
or demonise science is made easier when the science community remains 
essentially invisible to political actors and the public. Largely because of 
this invisibility, US politicians rarely talk about science. Unlike in many 
other countries, and unlike in the US in the past, few elected officials in 
the US today have training in science. This can make them reluctant to 
talk about science. They are concerned that they might be asked a question 
they cannot answer. It is also a fact that they don’t hear from many voters 
– their constituents – that research is important, and in general they are 
not being pressed for action. Complicating the situation is that, like many 
Americans, politicians often take scientific progress for granted. Because 
we have all seen a lot of scientific progress in our lifetimes, it is all too 
easy to overlook what it takes to assure that progress continues. But the 
problem is broader still.
In the US today, vocal groups are opposed to the government’s role in 
science. In addition, there are many people, including elected members of 
Congress, who believe that we cannot afford to spend any more money on 
science. They say that the nation just does not have the money. Well, that 
is simply not true! There is a lot of money in the US; it is a matter of setting 
priorities as to how we choose to spend that money. For example, in 2017 
pet owners in the US spent $70 billion on their pets (APPA 2017). Pets are 
wonderful, but the problem is that people don’t see that with just a little 
more money devoted to science, not only they, but also their pets might 
have healthier lives. The $70 billion sum is about twice the budget of the 
entire National Institutes of Health (NIH). Of course, we don’t advocate 
taking money spent on pets to put towards medical research. But using 
examples like this illustrates the point that money, per se, is not the problem 
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we sometimes tell ourselves it is. We engage in false economies when we 
as a nation choose not to invest robustly in research. We are spending 
money on treating diseases such as Alzheimer’s and many more, and at the 
same time we are starving research into those very diseases. One of the 
founders of Research!America, the philanthropist Mary Lasker said, ‘If 
you think research is expensive, try disease.’ She is right. What are we 
thinking? Why don’t we spend more to prevent, eliminate or at least 
ameliorate disease and disability, rather than continuing to suffer physical, 
emotional and economic pain?
Research!America has one mission: to make research to improve health 
a high priority in the US. (We have four similar sister organisations in 
Sweden, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and work with other like-
minded organisations worldwide.) Founded in 1989, we are a not-for-profit 
alliance representing over 125 million Americans through their various 
organisations, universities, industry, patient groups and scientific societies. 
We are led by a magnificent volunteer board of well-respected individuals, 
many of whom have served in public office, as members of Congress and 
as leaders of federal agencies such as the NIH, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration. Our goals 
are to achieve more funding – we talk about money all the time! – and to 
ensure a positive, empowering policy environment that does not impede 
research in either the academic or the private sector. We make the case for 
public–private partnerships. We work to make sure that the public hears 
about research directly and via the media, and we also work to empower 
members of the science community to become effective spokespersons for 
research. Research!America’s Chair Emeritus, a former member of Congress, 
the Honourable John Edward Porter, speaks often to members of the science 
community saying: ‘You can change the image of things to come but you 
cannot do it sitting on your hands, you have to reach out to the Congress 
and build bridges.’
Scientists are often surprised to learn that most Americans cannot name 
a living scientist. In fact, 84 per cent say that they cannot name a scientist 
(Research!America, 2018). This shocking percentage is why I say that 
scientists are invisible in the US. Also troubling is that most Americans 
don’t know where research is conducted: 66 per cent cannot give the name 
of a place where science is conducted (Research!America, 2018). President 
Abraham Lincoln, who established the US National Academy of Science 
in 1863, pointed out that ‘public sentiment is everything. With public senti-
ment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed’. We must take it 
to heart that earning and maintaining public sentiment – if you will, public 
trust – is essential. We can understand and track public sentiment via public 
opinion surveys. We know, for example, that the public supports basic 
research funded by the government; we know that the public supports 
STEM education – that is, science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
– and we know that the public believes that the government should make 
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both science and STEM education a priority. However, some of the news 
we learn from commissioned surveys is not so good. People are split on 
their point of view as to whether the government should play a role in 
behavioural research; questions are raised as to whether the government 
should be involved in funding research to find answers to problems that 
involve personal choices, even when public safety and population health 
are at stake. If scientists were more visible and outspoken about the value 
of behavioural research, the public would be more inclined to listen. Public 
views do change, as they have about embryonic stem cell research. The 
public is now more likely to be positive than negative about this science, 
but it took a lot of work by many organisations and inspired individuals, 
including Bernard Siegel, to reverse what was once negative public opinion. 
It takes many people of conviction working together to speak out to influence 
public opinion, and with it policy and resource decisions. We should feel 
optimistic since history shows that advocacy works.
Importantly, we also know from surveys that the public say they are not 
well informed regarding what their elected representatives are doing and 
saying about medical and health research. In the 2016 U.S. elections, only 
14 per cent of the public in fact said that they were very well informed of 
the positions of the candidates for president of the US regarding public 
policies and public funding for science and innovation, which is why we 
developed a programme that is used every election year to persuade those 
running for office to declare their views on research for health and science 
overall (Research!America 2016). We reach out to potential voters via social 
media and advertising to urge them to become informed (we don’t take 
sides or back particular candidates). And we reach out to candidates to ask 
them to specify what their positions are regarding research. Our goal is to 
reach the point where anyone considering running for political office knows 
that she or he must articulate a position on medical research and science 
broadly, if they expect to be a successful candidate.
As our Chair Emeritus John Edward-Porter says, ‘Wouldn’t it be wonderful 
if all candidates had science advisers and advisory committees?’ They would, 
if individual scientists step up and volunteer to be advisers to a candidate 
or an elective official. Physicist Dr John Holdren, who served as President 
Obama’s scientific adviser, frequently remarks: ‘Everybody in the science 
and technology community who cares about the future of the world should 
be tithing 10 per cent of his or her time to interacting with the public in 
the policy process . . . if all us just got out to the public more and talked 
to policymakers more, we would get more of this done.’ What a difference 
that would make!
To again quote Dr Martin Luther King: ‘Our lives begin to end the day 
we become silent about things that matter.’ Science matters. It’s time for 
scientists to overcome their reluctance to engage the non-science-trained 
public, addressing questions and talking about how they are serving the 
public’s interest; describing how and why science matters to our society.
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Conclusion
Simona Giordano
This volume is the result of a long-standing international collaboration 
which takes the name of the World Congress for Freedom of Scientific 
Research (www.freedomofresearch.org). After the Third Meeting, held in 
Rome in April 2014, some of the presenters united in the preparation of 
this collection. Others interested in science and its regulation joined up 
along the way. The World Congress has overall brought together hundreds 
of people, including academics, policymakers, jurists, scientists and disability-
right activists from all over Europe, the US, India, Iran and many other 
countries.
I will keep this conclusion brief, because what the authors have written 
already provides a great deal of food for thought. But I would like to offer 
a brief history of the World Congress, and to report some of the achievements 
obtained through this common international forum. The World Congress 
for Freedom of Scientific Research is a permanent forum of activities to 
promote freedom of scientific research worldwide; it was founded in Rome 
in 2004 by professor of economics Luca Coscioni. Professor Coscioni was 
diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Within five years he was 
confined to a wheelchair, and founded, together with the main leaders of 
the Radical Party (Emma Bonino and Marco Pannella) a not-for-profit 
organisation that took his name: the Luca Coscioni Association. The World 
Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research was created to provide an 
arena for multidisciplinary and transnational discussion of scientific research, 
freedom and regulation, not attached to any specific political party. The 
First World Congress was held in Rome in 2006. At that time, Professor 
Coscioni was president of the Association, and was already severely ill. 
Sadly, he in fact died on the last day of the Congress. In a video message 
to the audience, Professor Coscioni said:
The first meeting of the World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research 
comes at a particularly difficult time in my life . . . Amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis does not limit intellectual skills, it makes you fully aware of feelings 
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of despair and fear of lifetime. A time which is violently becoming narrower 
and which forces me to address the urgency of the price that millions of people 
around the world are paying and will have to pay to a culture of power, a 
culture of class . . . imbued with anti-scientific dogmas and prejudices, which 
exclude scientific knowledge and which exclude individual freedom to benefit 
from knowledge. Stakes are too high to let time pass, more time pass . . . To 
the violence of this cynical prohibition on scientific research and on the 
fundamental rights of citizens, I have responded with my body, which maybe 
many would have liked to see just as a hopeless prison, and today I respond 
with my thirst for air – because I am truly breathless – which is my thirst for 
truth, my thirst for freedom.
As Marco Cappato and I noted in the conclusion of our first volume 
on scientific freedom (Giordano et al. 2012), this message reminded us 
all that when we speak about scientific freedom we are not discussing an 
abstract idea: we are talking about real people, who have real lives and 
suffer real vulnerabilities and illnesses. I wish to add now that, as human 
life has extended so significantly in the last few decades, and as it is even 
clearer today than it was in 2006 that the process is not going to reverse or 
stop, it is imperative to remind ourselves that hope for treatment for many 
degenerative diseases (some of which are likely to come with longevity) bears 
upon scientific research, including stem cell research. The personal and social 
implications of scientific freedom and proper regulation is inestimable, as 
incalculable are the losses resulting from regulation that hinders or prohibits 
scientific progress unjustly, that bows to a culture not just of obscurantism, 
but even more worryingly of misinformation and conspiracy.
The first meeting of World Congresses for Freedom of Scientific Research 
was held in Rome, at the Campidoglio, the second at the European Parliament 
in Brussels, and the third again at the Campidoglio. The symbolic importance 
of this particular location needs to be stressed: the Campidoglio is in the 
very heart of Rome and very close to the Vatican. The square was designed 
and realised by Michelangelo Buonarroti, and the Campidoglio has been 
chosen as one of the symbols represented on Europe’s coin, the euro. There 
is an interesting anecdote about this place. Before Christianity, the Cam-
pidoglio was the place where the pagans venerated the goddess Juno. Next 
to the goddess’s temple were the ‘sacred geese’. Around 390 bc Rome was 
besieged by the Gauls. It is said that on the night when the Gauls arrived, 
the sacred geese began to squawk so loudly that the consul woke up and 
alerted the city. According to the legend, it was Juno who woke up the 
geese – and after that Juno was also called Moneta, which in Latin means 
‘to warn, to caution’ (monere). Incidentally, over one century later the mint 
was built near the temple, and the goddess Moneta was meant to protect 
the valuables. From this fusion of mythology and history the word moneta 
began to indicate currency – and hence money in English, monnaie in 
French, moneda in Spanish, moeda in Portuguese, moneta in Italian.
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Perhaps now more than ever, particularly during the period of the separa-
tion of the United Kingdom from the European Union, with all this may 
imply for science (scientists’ mobility, research funding, and so on) it is 
important to remember the significance of international collaboration – and 
therefore of forums of these kinds. Science is not just a human activity, 
but, arguably, a human right. As such science is described and defended in 
a number of international documents, declarations and covenants. The 
human right to science is enshrined in Article 27 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;1 in Article 15 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;2 in Article 13 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;3 in Article XIII of 
the American Declaration of Human Rights;4 in Article 14 of the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ‘Protocol of San Salvador’;5 in 
Article 22 of the Charter of the African Union; in Part I of the Arab Charter 
of Human Rights; and in Article 32 of the Human Rights Declaration of 
the Association of Southeast Asia Nations.6
Specifically, Article 15 of the ICESCR sets forth:
1. the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts 
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields. (www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx)
This also means that citizens, all of us, are entitled to report specific violations 
of human rights, including those relating to science and the enjoyment of 
its benefits. The recognition of a human right is therefore also a call for 
mobilisation; it involves the acknowledgement of our responsibilities to 
check and strengthen the enjoyment of this right across the world.
It is obvious, and it will be obvious to the reader, that any area of scientific 
research needs to be regulated: clinical trials, the use of non-human animals 
in research, research on artificial intelligence and reproduction and so on 
are all regulated. Both financial constraints and regulations pose clear and 
inevitable limits to the freedom to perform scientific research. Knowledge 
transfer should be also regulated (as Rhodes persuasively argues in Chapter 
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6, this volume) because it is not always unproblematic. Freedom, thus, does 
not mean absence of regulation and lack of accountability. A serious ethical 
analysis of the various options, the advantages and disadvantages of various 
alternatives, the long-term consequences of scientific developments and 
innovations for future generations as well as for those living in other parts 
of the world, all needs to be part of dialogue on the regulation of research. 
This volume represents a contribution to this continued analysis. Although 
it is a small contribution, and certainly limited, I would like to stress the 
importance that enterprises such as these may bring to fruition by mentioning 
some of the achievements obtained through this forum.
The World Congress, together with fifty Nobel laureates who agreed to 
support the call, solicited the European Union to fund research involving 
embryonic stem cells. The 7th Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development was subsequently approved, which lifted the 
ban on the funding on embryonic stem cells, and thus now allows the 
funding of projects involving adult, induced pluripotent stem cells and 
embryonic stem cells, under special regulations and in accordance with 
national legislation. The World Congress also participated in action and 
consultation aimed at ensuring that this would continue in the 8th Framework 
Programme, now called Horizon 2020.
Another important achievement involved Costa Rica. In 2012 a hearing 
was held at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concerning Costa 
Rican law which prohibited in vitro fertilisation. Two doctors from Costa 
Rica participated in one of the national meetings of the World Congress. 
The World Congress deposited a third-party judgment (amicus curiae) in 
defence of people’s reproductive rights, highlighting the discriminatory 
nature of the law in question and its incompatibility with the fundamental 
human right to found a family.7 Also as a result of the third-party intervention 
submitted by the World Congress, the courts condemned Costa Rica’s 
legislation, which was consequently abrogated.
The World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research has also presented 
or supported various petitions to the European Parliament, on euthanasia, 
HIV and reproductive and sexual health. The World Congress took an 
active role in the case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy. This case concerned a 
man and a woman in a relationship, both carriers of the gene for cystic 
fibrosis, who were denied access to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis under 
the Italian Law 40 on assisted fertilisation.8 The World Congress submitted 
an amicus curiae with various patients’ coalitions and sixty MPs. On 28 
August 2012 the European Court of Human Rights condemned Italy for 
violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
The World Congress has, between 2016 and 2017, repeatedly denounced 
to the United Nations the repressive policies adopted in the Philippines by 
Rodrigo Duterte, under the guise of the ‘war on drugs’. As may be known, 
the anti-drug hard line taken by Duterte hits the poorest sections of society, 
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and has resulted in the killing of over 8,000 people. Representatives of the 
World Congress participated and presented evidence at the 60th session of 
the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs held in Vienna in March 2017, 
also in support of the vice-president of the Philippines, Maria Leonor Giorna 
Robredo, who has repeatedly intervened to denounce the massacre operated 
by Duterte in the name of the war on drugs.
These actions and achievements are important, as they illustrate the value 
of coordinated work between democratic states for the active consolidation 
of human, civil and political rights worldwide. Moreover, they also illustrate 
that the activation of international jurisdictions can guarantee supranational 
protection of democratic rights. Forums such as the World Congress ensure 
that debates do not remain confined to the ‘ivory tower’ of ‘armchair academ-
ics’, or within specific disciplines, or within specific ideological alliances, 
but can result in practical and political initiatives that remain sensitive to 
cultural identities.
The main message that this volume wants to convey is that science, 
research, development and the protection of the human, civil and political 
rights of many of us depend on the cooperation of many: scientists and 
policymakers of course, but also academics and lay citizens. Scientific 
development also depends on continued dialogue with all political parties; 
it involves popular action at national and international levels, consultations, 
knowledge transfer and, it is important to stress, non-violent action. Strong 
ideological opposition in delicate areas such as embryo research, narcotic 
drug use, women’s health (fertility treatments of various kinds) has fomented, 
as is sadly well known, episodes of serious violence. This book stresses the 
importance of dialogue and non-violent mobilisation.
This volume is perhaps only a small contribution to the international 
debate on freedom of scientific research, and there are many areas of science 
that we have not considered – and many ideas about regulation that we 
have not explored. But we hope that it will provide a method of cultural 
exchange, give some interesting perspectives and stimulate further debates 
on issues relating to science, freedom of research and individual rights and 
responsibilities.
Notes
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